DONALD E. WALTER, District Judge.
Before the court are several motions filed by the parties:
For the following reasons the court will
The present case was transferred from the United States District Court for the Central District of California based on improper venue.
The claims in the amended complaint stem from a foreclosure on a commercial property located at 2007 Moeling Street, Lake Charles, Louisiana. The amended complaint is virtually devoid of factual details regarding the foreclosure. The court has pieced together the following timeline of events based on court documents submitted by the defendants and a bankruptcy proceeding filed in the Western District of Louisiana by McZeal, Jr.'s father.
On June 9, 2004,
On July 20, 2009, McZeal, Sr. filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the Western District of Louisiana.
The Bankruptcy Court granted MidSouth's motion.
Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that MidSouth's foreclosure was improper because it allowed MidSouth to seize the commercial property to satisfy about $40,000 worth of debt, when McZeal, Jr. (without explaining how or with what basis) appraised the property's value at $400,000. He also alleges that the bank did not follow the correct procedures under Louisiana law.
Based on these allegations, the plaintiff pleaded fifteen claims
After the plaintiff filed his amended complaint, the defendants again moved for the court to take judicial notice of other court proceedings and to dismiss the case. The defendants argue that the court should take judicial notice of the prior proceedings because the prior proceedings show that the current claims are barred and the submitted documents also rebut some of the plaintiffs convoluted contentions. The defendants argue that the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because (1) the court does not have jurisdiction to overturn a state court judgment under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (2) the claims are precluded under res judicata, and (3) each claim fails to state a claim for relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9(a), and 12(b)(6). The plaintiff countered with a Motion to Strike.
McZeal, Jr. moves to strike the defendants' Motion for the Court to Take Judicial Notice and Motion to Dismiss claiming that he was not served.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(C), a motion is considered served when it is "mail[ed] to the person's last known address." Additionally, under Local Rule 5.3, a party is required to file a certificate of service, stating that "copies have been served on all parties or their attorneys, either in person or by mailing." The defendants complied with these rules.
The court finds that the defendants adequately established sufficient service of the motions through their Proofs of Service and detailed affidavit explaining how service was perfected. The plaintiff's conclusory allegations that he received everything but the motions do not rebut the defendants' showing of service. Therefore, the court finds that service was properly perfected, and McZeal, Jr.'s Motion to Strike will be
Next, the court addresses the defendants' Motions for the Court to Take Judicial Notice (Rec. Docs. 57, 66), which were made in support of the defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 56).
When deciding a motion to dismiss a district court may "consider matters of which they may take judicial notice." Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(f)). A court may take judicial notice of a fact that "(1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Additionally, the court must take notice of a fact if "a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information." Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2). A court "cannot take judicial notice of findings of fact of other courts, [but] the fact that a judicial action was taken is indisputable and is therefore amenable to judicial notice." Gray ex rel. Rudd v. Beverly Enterprises-Mississippi, Inc., 390 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Charter Med. Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 831 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Here the court will take judicial notice of the court proceedings presented by the defendants because they are relevant in determining whether McZeal's claims are precluded and there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the submitted proceedings. The court will also take judicial notice verifiable public documents, including the Sheriff's Deed of Sale and the California Vexatious Litigant list.
Therefore, the Motions to Take Judicial Notice will be
The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiffs amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state of a claim. The court first addresses the defendants Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because "[w]hen a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). If the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the claims. The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
The defendants first argue that, to the extent that McZeal, Jr., is trying to overturn the state court judgment allowing MidSouth to foreclose on the property, his claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, reduced to its essence, precludes lower federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate where the federal plaintiff seeks appellate review of a state court judgment." McZeal v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA, No. CIV. A. 13-6754, 2014 WL 3166715, at *5 (E.D. La. July 7, 2014) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005); United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994)). "A state court judgment is attacked under Rooker-Feldman `when the federal claims are inextricably intertwined with a challenged state court judgment, or where the losing party in a state court action seeks what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment.'" Id. (quoting Weaver v. Tex. Capital Bank N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 2011)). The doctrine should be applied narrowly and only to those cases that are "brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. The doctrine should be applied and the claim barred, if the injury complained of arises from a state judgment. In re Erlewine, 349 F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 2003).
