STIPULATION AND ORDER REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

ANTHONY W. ISHII, Senior District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for jury trial on February 24, 2015.

2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the trial confirmation to August 10, 2015, at 10:00 a.m. and the jury trial to August 25, 2015 at 8:30 a.m. in Courtroom 2 before Senior District Judge Anthony W. Ishii and to exclude time between February 24, 2014, and August 25, 2015.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government and the defense are actively engaged in plea negotiations, and hope to be able to resolve this matter.

b. Defendant Aruna Chopra surrendered on an arrest warrant on December 1, 2014, posted bail, and is set for arraignment and plea on January 2, 2015 in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Stanislaus on felony offenses that the government has indicated it intends to introduce into evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b). To date, the defendant has not received discovery regarding that matter, and does not anticipate receiving that discovery until sometime in January 2015. The defense needs sufficient time to be able to review and investigate the discovery, in order to present arguments regarding the admissibility of such evidence in this matter.

c. The defendant, Aruna Chopra, suffers from a number of debilitating medical conditions. She underwent left knee replacement surgery on August 25, 2014. The defendant's recovery has been extremely slow. She still has not recovered from that surgery. Also, she is scheduled to undergo right knee replacement surgery on or before January 25, 2015. Because of her medical condition, and residual pain, and the effect and side effects of the pain medications she's been prescribed, she has not been fully capable of assisting counsel in the preparation of her defense.

d. The defense has been diligent in the investigation and preparation of this matter, but needs additional time to become adequately prepared for trial.

e. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

f. The government does not object to the continuance.

g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

h. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., within which the trial must commence, the time period of February 24, 2015 to August 25, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

i. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.