IKOLA, J.
Cross-complainant Mark Seidenberg
Seidenberg's deceased mother held two deeds of trust on a property in Anaheim, California. After a foreclosure sale occurred, various legal disputes ensued because one of the deeds of trust was not paid off as a result of the sale. In November 2006, a trial court entered judgment against Seidenberg in a prior case (not this case) brought by Tustin Ave. Trust: (1) declaring "the total unpaid balance of the subject First Deed of Trust . . . to be $47,801.30 (consisting of principal of $44,563.82 plus interest in the amount of $2,950.06 plus late fees in the amount of $287.42"; (2) ordering Seidenberg to pay a civil penalty to Tustin Ave. Trust in the amount of $300 pursuant to Civil Code section 2943, for failing to provide a payoff amount to Tustin Ave. Trust upon written demand; and (3) ordering Seidenberg to pay reasonable attorney fees and costs in an amount to be determined by the court. This court affirmed the prior judgment in Seidenberg v. Reliable Trust Deed Services, Inc. (Aug. 28, 2008, G037726, G038072) [nonpub. opn.]. In December 2006, the trial court in the prior action awarded $68,540.50 in attorney fees and $2,234.50 in costs. This postjudgment order apparently was never appealed.
The instant action was filed by the former owner of the Anaheim property, Trees Wowor. Seidenberg filed his cross-complaint in the instant case in August 2008. The cross-complaint alleges certain parties, including Needham and Tustin Ave. Trust, conveyed the Anaheim property and recorded certain deeds in a manner suggesting Seidenberg no longer held a valid first deed of trust with regard to the Anaheim property.
Needham and Tustin Ave. Trust filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Seidenberg could not establish any pecuniary loss. They argued: (1) the prior action established the payoff amount to extinguish Seidenberg's deed of trust as $47,801.30; (2) the prior action ordered Seidenberg to pay Tustin Ave. Trust $71,075 in attorney fees, costs, and statutory penalties; and (3) because these awards offset one another (and then some in favor of Tustin Ave. Trust), Seidenberg no longer was owed any money and his deed of trust was no longer valid as the debt had been repaid to him (not in cash, but as an offset against the money he owed to Tustin Ave. Trust).
The trial court agreed with this argument and granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings. In the judgment, the court made explicit what it deemed implicit in the outcome of the prior action: "the judgment in favor of Tustin Ave. Trust and against Seidenberg [in the prior action] is partially satisfied. The net unpaid judgment in favor of Tustin Ave. Trust and against Seidenberg is now $24,273.70 plus interest."
Seidenberg's appeal raises a single argument:
Seidenberg cites Nathanson v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 355 in support of his argument. Nathanson involved the late filing of a creditor's claim in probate court.
Seidenberg refers in his reply brief to cases in which courts allowed the executor/administrator of an estate to raise tardy statute of limitations defenses on behalf of the estate, even for the first time on appeal. (Reay v. Heazelton (1900) 128 Cal. 335, 338-339; Bryson v. Hill (1930) 107 Cal.App. 158, 160.) But these cases do not allow a statute of limitations defense to be used to collaterally attack a final civil judgment. We reject Seidenberg's claim without addressing the merits of whether the underlying action was even subject to Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2. (See Dacey v. Taraday (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 962, 980-986 [analyzing applicability of Code of Civ. Proc., § 366.2 to claims arising in part after decedent's death].)
The judgment is affirmed. Seidenberg's request for judicial notice is denied. Respondents Needham and Tustin Ave. Trust shall recover costs incurred on appeal.
O'LEARY, P. J. and MOORE, J., concurs.