PERREN, J.
Appellant Anton Hoffman owns a parcel of real property that is subject to several easements favoring dominant tenements owned by respondents Edith Lorraine Zuiderweg and Lorraine Janet Andrews. Included in the easements are a water well and access roads to service it. Over time Hoffman interferes with these easements, obstructs and impairs service from the well and otherwise interferes with Zuiderweg and Andrews' enjoyment of their respective parcels. Following one of the many confrontations between them, Hoffman sues Zuiderweg and Andrews accusing them of a variety of acts against the easements and his use of his land. They cross-complain. The cause is tried to a jury which returns verdicts in favor of Zuiderweg and Andrews and which denies all of Hoffman's claims.
Hoffman appeals from the portion of the $390,250 judgment which reflects $50,000 judgments in favor of each cross-complainant for conversion. He also appeals the trial court's order awarding Zuiderweg $210,697.50 in attorney fees. We affirm.
Hoffman purchased property in San Luis Obispo County in 1991. Zuiderweg and Andrews own separate parcels next to Hoffman's property. At the time of purchase, Hoffman's property was subject to several easements owned by Zuiderweg and Andrews. They own a joint easement for ingress and egress over Hoffman's property to parcels used for a pasture. Zuiderweg owns four additional easements through Hoffman's property: (1) An easement for ingress and egress to a barn on a parcel adjacent to Hoffman's property, (2) a city water line easement to the barn and pasture, (3) a well site easement, and (4) a waterline easement from the well to Zuiderweg's home. The well easement was the subject of litigation between Zuiderweg and the prior owner of Hoffman's property. The litigation resulted in a stipulated judgment for a permanent injunction in 1989 prohibiting Hoffman's predecessor, Benjamin Roxton, from interfering with Zuiderweg's use of the well.
In 2005, following many years of confrontations between the parties, Hoffman filed a complaint against Zuiderweg and Andrews for conversion, trespass to chattels and real property, nuisance and invasion of privacy. Hoffman claimed that Zuiderweg and Andrews removed and destroyed improvements on his property, trespassed on his land, created a nuisance by speeding on the road easements and blocking them with parked vehicles, exceeded the permissible use of the waterline easements, and violated his right to privacy by placing security cameras near the well site.
Zuiderweg and Andrews filed a cross-complaint against Hoffman, alleging intentional interference with easement, intentional nuisance, intentional trespass, intentional conversion, intentional breach of contract and quiet title to easement by prescription. The cross-complaint alleged that Hoffman interfered with their easements by placing wires across them, pulling up surveyor's stakes, illegally installing a septic system over or near their water lines, cutting fences, leaving gates open, making false reports to code enforcement and fish and game authorities, and obstructing access to their road easement with parked vehicles. They also alleged Hoffman tapped into their water lines, placed trash and other debris in the access road easement, and built various improvements that partially obstructed and interfered with their use of the easements. In addition, the cross-complaint alleged that Hoffman converted respondents' personal property by cutting cattle fences and cattle blocks, damaging a gate, stealing water, and taking down no-trespassing signs. The cause of action for breach of contract was based on the stipulated judgment and alleged that Hoffman breached the judgment by "obstructing the access road easements to the well site and barn, by adding back fill, excavating the finished road grade, and installing a retaining wall within the access road and the well site" and failing to remove the obstructions when requested to do so.
A jury trial resulted in a verdict against Hoffman on all issues. The jury awarded Zuiderweg and Andrews a combined total of $390,250 in compensatory and punitive damages on their cross-complaint. The trial court subsequently ruled against Hoffman on the equitable issues.
Hoffman moved for a new trial on the ground that the damages were excessive and insufficient evidence supported the verdict. The trial court denied the motion, finding that "it was not the amount of the physical damages, but it was the course of conduct of the plaintiff that traumatized the cross-complainants," and "the whole course of conduct more than justified the award."
Zuiderweg and Andrews filed a motion for attorney fees in the amount of $380,000 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.9 and a fee provision in the stipulated judgment. They filed a second motion for attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 in the amount of $287,251.34. The court awarded attorney fees in the sum of $210,697.50 to Zuiderweg based on the fee provision in the stipulated judgment and denied Andrews' fee request in its entirety.
On appeal, Hoffman contends the jury award for conversion is not supported by substantial evidence and the attorney fee award to Zuiderweg included fees for work on issues not covered by the fee provision in the stipulated judgment.
