Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change

U.S. v. Martinez, CR-S-15-140 MCE. (2017)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20170801842 Visitors: 11
Filed: Jul. 28, 2017
Latest Update: Jul. 28, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Paul A. Hemesath, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Jamie Ramon Fuentes Martinez, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Miguel Mejia Servin, Clemente M. Jimenez, Esq., counsel for defendant Jessica Corro, Todd D. Leras, Esq., and counsel for defendant Gladys Mondragon,
More

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Paul A. Hemesath, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Jamie Ramon Fuentes Martinez, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Miguel Mejia Servin, Clemente M. Jimenez, Esq., counsel for defendant Jessica Corro, Todd D. Leras, Esq., and counsel for defendant Gladys Mondragon, Tasha Chalfant, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on July 27, 2017.

2. By this stipulation all defendants now move to continue the status conference until September 14, 2017 and to exclude time between July 27, 2017 and September 14, 2017 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:

a. Currently, the government has provided approximately 150 pages of reports, 976 audio files, 204 pages of transcripts, 13,493 Google Earth files, and hundreds of pages of call logs. b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, interview potential witnesses, and discuss possible resolutions. Additionally, counsel for Ms. Mondragon, Ms. Chalfant, was only recently appointed in this matter (May 9, 2017). c. Counsel for the defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d. The government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of July 27, 2017, to September 14, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A)) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. 4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer