NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MANELLA, J.

INTRODUCTION

The Petersen Law Firm (plaintiff) appeals from the orders of the superior court granting defendants' special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, also known as the anti-SLAPP statute, and granting defendants attorney fees of $25,000 and costs of $1,500.1 Plaintiff contends (1) that the trial court's orders violated its constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances, and (2) that the underlying actions are not within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. Defendants cross-appeal from the fee order, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in granting them less than their requested fees and costs. As to the appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the anti-SLAPP motion. As to the cross-appeal, because we are unable to determine from the record below the basis for the court's award of attorney fees, we are compelled to remand to the trial court for further proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As an initial matter, we note that plaintiff did not provide a statement of the facts in its opening brief, as required by rule 8.204(a) of the Appellate Rules. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204, subd. (a)(2) ["An appellant's opening brief must: [¶]. . . [¶] (C) Provide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record."].) In addition, plaintiff did not provide the pleadings in the underlying action. Accordingly, plaintiff has forfeited any challenges to the trial court's factual findings. (See, e.g., Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317 [appellant forfeited challenge to a factual finding by failing to state the evidence used to support that finding].) In contrast, defendents augmented the record on appeal with the pleadings related to the attorney fees motion. Therefore, the following factual and procedural history is based upon the trial court's factual findings and the augmented record on appeal.

On February 5, 2009, plaintiffs, two law firms, and a Los Angeles police officer, filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court, "asking the court to command the City of Los Angeles, its police department, the Chief of Police and certain supervisory police officers, not to violate Government Code sections 3303(c), (h) and (i), [and] provisions of the Public Safety Officers Bill of Rights Act (POBRA)" by implementing a certain Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) policy. According to plaintiffs, "[t]he LAPD has adopted a policy that none of its police officers is entitled to overtime pay unless the officer was authorized in writing, in advance, by a supervisor, to work overtime. The LAPD adopted that policy in order to stem lawsuits brought against it by its officers under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act to recover overtime pay. To enforce its policy, whenever such a lawsuit is brought by a police officer, the LAPD responds by investigating the officer to determine whether he has violated the policy by working overtime without the express written permission of a superior. If the LAPD finds that the officer has violated said policy, it responds by disciplining the officer."

Defendants removed the case to federal court and filed an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the petition. The federal court remanded the matter to the superior court on May 26, 2009, without ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion. After revising the anti-SLAPP motion for use in the superior court, defendants filed the motion on June 15, 2009. Following a hearing on July 14, 2009, the superior court granted the motion.

While expressing some doubt over defendants' right to file an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court relied on an appellate case permitting such a motion and found that "[p]etitioners apparently concede that defendants properly brought the anti-SLAPP motion because they make no argument and cite no authority to the contrary." The trial court then determined that plaintiffs were unable to meet their burden under the anti-SLAPP statute to show a probability of success on their petition for writ of mandate. The order dismissing the petition with prejudice was filed August 5, 2009.

On September 11, 2009, defendants filed a motion seeking $52,278 in attorney fees and $2,715.10 in costs under section 425.16, subdivision (c). Of that amount, approximately $20,000 was incurred to prepare the federal anti-SLAPP motion, $23,000 was incurred to prepare, defend, and argue the state anti-SLAPP motion and plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, and $7,000 was incurred for the attorney fees motion.2 Defendant argued that they were entitled to the fees and costs associated with filing the federal anti-SLAPP motion because "had [defendants] not filed the anti-SLAPP Motion in federal court prior to filing the same motion in this Court, [defendants]' counsel would have expended approximately the same amount of time on research and preparation that it spent on the federal court motion on the state court motion." Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the fee motion, contending (1) that an award of attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute would infringe upon their right to petition and (2) that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine would bar a fee award because the petition for writ of mandate was not a sham.3 They also made general and conclusory objections that the billing records were "vague," "unreasonably padded," and "not credible," but made no objections to the time spent on any specific task.

On October 14, 2009, the trial court granted defendants' motion for attorney fees and costs in part. The trial court found that "[t]he reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred by [defendants] in connection with their special motion to strike is the sum of $25,000.00, and the reasonable amount of costs and expenses incurred with respect to said motion is the sum of $1,500.00." On October 22, 2009, a written order on fees and costs was entered by the court clerk writing the above amounts on the August 5, 2009 order. Plaintiff was the only petitioner to file an appeal from the trial court's orders, or to respond to defendants' cross-appeal from the fee award.

