ROY S. PAYNE, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Amazon Web Services, Inc., and VADATA, Inc. ("Amazon")'s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Transfer Claims Against Amazon Under The First-to-File Rule and to Stay Claims Against Customer Defendant Ericsson, Inc. Pending Resolution of the First-Filed Action in the Eastern District of Virginia (Dkt. No. 10) ("Amazon's Motion"), as well as Defendant Ericsson Inc. ("Ericsson")'s Motion to Stay and Joinder in Amazon's Motion to Stay (Dkt. No. 16) ("Ericsson's Motion"). For the following reasons, the Court hereby
Plaintiff Global Equity Management (SA) Pty. Ltd. ("GEMSA") filed 37 patent lawsuits (of which 34 are currently pending and 3 have been closed) with this Court in five main phases:
On
The consolidation orders in cases 2:16-cv-104, -1700, -1702, -1703 were posted
On
In all of these 34 currently pending lawsuits except for three,
On
Because GEMSA is an Australian company with no U.S. presence (Dkt. No. 10 at 1), and has not designated a representative in the United States for service of process affecting its patent rights (Id. at 7), Amazon filed its declaratory judgment suit in the Eastern District of Virginia under 35 U.S.C. § 293, which provides, in pertinent part:
35 U.S.C. § 293 (Emphasis added). Id. at 1, 7. Amazon also contends that "Amazon maintains offices and data centers that provide and support the accused technology" in the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. at 1.
On
In its pending 31 lawsuits alleging infringement by Amazon's customer Defendants, GEMSA alleges that each customer Defendant through its website "or one of its websites linked directly or indirectly thereto, accesses Amazon Web Services (`AWS')." Id. at 3.
According to GEMSA, the Amazon customer Defendants infringe because their websites "access[ed] websites, data, data centers and the like owned or controlled by Amazon." Id. at 4. The complaints in these Amazon customer suits also allege that each Amazon customer Defendant infringes the asserted '400 and '677 GEMSA patents by using a "GUI for the administration and management" of its website, and the "GUI" of these accused customer Defendant websites "interacts with AWS." Id. Amazon further contends that GEMSA's claim charts identify only functionality of Amazon's AWS, not individual features or technology provided by each of the customer Defendants, in their infringement contentions. Id.
An introductory segment in GEMSA's infringement contentions claim chart for the '400 patent states that the GUI of the accused customer Defendant websites "connects to a virtualized operating systems [sic] and databases run hosted [sic] by Amazon as . . . shown in the following charts." Id. The claim chart then includes mapping of every limitation of the asserted claims to a screen shot from the AWS website, e.g. (1) GEMSA accuses "Amazon's main menu bar" in an AWS screenshot as infringing the limitation of a "main menu bar" recited by claim 1 of the '400 patent (Id. at 4-5); (2) GEMSA alleges that "Amazon's cabinet selection button bar" in an AWS screenshot infringes the limitation of "a cabinet selection button bar" as recited by claim 1 of the '400 patent (Id. at 5); and (3) GEMSA alleges that a screenshot from the AWS website infringes each remaining limitation of claim 1 of the '400 patent, e.g., the limitation "a cabinet visible partition window" as recited by claim 1 of the '400 patent (Id. at 6).
GEMSA's infringement contention claim chart for the '677 patent similarly maps claim limitations from the '677 patent to screenshots of the AWS website. For example, (1) GEMSA maps the limitation "means for selecting one of said virtual computer systems to become next operable before suspending a currently operational virtual computer system" to an AWS screenshot (Id.), and (2) GEMSA also states that each accused Defendant customer website "satisfies the recitation via: [Each Defendant's] Client APP in AWS (Me SOS) / Framework/AMI [Amazon Machine Image] then XEN handles ACPI [Advanced Configuration and Power Interface] calls from AMIs and HW level," which Amazon contends is "squarely directed" to their technology because the AMI or "Amazon Machine Image" is used to create an instance of a virtual machine on Amazon's "Elastic Compute Cloud" (EC2) web service, and "XEN" refers to the primary virtual machine hypervisor used by Amazon's EC2. Id. at 6-7. Therefore, Amazon contends that "GEMSA's complaints and its infringement contentions make clear that Amazon's technology — not the technology provided by, or specific to, any of the disparate Amazon customers it has sued — is the sole basis of GEMSA's infringement case" and that each of "these customers [ranging from Ticketleap.com, LLC, to Uber Technologies, Inc., to Ubisoft Studio Inc., to Netflix, Inc., Zillow, Inc., and Spotify USA Inc.] provide a wide variety of products and services, including music and video streaming, video gaming, travel services, financial services, and consumer health products, among others — none of which is accused of infringing the GEMSA Patents." Id. at 7.