This is not the first time that McZeal, Jr. has encountered this doctrine. In a case before the Eastern District of Louisiana, McZeal, Jr. brought almost identical claims against a different bank that had mortgaged a property in Lafayette, Louisiana. McZeal, 2014 WL 3166715, at *1. The bank asserted that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over any claims that were, in essence, appellate review of the state court's foreclosure order. Id. at *5. After noting that "a discerning review of McZeal's Complaint [was] nearly impossible due to its sheer abstruseness," the court determined that the complaint did not include enough facts to determine how extricably intertwined the action was with state court proceedings. The court found that some, but not all, of the claims were likely barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
This court is faced with an almost identical analysis. To the extent that the plaintiff's injuries are extricably intertwined with the state court proceeding which allowed MidSouth to foreclose on the Moeling Street property, the court does not have jurisdiction over those claims. The dense and incomprehensible pleading however makes it impossible for the court to pinpoint which claims arise out of an independent injury and which arise out of the Louisiana state court order. However, to the extent that any of McZeal, Jr.'s claims are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, the claims are precluded under res judicata, and/or the claims are insufficiently pleaded in his amended petition under Rule 12(b)(6).
The defendants next argue that the claims should be dismissed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because they are barred by res judicata and they do not support a claim for relief.
An action can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the claimant fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Motions to dismiss are generally "viewed with disfavor and [should be] rarely granted." Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gregson v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 2003)). "[The] Court construes the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, and takes all facts pleaded in the complaint as true." Id. (quoting Gregson, 322 F.3d at 885).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," making the right to relief more than merely speculative. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). If the allegations in the complaint, even if taken as true, do not entitle the plaintiff to relief, the complaint should be dismissed. Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558). Additionally, documents attached by defendants to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if the documents are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to his claims. Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004).
The court holds the complaint of a pro se litigant "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2002)). However, "[e]ven a liberally construed pro se. . . complaint . . . must set forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief be may be granted." Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Levitt v. Univ. of Texas El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1988)). Typically if a pro se complaint fails to state claim upon which relief can be granted, the court will dismiss the complaint and give the plaintiff an opportunity to replead, unless the plaintiff has already pleaded the best possible case. Hale, 642 F.3d at 503.
Furthermore, res judicata generally must be pleaded as an affirmative defense and cannot be brought in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2002)). However, "[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on res judicata grounds is appropriate when the elements of res judicata are apparent on the face of the pleadings." Murry v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 553 F. App'x 362, 364 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Kan. Reinsurance Co. v. Congressional Mortg. Corp. of Tex., 20 F.3d 1362, 1366 (5th Cir.1994)).
By taking judicial notice of other court proceedings filed by McZeal, Jr., the court finds that the elements of res judicata require no further factual development and are apparent on the face of McZeal, Jr.'s amended complaint. Therefore, the court will consider whether the claims are barred by res judicata in the defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party cannot litigate claims that have already been litigated in an earlier suit, or that should been brought in an earlier suit. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385, 395 (5th Cir.2004)).
Wainscott v. Dallas Cty., Tex., 408 F. App'x 813, 815 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Southmark Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand (In re Southmark Corp.), 163 F.3d 925, 934 (5th Cir. 1999)). McZeal, Jr. filed an almost identical suit against MidSouth and Angelle in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, 2:11-cv-07739-PA-PJW and the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, 1:16-cv-00430-SS. The plaintiff's claims were dismissed with prejudice by both courts.
First, for a claim to be barred by res judicata, the parties must be identical to the parties in the previous suit or in privity with the parties of the previous suit. In what capacity a party is sued also affects the application of res judicata. Parties sued in their representative capacities are not considered identical parties or parties in privity if they are later sued in their individual capacities. Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams, 897 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Clark v. Amoco Production Co., 794 F.2d 967, 973 (5th Cir. 1986)). Further, suits against a party in his representational or official capacity "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against [the] entity." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Therefore, a party sued in a representational capacity would have the same identity as the entity it represents. See id. However, unless they are found to be an alter ego of the corporation, individually sued "[s]tockholders and officers are not in privity to and are not personally bound by judgments against their corporations." Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 982 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Am. Range Lines v. C.I.R., 200 F.2d 844, 845 (2d Cir. 1952)).