DISCUSSION

A. The Anti-SLAPP Motion

The anti-SLAPP statute "provide[s] a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights. [Citation.]" (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055-1056.) The anti-SLAPP statute provides a two-part test to determine whether a cause of action should be dismissed. Under the first part, the party bringing the anti-SLAPP motion has the initial burden of showing that the cause of action arises from an act in furtherance of the right of free speech or petition — i.e., that it arises from a protected activity. (Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 965.) Once this burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the cause of action. (Ibid.) Only a cause of action that satisfies both parts of the anti-SLAPP statute — i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit — is subject to being stricken under the statute. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.)

Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's rulings that defendants' actions arise from protected activity and that the petition for writ of mandate lacked minimal merit. Thus, plaintiff has forfeited challenging those determinations. (See In re Marriage of Krempin (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1018 [contention not supported by proper argument deemed abandoned].) Even absent forfeiture, this court would independently determine that defendants' actions arose from protected activity, and that plaintiff failed to show the petition for writ of mandate had even minimal merit.

Here, the actions at issue in the petition for writ of mandate are defendants' actions of implementing an overtime policy, including authorizing investigations of any police officer who brings a lawsuit to recover overtime pay. Under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), "any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law" is "an `"act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue."'" An internal investigation is an official proceeding authorized by law. (See Hansen v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1544.) Interviews and written statements made in connection with an internal investigation are thus protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Ibid. ["[C]ommunications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an official proceeding are within the protection of section 425.16."].) Thus, defendants have met their burden of showing that their actions are protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Because defendants met their burden of showing that their acts arose from protected activity, the burden shifted to plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on its petition for writ of mandate. (Zamos v. Stroud, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 965.) Plaintiff did not include its opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion in the record, and made no argument in its appellate brief demonstrating a probability of prevailing on the petition for writ of mandate. On this record, plaintiff has failed to show the trial court erred in concluding that the petition for writ of mandate lacked minimal merit. Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the trial court's determination that the petition for writ of mandate should be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Plaintiff contends, however, (1) that the anti-SLAPP statute, as applied in this case, violated plaintiff's constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances and (2) that petitions for writ of mandate and POBRA actions are not within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. Defendants contend that plaintiff did not timely raise these arguments in the trial court. As a general rule, an appellate court will not consider a new legal theory that was raised for the first time on appeal. "Only when the issue presented involves purely a legal question, on an uncontroverted record and requires no factual determinations, is it appropriate to address new theories." (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 820, 847.) Because plaintiff's contentions arguably present purely legal questions, we address each contention in turn.

According to plaintiff, the anti-SLAPP statute is unconstitutional as applied in this case because plaintiff's constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances trumps the defendants' statutory rights under the anti-SLAPP statute. We disagree. "`The right to petition is not absolute, providing little or no protection for baseless litigation.' [Citation.]" (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 64 (Equilon).) The anti-SLAPP statute provides a means of identifying and disposing of meritless lawsuits. It does not prevent a petitioner with a meritorious claim from seeking redress. (Id. at p. 63 ["[S]ection 425.16 does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the defendant's free speech or petitioning. It subjects to potential dismissal only those causes of action as to which the plaintiff is unable to show a probability of prevailing on the merits."].) Accordingly, the anti-SLAPP statute does not violate plaintiff's constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances. (See Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 357-358 (Bernardo) [rejecting claim that the anti-SLAPP statute violated plaintiff's "First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances by filing her lawsuit"].)

Plaintiff also contends that because the City of Los Angeles has no constitutional right to petition or to free speech, it should be precluded from using the anti-SLAPP statute. In support, plaintiff cites City of Long Beach v. Bozek (1982) 31 Cal.3d 527, judgment vacated and cause remanded (1983) 459 U.S. 1095, reiterated (1983) 33 Cal.3d 727 (Bozek), in which our Supreme Court held that the state constitutional right to petition bars a municipality from filing a malicious prosecution lawsuit against a plaintiff. Bozek is readily distinguishable, as it involved malicious prosecution claims and not anti-SLAPP motions. Setting aside the fact that five of the six defendants are individuals who, indisputably, may bring anti-SLAPP actions, the California Supreme Court has affirmed "a long and uniform line of California Court of Appeal decisions explicitly hold[ing] that governmental entities are entitled to invoke the protections of section 425.16 when such entities are sued on the basis of statements or activities engaged in by the public entity or its public officials in their official capacity." (Vargas v. City of Salinas (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1, 17 [citing cases].) The court held that "the statutory remedy afforded by section 425.16 extends to statements and writings of governmental entities and public officials on matters of public interest and concern that would fall within the scope of the statute if such statements were made by a private individual or entity." (Ibid.) Accordingly, defendants may bring the anti-SLAPP motion even though one defendant is a municipality.

