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U.S. v. Saeteurn, 2:18-cr-00212-TLN. (2019)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20190530a91 Visitors: 22
Filed: May 28, 2019
Latest Update: May 28, 2019
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . Defendant A Vern Saeteurn, by and through Linda M. Parisi, his counsel of record, and plaintiff, by and through its counsel, Vincenza Rabenn, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous judges' order, this matter was set for a Status Conference on May 30, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the Status Conference until July 18, 2019, at 9:
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

Defendant A Vern Saeteurn, by and through Linda M. Parisi, his counsel of record, and plaintiff, by and through its counsel, Vincenza Rabenn, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous judges' order, this matter was set for a Status Conference on May 30, 2019.

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the Status Conference until July 18, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between May 30, 2019 and July 18, 2019 under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Counsel for Mr. Saeteurn need additional to review discovery.

b. Defense counsel and the US Attorney have been discussing a resolution to the case and need further time to resolve the matter.

c. Counsel for defendant Mr. Saeteurn believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

c. The United States Attorney agrees to the continuance.

d. All counsel agrees to the continuance.

e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 30, 2019 and July 18, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local CodeT4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

Dated: May 28, 2019 Respectfully Submitted, /s/ Linda M. Parisi Linda M. Parisi Attorney for A Vern Saeteurn Dated: May 28, 2019 BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney /s/ Linda M. Parisi by e-mail authorization Vincenza Rabenn, Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorney for Plaintiff

Based on the reasons set forth in the stipulation of the parties filed on My 28, 2019, and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Status Conference currently set for May 30, 2019, be vacated and that the Status Conference be set for July 18, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated in the parties' July 18, 2019 stipulation, the time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act is excluded during the time period of May 30, 2019 and July 18, 2019, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T4.

Source:  Leagle

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