STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER

RICHARD SEEBORG, District Judge.

STIPULATION

WHEREAS, on October 3, 2017, defendant G. Steven Burrill, specially represented by Rees F. Morgan, Esq.; defendant Marc Howard Berger, represented by Miranda Kane, Esq.; and the government, represented by Robert S. Leach, Assistant United States Attorney, appeared before the Court for a status hearing;

WHEREAS, at the hearing, the government represented that, upon receipt of a discovery request, it was prepared to produce in excess of 500GB of data pursuant to Rule 16;

WHEREAS, the parties requested a continuance of this matter to November 7, 2017, and that time be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act between October 3, 2017, and November 7, 2017, to afford counsel time to review the discovery and to conduct any necessary investigation;

WHEREAS, failing to exclude the time between October 3, 2017, and November 7, 2017, would unreasonably deny the defendant continuity of counsel and would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and under the circumstances, the ends of justice served by a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Criminal Local Rule 47-2(c), counsel for the government calculates that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161, there are seventy (70) days remaining before a trial of defendants must commence;

THEREFORE, the United States and the defendants in this action, through undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate and agree that the period of time from October 3, 2017, and November 7, 2017, shall be excluded in computing the time within which the trial of the offenses alleged in the Indictment must commence under 18 U.S.C. § 3161.

STIPULATED AND AGREED TO.

[PROPOSED] ORDER

PURSUANT TO STIPULATION and for good cause shown, the Court finds that failing to exclude the time between October 3, 2017, and November 7, 2017, would unreasonably deny the defendant continuity of counsel and would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). The Court further finds that the ends of justice served by excluding the time between October 3, 2017, and November 7, 2017, from computation under the Speedy Trial Act outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time between October 3, 2017, and November 7, 2017, shall be excluded from computation under the Speedy Trial Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv).