NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KRIEGLER, J.

Plaintiff, cross-defendant, and appellant Hastings Village Investment Company, L.P., appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendant, cross-complainant, and respondent Old Navy, LLC, in this action arising out of a shopping center lease agreement. Hastings contends: 1) cotenancy requirements of the agreement applied only during the first five years of the lease term, or 2) if the provisions are ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence supports Hastings' interpretation of the agreement. We agree with the trial court that the agreement is unambiguous and the cotenancy requirements apply to the entire term of the lease, including extensions of the lease. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

Hastings owns a retail shopping center in Pasadena. On September 21, 1999, Old Navy entered into an agreement to lease space in the shopping center.

Under the lease term provisions, the "Original Term" of the lease was five years. However, references to "the Term" in the lease include the "Original Term" and any extensions or renewals of the lease exercised in writing, unless context required otherwise. Old Navy had the option to extend "the Term" for two 5-year periods, referred to individually as an "Option Period," on the same terms and conditions as provided for the "Original Term," with the exception that different minimum rent terms were set forth for the "Original Term," the First Option Period and the Second Option Period.

Paragraph 13.3 sets forth cotenancy requirements. Subdivision (A) of paragraph 13.3 states: "For and during the first sixty (60) full calendar months of the Term (the `Initial Period') Tenant agrees to operate during the Required Times (as defined herein), subject to all applicable provisions of this Lease which permit closure of the Premises. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing sentence, Tenant shall not be required to open the Premises for business at all nor operate during Required Times unless (i) the Key Stores plus retail stores (other than the Premises and the Key Stores) having an aggregate of forty percent (40%) or more of the total [gross leasable area] of the Shopping Center (other than the Premises and the Key Stores) are also open for business during the Required Times; and (ii) within one hundred eighty (180) days following the Commencement Date, Key Stores plus retail stores (other than the Premises and the Key Stores) having an aggregate of seventy percent (70%) or more of the total [gross leasable area] of the Shopping Center (other than the Premises and the Key Stores) are also open for business during the Required Time."

Subdivision B of paragraph 13.3 contains definitions. "Cotenancy Requirements" means four specified "Key Stores" and a certain percentage of satellite stores are open for business during required times. "Open for Business" means a store is open and operating during the required times in substantially all of its space. "Required Times" are the days and hours set by Hastings, or the minimum days and times stated in the agreement. "Cotenancy Failure" means the cotenancy requirements are not being met.

If the cotenancy requirements were not met, Old Navy had three remedies under paragraph 13.4. One remedy was the right to close, set forth in paragraph 13.4, subdivision (A)(1): "Tenant may close the Premises for business and during such period of closure Tenant shall continue to pay Minimum Rent but not Other Charges and perform all of such other obligations as are applicable to a vacant premises. This remedy is referred to herein as the `Right to Close Remedy.' Subsequent to the Initial Period[,] Old Navy shall have no obligation to operate any business in the Premises whether or not there is a Cotenancy Failure. However, if Tenant is closed for business when the Cotenancy Requirements are being met, then Tenant shall be required to pay Other Charges."

As an alternative, if the cotenancy requirements were not met, the second remedy was to pay an alternate rent as provided in paragraph 13.4, subdivision (A)(2), as follows in pertinent part: "Tenant may remain open for business and pay monthly, as `Alternate Rent' during the period that the Cotenancy Requirements are not being met, in lieu of Minimum Rent, regular Percentage Rent and Other Charges, an amount equal to the lesser of: (a) two percent (2%) of all Gross Sales (without regard to the Breakpoint) made in the Premises for each month (or portion thereof) during such period, or (b) the amount of Minimum Rent then applicable." The third remedy was termination. If the cotenancy requirements were not met for nine months, Old Navy could terminate the lease.

After the initial five-year term, Old Navy exercised its option to extend the lease for an additional five years. In April 2008, a furniture store in the shopping center closed. As a result, the cotenancy requirements, if applicable, were not met. Old Navy attempted to pay the alternate rent provided for in paragraph 13.4, subdivision (A)(2). Hastings threatened to institute legal proceedings to recover damages and possession of the premises. Old Navy paid the amount that Hastings demanded under protest. In October 2009, a new store opened and the cotenancy requirements were met.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Hastings filed a complaint against Old Navy for declaratory relief. Hastings filed an amended complaint on May 28, 2009. Old Navy filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and money had and received on July 8, 2009. On December 23, 2009, Old Navy filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the lease unambiguously provides for Old Navy to pay "alternative rent" for the period from May 1, 2008, to December 7, 2009, when the shopping center's occupancy rate dropped below the 70 percent. Hastings filed a motion for summary judgment on December 24, 2009, on the ground that the occupancy provision applied to only the first five years of the term, and therefore did not apply after 2004. The trial court found that the cotenancy requirements applied beyond the initial period of the lease and the extrinsic evidence was not different from the language of Old Navy's letter of intent in any significant way. Therefore, the court granted Old Navy's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Old Navy in the amount of $706,418.22. Hastings filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

"We review the summary judgment de novo. [Citation.] Further, the `interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review where the interpretation does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence.' [Citations.]" (People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 520.)

Cotenancy Requirements

Hastings contends that under paragraph 13.3, subdivision (A), the cotenancy requirements of the lease agreement applied solely to the initial period of the term. We conclude that the plain language of the agreement reveals that the cotenancy requirements apply to the term of the lease, including extensions.

"The Supreme Court has held: `"`The fundamental rules of contract interpretation are based on the premise that the interpretation of a contract must give effect to the "mutual intention" of the parties. "Under statutory rules of contract interpretation, the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed governs interpretation. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) Such intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract. (Id., § 1639.) The `clear and explicit' meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their `ordinary and popular sense,' unless `used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage' (id., § 1644), controls judicial interpretation. (Id., § 1638.)" [Citations.] A [contract] provision will be considered ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable. [Citation.] But language in a contract must be interpreted as a whole, and in the circumstances of the case, and cannot be found to be ambiguous in the abstract.' [Citation.]"' [Citation.]" (EFund Capital Partners v. Pless (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1321.)

The plain language of the cotenancy requirements and remedies shows that they applied to the entire term of the agreement, including extensions. In paragraph 13.3, Old Navy agreed to operate its business for the first five years of the term, subject to provisions that allowed it to close, but it was not required to open or operate if the cotenancy requirements were not being met. Under paragraph 13.4, Old Navy had the right to close and pay only the minimum rent if the cotenancy requirements were not being met, but after the first five years, if Old Navy closed while cotenancy requirements were being met, Old Navy would have to pay other charges required under the agreement in addition to the minimum rent. As an alternate remedy when the cotenancy requirements were not being met, Old Navy could remain open for business and pay the lesser of the alternate rent or the minimum rent "then applicable."

The five-year limitation in paragraph 13.3 limits Old Navy's obligation to operate the business. It did not limit the application of the cotenancy requirements. After five years, as clarified in paragraph 13.4, Old Navy had no obligation to operate the business. It would be unreasonable to find the cotenancy requirements did not apply after the first five years, when paragraph 13.4 specifically sets forth the charges that Old Navy must pay if it closes after the first five years and the cotenancy requirements are being met. In addition, different minimum rent amounts were set forth in the agreement for the original term, the first option period and the second option period. The alternate rent provision specifically refers to paying the minimum rent "then applicable" which would be unnecessary if the remedy applied to only the first five years. The trial court correctly found the cotenancy requirements and remedies apply for the entire term of the agreement, including extensions.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Old Navy is awarded its costs on appeal.

We concur:

ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J.

MOSK, J.