NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

THE COURT*

Appellant, Hector P., a minor, was initially adjudged a ward of the court in August 2009, and readjudged a ward in October 2009 and again in March 2010. In each case, he was adjudicated of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). In the instant case, following a contested jurisdiction hearing in August 2010, the juvenile court found true an allegation, set forth in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602),1 that appellant committed first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)). At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court readjudged appellant a ward of the court, committed him to the Juvenile Justice Campus for a period of 90 days, and ordered that he be under the care, custody, and control of the probation officer for the purpose of making a suitable placement, pursuant to section 727, subdivision (a).

On appeal, appellant contends reversal of the disposition order is required because the probation department (1) failed to make an adequate showing that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for the removal of the minor from his home, and (2) failed to include in the dispositional social study (DSS) a case plan as defined in section 706.6. We will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Instant Offense2

At approximately 6:00 p.m. on July 15, 2010, Felipe Pedraza saw appellant pick up a "UPS box" from the porch of the house he (Pedraza) rented to Jennifer Malstan, and run off with it in the company of another boy. A few minutes later, Pedraza saw appellant's companion standing outside the house, "looking down the street, back and forth." Pedraza walked to the side of Malstan's residence and saw appellant, "half of his body in the window." Pedraza yelled, and appellant "just came right out" and ran off.

When Malstan returned home, she found that a screen that had been on one of her windows was lying up against the side of the house. She also found a butter knife lying on the ground right below the window.

Fresno County Sheriff's Deputy Courtney Williams spoke to appellant later that day. Appellant told the deputy the following: He "knew of the theft of a box." He had "needed a butter knife to cut some fishing line" and that was "the only reason why his fingerprints would be on a butter knife."

Prior Dispositions3

Following his first adjudication, in August 2009, appellant was placed on probation, committed to 90 days on the electronic monitoring program, and ordered to perform 50 hours of community service and complete the "Property Offender Program."

Following his second adjudication, in October 2009, he was continued on probation, committed to 63 days in the Juvenile Justice Campus Pre-Adolescent Program (Pre-Adolescent Program), again ordered to complete the Property Offender Program, and made subject to an 8:00 p.m. curfew.

Following his third adjudication, in March 2010, he was again continued on probation, committed to 63 days in the Pre-Adolescent Program, and ordered to complete the Property Offender Program and participate in family counseling.

Additional Background

Appellant was 13 years old at the time of the instant offense. He stated he had been "a `jumped in' member" of a criminal street gang since he was 12 years old.

Appellant lives with his mother and six siblings. His mother stated she had been giving birth to her 18th child when appellant committed the instant offense. She does not know appellant's father and does not have contact with him. She "reported that [appellant] is out of her control and she requested a higher level of care."

The probation officer "recommend[ed] that [appellant] be placed outside of the home of a parent or guardian pursuant to ... [section] 727(a)."4

Disposition Hearing

The court made the following findings at the disposition hearing: "The minor has been tried on formal probation, in the physical custody of a parent or guardian, and has failed to reform. [¶] The welfare of the minor requires that custody be taken from the minor's parent or guardian."

Later in the hearing, the court found further: "Now, on the placement deal, I have to make some findings there.... [¶] Reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the minor from the home and to make it possible for the minor to return to the home."

DISCUSSION

Reasonable Efforts Finding

Appellant first argues that reversal is required because, he asserts, the probation department "failed to meet its burden" to establish, by clear and convincing evidence at the disposition hearing, that it had provided what appellant describes as "reasonable efforts" and "reasonable services"—terms he appears to use interchangeably—"to prevent or eliminate the need for removal [of appellant from his mother's custody]." We disagree.

The major legal premise of appellant's argument is the claim that the juvenile court was not authorized to order appellant removed from his mother's custody absent a finding, supported by substantial evidence, that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of appellant from his parent's custody. This premise is false.

Appellant argues, as best we can determine, that such a finding is required by section 727.2, and, specifically, by the language we have italicized in the following quoted portion of the statute: "The purpose of this section is to provide a means to monitor the safety and well-being of every minor in foster care who has been declared a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 601 or 602 and to ensure that everything reasonably possible is done to facilitate the safe and early return of the minor to his or her home or to establish an alternative permanent plan for the minor." (§ 727.2, 1st par., italics added.) This contention is without merit.

Section 727.2 addresses reunification services available to a minor and his or her parents when the minor is removed from his parents' custody after being declared a ward under section 602. Subdivision (a) of section 727.2 provides, in relevant part, that when, as in the instant case, the court places a minor under the supervision of a probation officer for placement pursuant to section 727, subdivision (a), the court "shall order the probation department to ensure the provision of reunification services to facilitate the safe return of the minor to his or her home or the permanent placement of the minor...." The statute also mandates periodic "status review hearing[s]" (§ 727.2, subds. (c), (d)), and that at such hearings, the court make certain "findings and orders which determine," inter alia, the following: "The extent of the probation department's compliance with the case plan in making reasonable efforts to safely return the minor to the minor's home or to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the minor." (§ 727.2, subd. (e)(2).) However, nothing in section 727.2 indicates, and the statute cannot be read to provide, that a juvenile court that has adjudged a minor may not order the minor be removed from the physical custody of the parents or guardian unless the court finds that reasonable efforts had previously been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the minor from the home.