"`Before an appellate court can interfere with a judgment on the ground that it is excessive, "the excess must either appear as a matter of law, or be such as to suggest, at first blush, passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trier of the fact." [Citation.]'" (Kelly v. CB & I Constructors, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 442, 452; see also Johnston v. Long (1947) 30 Cal.2d 54, 76 ["it is not the function of a reviewing court to interfere with a jury's award of damages unless it is so grossly disproportionate to any reasonable limit of compensation warranted by the facts that it shocks the court's sense of justice and raises a presumption that it was the result of passion and prejudice"].)
There are no fixed or absolute standards by which an appellate court can measure in monetary terms the extent of the damages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of the wrongful act of the defendant. (Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Cannan (1933) 219 Cal. 184, 192.) The amount to be awarded is "a matter on which there legitimately may be a wide difference of opinion." (Roedder v. Rowley (1946) 28 Cal.2d 820, 823.) In considering the contention that damages are excessive the appellate court must determine every conflict in the evidence in respondent's favor, and must give respondent the benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn from the record. (Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498, 508.)
Hoffman asserts that the conversion award must be reversed because no evidence of the value of the property converted was offered at trial. Hoffman is mistaken.
"Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion are the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion; the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and damages. It is not necessary that there be a manual taking of the property; it is only necessary to show an assumption of control or ownership over the property, or that the alleged converter has applied the property to his own use." (Oakdale Village Group v. Fong (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 539, 543-544; Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Assn. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 221.) The foundation of a conversion claim "`. . . rests upon the unwarranted interference by defendant with the dominion over the property of the plaintiff from which injury to the latter results. . . .'" (Burlesci v. Petersen (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1065.)
The measure of damages for conversion is set forth in Civil Code section 3336: "The detriment caused by the wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to be: [¶] First—The value of the property at the time of the conversion, with the interest from that time, or, an amount sufficient to indemnify the party injured for the loss which is the natural, reasonable and proximate result of the wrongful act complained of and which a proper degree of prudence on his part would not have averted; and [¶] Second—A fair compensation for the time and money properly expended in pursuit of the property."
Section 3336 thus provides for alternative measures of recovery—one based on the value of the property converted and the other determined by "an amount sufficient to indemnify the party injured for the loss which is the natural, reasonable and proximate result of the wrongful act complained of."
"As a general rule, the value of the converted property is the appropriate measure of damages, and resort to the alternative occurs only where a determination of damages on the basis of value would be manifestly unjust." (Lueter v. State of California (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1302.) Damages in excess of the value of the property may be recovered if they were proximately caused by the defendant's act of conversion. (Ibid.; see also Lint v. Chisholm (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 615, 624-625 ["where proof establishes an injury beyond that which would be adequately compensated by the value of the property and interest, the court may award such amounts as will indemnify for all proximate reasonable loss caused by the wrongful act"].)
The absence of a complete and fully accurate list of damages does not bar recovery where damage is shown by other means. The record discloses and the trial court found that there were special circumstances in the case which allowed for a different measure of damages to be applied than that provided under the first alternative. (Myers v. Stephens (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 104, 116.) "`While it is true that plaintiffs must show with reasonable certainty that they have been damaged because of the wrongful conduct of the defendant, "once the cause and existence of damages have been so established, recovery will not be denied because the damages are difficult of ascertainment." [Citation.] Liability cannot be evaded because damages cannot be measured with exactness.'" (Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, 920-921.) In addition, where, as here, property was converted by means of a series of acts inextricably interwoven, there is no need for a separate assessment of the various elements of damages. (Foster v. Keating (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 435, 453; see also South Bay Irr. Dist. v. California-American Water Co. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 944, 995 ["[w]here damages are the product of interwoven elements, the court is not required to separately assess the damage attributable to each element"].)
In addition, "[a] jury may award a plaintiff reasonable compensation for physical pain, discomfort, fear, anxiety and other emotional distress which he has suffered and which he will suffer in the future as the result of an injury. The law does not prescribe a definite standard or method to calculate compensation for pain and suffering. The jury is merely required to award an amount that is reasonable in light of the evidence. [Citation.] An appellate court may not disturb an award of such general damages unless the amount `is so disproportionate to the injuries suffered that the result reached may be said to shock the conscience . . . .'" (Damele v. Mack Trucks, Inc. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 29, 38.)