Plaintiff further contends that the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be used to strike petitions for writ of mandate, but provides no legal argument in support of this contention except a generalized argument that doing so would unconstitutionally violate plaintiff's right to petition. We have rejected the argument that the anti-SLAPP statute violates plaintiff's right to petition. In addition, the anti-SLAPP statute has been used numerous times to strike petitions for writs of mandate that assert meritless claims and arise out of protected activity. (See, e.g., Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1245 [dismissing petition for writ of mandate pursuant to anti-SLAPP statute].) Thus, we reject plaintiff's claim.

Finally, plaintiff contends that POBRA actions are not within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. We deem this argument abandoned, as plaintiff has provided no argument in support of this contention. (See In re Marriage of Krempin, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018 [contention not supported by proper argument deemed abandoned].)4 We note, however, that the anti-SLAPP statute does not provide an exemption for POBRA actions, but instead applies to any action arising out of protected activity that lacks minimal merit. (§ 425.16, subd. (b).) Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and dismissing with prejudice the petition for writ of mandate.

B. The Attorney Fees Motion

Plaintiff also appeals from the attorney fees motion. Plaintiff contends that the fee award was barred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and that the fee shifting provisions in the anti-SLAPP statute impermissibly infringe on its constitutional right to petition. Defendants cross-appeal from the fee order, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in granting their motion only in part. We address each argument in turn.

1. Plaintiff's appeal from fee award

"The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which arose in the context of antitrust law, holds that `[t]hose who petition government for redress are generally immune from antitrust liability.' (Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 49, 56. . . . [¶] The Noerr-Pennington doctrine was extended by the [United States] Supreme Court in California Transport v. Trucking Unlimited (1972) 404 U.S. 508, 510 to `the approach of citizens . . . to administrative agencies . . . and to courts.'" (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 464, 478.) Because the Noerr-Pennington doctrine derives from the right to petition, plaintiff's argument based upon the Noerr-Pennington doctrine encompasses its argument that the fee-shifting provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute infringe upon the right to petition. In Equilon, the California Supreme Court rejected this argument. (See Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 62-64 [fee shifting provisions in anti-SLAPP statute do not make plaintiffs liable for filing lawsuits and do not overburden those who exercise their constitutional right to petition]; see also Bernardo, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 362 ["[trial] court's award of attorney fees in favor of [moving party] under section 425.16(c) did not violate [plaintiff's] constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances"].) Bozek is not to the contrary. (See Bozek, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 530 [state constitutional right to petition bars a municipality from filing a malicious prosecution lawsuit against a plaintiff].) In Bozek, the court did not prohibit an award of costs. Indeed, the court noted that "[f]rom a constitutional standpoint, an award of expenses upon a finding that monetary sanctions are appropriate . . . is a clearly preferable remedy to an independent action for malicious prosecution." (Id. at p. 538.) Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's fee award did not violate plaintiff's constitutional right to petition.

2. Defendants' appeal from fee award

Next, we turn to the cross-appeal from the fee award. We review the amount of the fee award for an abuse of discretion. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1322.) "`[I]n so-called fee shifting cases, in which the responsibility to pay attorney fees is statutorily or otherwise transferred from the prevailing plaintiff or class to the defendant, the primary method for establishing the amount of "reasonable" attorney fees is the lodestar method. The lodestar (or touchstone) is produced by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate. Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative "multiplier" to take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.' [Citation.]" (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833.) "When the trial court substantially reduces a fee or cost request, we infer the court has determined the request was inflated. [Citation.] The trial court is not required to issue a statement of decision. [Citations.]" (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, supra, at p. 1323.) Nevertheless, "[w]hen the record is unclear whether the trial court's award of attorney fees is consistent with the applicable legal principles, we may reverse the award and remand the case to the trial court for further consideration and amplification of its reasoning. [Citations.]" (In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052.)

As set forth above, defendants sought roughly $52,000 in attorney fees and $2,700 in costs. Plaintiffs raised no objections to the number of hours spent on any specific task or to the hourly rates charged; rather, they asserted that any award of fees was constitutionally prohibited. The trial court was not, of course, required to accept defendants' figures but only to determine what was reasonable. On the record before us, however, we are unable to determine on what basis the court arrived at its fee award. As the fees awarded were roughly half those requested, it is conceivable the court concluded that defendants' fees incurred for the federal and state anti-SLAPP motions were largely duplicative. We decline, however, to speculate. Rather, we remand to the trial court to provide the basis for its decision. On remand, defendants may seek reasonable fees for this appeal. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 556.)

DISPOSITION

The order of the trial court granting defendants' special motion to strike pursuant to section 425.16 is affirmed. The order of the trial court granting defendants their attorney fees and costs in the amount of $26,500 is reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings on the reasonableness of defendants' attorney fees and costs. Costs are awarded to defendants.

We concur:

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

SUZUKAWA, J.