Two of the parties have been named in the current suit and the suits in California and Texas: MidSouth and Angelle. Five other defendants
Therefore, the identities of the parties are identical in the claims against MidSouth, Angelle, and the five other defendants in their representational capacities. However, because nothing suggests that they are alter egos of MidSouth, the five previously unnamed defendants are not in privity with MidSouth for claims brought against them in their individual capacities, and res judicata does not apply to those claims. See Dudley, 504 F.2d at 982 (citing Am. Range Lines, 200 F.2d at 845).
Second, for a claim to be barred by res judicata, the previous judgment must have been issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
For a court to have competent jurisdiction, it must have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. See Piggly Wiggly Clarksville, Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 83 F.Supp.2d 781, 788 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (finding that the state court was not a court of competent jurisdiction when it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over an exclusively federal claim). Both the California and Texas cases were brought in federal court under federal question jurisdiction.
Neither the courts nor the defendants challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction to dispose of the federal question claims. Therefore, the judgments were issued by courts of competent jurisdiction.
Third, the previous judgment must have been a final judgment on the merits for res judicata to apply. "[T]he law is clear that a determination on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that claims are dismissed with prejudice satisfies the requirement for a `final judgment' for res judicata purposes." Landor v. Lafayette Consol. Gov't., 126 F.Supp.3d 761, 763-64 (W.D. La. 2015) (citing Stevens v. Bank of Am., N.A., 587 F. App'x 130, 133 (5th Cir. 2014)).
A district court's dismissal with prejudice is considered a final judgment even if the dismissal is currently being appealed. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 467 (5th Cir. 2013). Both the California and Texas courts dismissed McZeal's federal claims against Angelle and MidSouth with prejudice on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Because the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals were with prejudice they are a final judgment on the merits, and McZeal, Jr.'s current appeals do not impact their finality.
Finally, to show that a claim is barred under res judicata, the cause of action or claim must have been the same in the prior suit.
"To determine whether the claims are the same, the court applies the transactional test, which considers whether the claims turn on the same nucleus of operative facts." Wainscott, 408 F. App'x at 815 (citing In re Southmark Corp., 163 F.3d at 934). McZeal, Jr.'s current claims before this court arise out of the foreclosure on the Moeling Street property. In the California and Texas suits, he does not specifically name the Moeling Street property, but his claims are based on improper foreclosures. Because MidSouth's foreclosure connection to McZeal, Jr. is through the Moeling Street property, the court finds that the claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts.
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the claims raised by McZeal, Jr. in all three suits are largely identical.
Based on the foregoing reasons, McZeal, Jr.'s claims against MidSouth, Angelle, and the five other defendants in their official capacities are barred under res judicata.
The only remaining claims are claims brought against the five previously unnamed defendants in their individual capacities.
With respect to these defendants plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support these claims and neither has he met the heightened standard of pleading required for fraud claims even when holding McZeal, Jr.'s pro se complaint to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hale, 642 F.3d at 499. The complaint was largely incomprehensible. Even when McZeal attempted to state the factual basis and acts done by the defendants, those allegations were, as Judge Sparks accurately put it, "gobbledygook."
The plaintiff had an opportunity to amend the complaint, but his amended complaint did not cure the deficiencies noted by the court. The only changes made to his amended complaint, as far as the court can determine, are adding thirty-two pages, changing the formatting on how the complaint was presented, and decreasing the amount for which he asked.
While this court could have summarily dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6), the undersigned has gone through the details of this case and the reasoning behind the dismissal because it seems inevitable that McZeal, Jr. will file suit again. His history of litigation clearly shows that he does not take direction from the courts. He repeatedly has had suits dismissed for procedural and substantive reasons. His filings waste the time of the parties involved and they waste the time and resources of the courts that must make sense of them.
Looking through McZeal, Jr.'s litigation history within Western District of Louisiana does not show the same egregious repeated pattern of abuse that he has committed in other districts.
McZeal, Jr. apparently has not understood the message. Therefore, because McZeal, Jr. filed a complaint and amended complaint that he knew or should have known was barred under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, was barred under res judicata, and was inadequate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court will consider whether sanctions should be imposed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and/or the court's inherent powers. The issue of sanctions is referred to the Magistrate Judge for further proceeding.
For reasons the court will deny plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Rec. Doc. 63) and grant defendants' Motions for the Court to Take Judicial Notice (Rec. Docs. 57, 66). Additionally the court will grant defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 56)
Finally, the court will refer to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings the issue of potential sanctions against plaintiff under Rule 11 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and/or the court's inherent powers.