Damages for emotional distress were permitted by our Supreme Court in a case involving facts similar to those here—disruption of a water supply. The court said: "It was also proper to permit the jury to award damages to [plaintiff] for . . . mental suffering. It is settled that, regardless of whether the occupant of land has sustained physical injury, he may recover damages for the discomfort and annoyance of himself and the members of his family and for mental suffering occasioned by fear for the safety of himself and his family when such discomfort or suffering has been proximately caused by a trespass or a nuisance. [Citations.] Defendant's disruption of the water supply is closely analogous to a trespass or a nuisance in that it interfered with the use and enjoyment of the land by [plaintiff] and such conduct warrants imposition of liability for mental distress of the occupants, at least where, as here, the tortious acts are willful." (Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert (1960) 54 Cal.2d 328, 337-338.)
The damage award for conversion is supported by substantial evidence. The jury heard evidence concerning the costs of making repairs to the well and city waterline to protect the area from further tampering and "tap-ins." Money was spent installing security cameras to protect against further vandalism by Hoffman. Money also was spent on replacing and repairing the fences Hoffman had destroyed or damaged.
In addition, testimony during trial detailed Hoffman's acts of vandalism and conversion. The evidence established that his conduct caused Zuiderweg's water to be shut off at least six times and dirt to be found in the water. There was testimony that Hoffman modified the city waterline to divert water from Zuiderweg for use on his own property. Hoffman took "no trespassing" signs from respondent's property. On numerous occasions, Andrews discovered that water at her barn had been turned off after she had seen Hoffman on the property. Gates were opened or damaged and fences cut or damaged allowing cattle to escape and enter the highway. Both respondents testified they were extremely frightened of Hoffman and felt threatened and intimidated by him. They said Hoffman lurked about their property, had jumped out of his truck and rushed towards them and, on one occasion, brandished a gun at Andrews.
Hoffman acted without regard to the easement rights of Zuiderweg and Andrews. The jury could reasonably believe that Hoffman acted in callous disregard of respondents' rights, knowing his conduct was substantially certain to vex, annoy, and injure respondents. His conduct justified including in the damage award compensation for emotional pain and distress. (See, e.g., Gonzales v. Personal Storage, Inc. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 464, 475 [damages for emotional distress are recoverable where conversion is alleged]; Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Assn., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 221 [same].)
We review the basis for an attorney fee award de novo. (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1132-1133.) We review the amount of an attorney fee award for abuse of discretion. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
The trial court denied Andrews' request for attorney fees and awarded Zuiderweg $210,697.50 in fees based on a provision in the 1989 stipulated judgment between her and Roxton. That provision states: "If the road easement is obstructed in any manner and plaintiffs . . . have given reasonable advance notice as defined above, plaintiffs . . . shall be entitled to have any obstruction of the access roadway removed by the use of any reasonable means. Defendant . . . or his successors-in-interest shall be obligated to reimburse plaintiffs . . . within fifteen (15) days of notice of all reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the removal of an obstruction caused by defendant . . . [or] his successors-in-interest . . . . Should any litigation result from the act of removing an obstruction hereunder, the party found by the court to have acted unreasonably or in an unjustified manner, given all the circumstances, shall pay the reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the other party."
We quote at length from the trial court's meticulous and thoughtful analysis of the claim for attorney fees. In its order awarding fees, the trial court reasoned as follows: "The Stipulation . . . defines the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to an appurtenant road easement for ingress and egress from Reservoir Canyon Road to the well and well site for the purpose of maintaining and repairing the well, the well site and access road. [Citation.] The Stipulation implements the rights of Zuiderweg . . . by specifying, in paragraph 5, under what conditions they are entitled to traverse the road easement. The Stipulation also specifically defines [the] obligation to keep the road easement unobstructed. [Citation.]
"The Stipulation provides Zuiderweg . . . with access, once a month on any Monday between 8:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., `for purposes of a monthly inspection and/or regular maintenance of the well and well site and at such other dates and times that are reasonably necessary to undertake reasonable maintenance and repair of the well, well site or the access road leading thereto.' . . . In short, the rights of Zuiderweg . . . to use the access road easement under the Stipulation are narrowly circumscribed.
"The Stipulation defines `unobstructed' in functional terms: the easement is considered `unobstructed' if Zuiderweg . . . [is] able to transport reasonably necessary vehicles and equipment to maintain or repair the water system located on the well and well site or to maintain and repair the access road. [Citation.]