Appellant also argues that In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296 (Monica C.) supports his claim that the probation department was required to show by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts had been made and/or reasonable services provided to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the minor from his mother's home. In that case, the juvenile court declared the minor a dependent of the court under section 300, allowed the child to remain in the custody of the mother's aunt, and ordered, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1), that the Department of Social Services provide family reunification services. (Monica C., supra, at p. 300.) Thereafter, following the statutorily mandated 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court made an order terminating the mother's parental rights. (Id. at p. 303.) Under section 366.21, subdivision (g)(3), the "provision of reasonable [reunification] services" is an "absolute condition for the termination of parental rights." (Monica C., supra, at p. 304.) Moreover, that statute also provides that it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that such services were offered. (Id. at p. 306.) On appeal, the mother argued that the record at the review hearing did not support a finding that she had been provided "reasonable [reunification] services." (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal agreed (ibid.), and reversed the order terminating parental rights (id. at p. 311).

Monica C. is inapposite. As our discussion demonstrates, that case dealt with the requirements of section 366.21. That statute has no bearing on the instant case.

Section 726 sets forth what a court must find in order to remove from the physical custody of a parent or guardian a minor who, like appellant, has been adjudged a ward of the juvenile court. Specifically, the statute provides that the court may not order the physical custody be taken from a parent or guardian unless the court "finds one of the following facts: [¶] (1) That the parent or guardian is incapable of providing or has failed or neglected to provide proper maintenance, training, and education for the minor. [¶] (2) That the minor has been tried on probation while in custody and has failed to reform. [¶] (3) That the welfare of the minor requires that custody be taken from the minor's parent or guardian." (§ 726, subd. (a).) The statute does not contain, and we will not impose by judicial fiat, a requirement that the court find that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the removal of the minor. Although the juvenile court here made such a finding, the court was not required to do so. Accordingly, it is of no moment whether that finding was supported by substantial evidence.

Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that the finding in question was required, it is supported by the record. The DSS indicates that appellant was beyond his mother's control despite multiple grants of probation, which included counseling, community service, curfew, electronic monitoring, the Property Offender Program, and the Pre-Adolescent Program. The court reasonably could have concluded that these services constituted reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove appellant from his mother's custody.

Case Plan

If the probation officer recommends placement in foster care, the DSS "shall include a case plan, as described in Section 706.6." (§ 706.5, subd. (a).) The case plan "shall either be attached to the [DSS] or incorporated as a separate section within the [DSS]." (§ 706.6, 1st par.) Section 706.6 provides a detailed list of the information that the case plan must provide, including, for example, the following: "[a]n assessment of the minor's and family's strengths and needs" and the "type of placement best equipped to meet those needs" (§ 706.6, subd. (b)); "[a] description of the type of home or institution in which the minor is to be placed" (§ 706.6, subd. (c)); "[s]pecific time-limited goals and related activities designed to enable the safe return of the minor to his or her home" (§ 706.6, subd. (e)); and "[t]he projected date of completion of the case plan objectives and the date services will be terminated" (§ 706.6, subd. (f)).

Appellant argues that reversal is required because the DSS fails to provide these and other categories of information required to be included in a case plan under section 706.6.5 However, at the disposition hearing, appellant did not raise any of the objections to the DSS he now raises on appeal, or in any way challenge the content of the DSS.

"It is well established that procedural errors may not be raised at the appellate level if they were not raised in the trial court level. `[E]ven constitutional rights, including those of a minor in the area of juvenile court procedure, will ordinarily be waived by silence, i.e., by their nonassertion.'" (In re Christopher S. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1344.) "Any other rule would `"`permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.'" [Citations.]'" (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 411-412.)

In the adult criminal context, "It is settled that failure to object and make an offer of proof at the sentencing hearing concerning alleged errors or omissions in the probation report waives the claim on appeal." (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235.) And, in In re Travis W. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 368, the court applied the Welch waiver rule in a juvenile proceeding where the minor "fault[ed] the probation officer's report for `limited investigation' and faulty reasoning...." (Travis W. at p. 379.) Here, as in Travis W., appellant challenges the content of the DSS for the first time on appeal. We conclude, based on the foregoing principles, that appellant has forfeited his claim that the probation department failed to provide a case plan.

DISPOSITION

The order appealed from—the disposition order—is affirmed.