"The Stipulation provides a mechanism for Zuiderweg . . . to recover out-of-pocket costs incurred by [her] to remove obstructions to the easement if it is blocked at a time when [she is] entitled to use it. Subparagraph (e) obligates `Roxton [Hoffman's predecessor] to reimburse Zuiderweg . . . within fifteen (15) days of notice of all reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the removal of an obstruction caused by Roxton.' [Citation.] Further, if any litigation results from the act of removing an obstruction, the party found by the court to have acted unreasonably or in an unjustified manner, given all the circumstances, shall pay the reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the other party. [Citation.]
". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"With respect to Zuiderweg, although the jury found that Hoffman did something that he was precluded from doing by the Stipulation . . ., it awarded Zuiderweg only $100.00 in damages for Hoffman's breach. [Citation.] In monetary terms, $100.00 is less than 1/10 of 1% of the total damages ($195,000) the jury awarded to Zuiderweg. Nevertheless, under Hsu v. Abarra (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876-877, it would appear that Zuiderweg . . . prevailed on her contract claim pursuant to the Stipulation.
"The question remains as to the amount of reasonable fees that are due Zuiderweg. (See Foothill Properties v. Lyon/Copley Corona Associates (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1555-1556 (' In determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by equitable considerations.") . . .
"On the one hand, the fee provision in the Stipulation appears narrowly tailored to reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses incurred in removing obstructions. On the other hand, this fee provision can be read broadly because it also states that, if any litigation results from the act of removing an obstruction, the unreasonable party is on the hook, without qualification, for the other side's legal fees. Moreover . . . an award of fees under the Stipulation does not depend upon litigation success or any particular damage award, but rather upon an assessment `by the court' of various factors. In large measure the jury's minimal damage award is entirely irrelevant with respect to the fee claim based on the Stipulation.
"Construing paragraph 5(e) in its entirety, the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees critically depends upon the role that the road easement (for well site access) played in the overall scope of litigation. In this regard, much of the litigation indeed revolved around road easement/well access issues, which is reflected in the pleadings and the evidence. For example, Hoffman alleged that Andrews and Zuiderweg had improperly removed the retaining wall, skateboard ramp and apiary, and he sought damages for these actions. All of these items involved access along the easement road to the well site. Similarly, the cross-complaint by Andrews and Zuiderweg alleged that Hoffman had obstructed the road easement in various ways in an effort to hinder or prevent their access to the water well, as well as to intimidate and harass them.
"Much of the trial evidence was focused upon Hoffman's obstruction and interference with Zuiderweg's well access by, among other things, constructing a retaining wall across the easement road. Many of the trial exhibits referred to the retaining wall, and multiple expert witnesses discussed the cost of replacing the retaining wall and removing obstructions that had been placed by Hoffman. Although well access was by no means the only important issue, it was a central issue that permeated the entire case.
"Given the pleadings, evidence, and arguments of counsel, the Court concludes that both the litigation brought by Hoffman, and the litigation by cross-complainants against him, `result[ed] from the act of removing an obstruction' under paragraph 5(e) of the Stipulation. Moreover, there is no doubt that Hoffman acted `unreasonably' and `in an unjustified manner given all the facts and circumstances' under paragraph 5(e). Indeed, Hoffman engaged in irrational, intrusive, and sometimes frightening behavior that included malicious acts of vandalism and intimidation against the cross-complainants, their health and their residences.
"The remaining question is whether Zuiderweg should be compensated for all of the time that her counsel spent litigating the entire matter, or instead only for time spent specifically related to seeking reimbursement of specific `obstruction removal' costs. For two reasons the Court concludes that a fully compensatory fee is warranted. First, paragraph 5(e) broadly states that whichever party acts unreasonably or unjustifiably `shall pay the reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the other party.' Plainly the trigger of this lawsuit was access to the water well, upon which Zuiderweg's health and welfare critically depended. Whether all the claims involved removal of obstructions is not determinative.
"Second, the claims related to removing the well and roadway obstructions are very closely related to, and overlap with, the claims respecting harassment, conversion, interference with water lines and other matters that do not directly involve the road and well access. All of the claims arise from a common core of operative facts and are, to use legal lexicon, `inextricably intertwined.' (See, e.g., Cruz v. Ayromloo (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1277; Benhiwal v. Mix (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 621, 641; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th 1127.)
"The Court has examined the hours spent by Zuiderweg's counsel on the litigation as well as the hourly rates that are sought. Both the hours and the rates sought are reasonable. In particular, many of the hours invested by Zuiderweg's counsel were in response to various litigation tactics employed by Hoffman. Accordingly, the Court will award attorney's fees to Zuiderweg in the amount of $210,697.50 based upon the Stipulation for Judgment." (Fn. omitted.)
Hoffman does not contend that the hourly rate or time expended by Zuiderweg's attorney was excessive. His sole argument is that the trial court misinterpreted the language of the stipulated judgment. Hoffman asserts that the phrase "[s]hould any litigation result from the act of removing an obstruction hereunder" in the fee provision imposes a limitation on the amount of attorney fees that may be awarded and that the trial court awarded fees incurred litigating issues unrelated to removal of obstructions to the well. We disagree. The well-reasoned opinion of the trial court is supported by both the facts and the law.
The attorney fee provision in the stipulated judgment provides for an award of fees when two circumstances are present: (1) if "any litigation results from the act of removing an obstruction" and (2) "the party [is] found by the court to have acted unreasonably or in an unjustified manner, given all the circumstances." As the trial court found, this broadly-worded clause does not limit fees to those incurred for removing an obstruction. That qualifier operates solely to limit the cause for initiating litigation. The remaining portion of the fee provision gives the court discretion to award reasonable attorney fees and costs in any such litigation without limitation to specific causes of action.
Similar fee provisions have been interpreted broadly by the courts. For example, a provision in a contract that states "in any `lawsuit or other legal proceeding' to which `this Agreement gives rise'" has been held broad enough to encompass recovery of attorney fees for tort claims. (Xuereb v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342-1343; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Loo (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1796-1797 [contract providing for recovery of attorney fees "`In any legal action brought by either party to enforce the terms hereof . . .'"].)
As stated above, we interpret the language in the fee provision regarding removal of obstructions to apply only to the initiation of a lawsuit. However, even if we were to agree that this language was intended to limit the issues for which attorney fees could be awarded, apportionment was not necessary or required under the facts of this case. It is well settled that "[a]pportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney's time into compensable and noncompensable units." (Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687.)
It also is well settled that "[a]ttorney's fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed." (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129-130; see also Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 159 ["`Attorney's fees need not be apportioned between distinct causes of action where plaintiff's various claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories'"]; Erickson v. R.E.M. Concepts, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1086 [time spent on non-fee shifting claims was determinative of fee-shifting claims and thus compensable]; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133 [where "liability issues are so interrelated that it [is] impossible to separate them into claims for which attorney fees are properly awarded and claims for which they are not, then allocation is not required"]; Abdallah v. United Savings Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1111 [defense of contract, tort and RICO claims so intertwined that separation of time "`impracticable, if not impossible . . .'" to achieve]; Beeman v. Burling (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1608 [successful party may recover fees for work on overlapping claims].)
The trial court conducted an extensive review of the request for attorney fees and considered the request in connection with its personal knowledge of the case. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) Whether the trial actually involved distinct factual and legal theories that could properly be the basis for an apportionment of fees incurred is entrusted in the first instance to the wide discretion of the trial court. (See El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1365 [apportionment is within the trial court's discretion]; Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 687.) In this case, the trial court reasonably found that Zuiderweg's claims against Hoffman were "`"inextricably intertwined"'" [citation] making it `impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the multitude of conjoined activities into compensable or noncompensable time units' [citation]." (Abdallah v. United Savings Bank, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 1111.)
Hoffman has not identified anything in the record compelling a contrary result. "Once we determine the trial court's findings have the requisite measure of support in the record, we cannot substitute our conclusions for those of the trial court." (Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1291.) Upon determining a right to attorney fees, "apportionment of fees and costs similarly rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] "`A trial court's exercise of discretion is abused only when its ruling "`exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. "`[Citation.]"'" (Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 687.) We are unwilling (and, indeed, not empowered) to substitute our own opinion on apportionment, reviewing only a cold record, for the evaluation made by the experienced judge who presided at the trial. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 ["`[t]he burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of discretion, and unless a clear case of abuse is shown and unless there has been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its discretionary power'"]; see also Erickson v. R.E.M. Concepts, Inc., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1083 [abuse of discretion in apportionment of fees is established only when trial court's ruling exceeds bounds of reason, considering all the circumstances before it].) Here, the claims for relief were, at least to some degree, inextricably intertwined. We find no abuse of discretion.
The judgment and order are affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on appeal.
We concur.
GILBERT, P.J.
COFFEE, J.