The contentions from the parties involving Amazon's Eastern District of Virginia ("EDVa") declaratory judgment ("DJ") action and GEMSA's Eastern District of Texas ("EDTx") patent suits will be addressed first before the Court performs its analysis of the case at hand.
Amazon first argues that because their
Amazon then asserts that GEMSA's
Amazon further contends that the core issues in both the EDVa DJ action and the EDTx patent suits not only "substantially" overlap — they "completely" overlap (Dkt. No. 10 at 14), an assertion that GEMSA does not dispute (Dkt. No. 13 at 5; Dkt. No. 19 at 2).
Amazon additionally argues that because (1) Amazon is the real party-in-interest with respect to GEMSA's infringement allegations, (2) Amazon's filing of its EDVa DJ action was not anticipatory, (3) venue and jurisdiction are proper in the EDVa, and (4) there is no efficiency to be gained from consolidation with any other case in the EDTx, there is no reason for the Court to deviate from the first-to-file rule. (Dkt. No. 10 at 14-17).
Amazon finally asserts that Federal Circuit law — specifically In re Google, 588 F. App'x 988, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2014) and In re Nintendo, 756 F.3d 1363,1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) as well as various district court cases listed at (Dkt. No. 10 at 20-21) — mandates that customer suits must be stayed in favor of suits against the real source of the accused technology. Id. at 17-20.
In response, GEMSA argues that because their 20 earlier-filed
GEMSA then asserts that Amazon has failed to establish that the customer suit exception properly applies here because their Defendant customers are not "mere resellers" as they allege is required by the customer suit exception. Id. at 5-7.
GEMSA further contends that the customer suit exception's guiding principles of efficiency and judicial economy comprising three factors
GEMSA additionally argues that Amazon has not proven that a substantial controversy exists for their EDVa DJ action (Id. at 8-9), that Amazon has failed to prove that its customers agreed to be bound by infringement and validity decisions in the EDVa DJ action (Id. at 9-10), and that the equities of the customer suit doctrine do not support transfer to EDVa (Id. at 10-11).
GEMSA next asserts that Amazon has not proven that the convenience factors under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) show EDVa is "clearly more convenient" than EDTx, namely that the relative ease of access to sources of proof actually weighs against transfer (e.g. Ericsson "regularly conducts business" in the EDTx, prior-art witnesses are located in Texas, and key patent prosecution documents are located in the Houston area) (Id. at 11-15). Also, GEMSA contends that many Texas witnesses GEMSA identified are subject to compulsory process in the EDTx but not EDVa (Id. at 15), the cost of attendance for willing witnesses weighs against transfer (Id. at 16), the motions to transfer venue to EDVa involve only some of the related actions, thus transferring would result in conflicting rulings (Id. at 16-17), Amazon has not shown that EDTx would be necessarily slower or that EDVa would be faster (Dkt. No. 17-18), the EDTx has a particular local interest in the outcome of the case (Id. at 18), the EDTx's familiarity with the governing law (patent law and also issues of Texas state law involving patents) weighs against transfer to EDVa (Id. at 18-19) and transfer could raise potential conflict of law issues (Id. at 20).
In reply, Amazon first argues that the case here is nearly indistinguishable from the facts of In re Google, 588 F. App'x at 990, which GEMSA ignores in their response. (Dkt. No. 17 at 1). Amazon then asserts that its EDVa DJ action is still first-filed under the first-to-file rule because the Federal Circuit (in e.g., In re Google, 588 F. App'x at 989) has held that first-filed customer suits (such as the EDTx Defendant customer suits filed by GEMSA) are not entitled to deference under the first-to-file rule. (Dkt. No. 17 at 1-2). Amazon next contends that GEMSA's reliance on the 60 year-old Kerotest case, 342 U.S. at 180, is misplaced because it involved only one customer case, where GEMSA has sued more than 30 customer defendants here. Id. at 2-3.
Amazon additionally argues that the EDVa is the proper venue for this lawsuit not only because of 35 U.S.C. § 293, which states that non-resident patentees such as GEMSA must be sued in the EDVa, but also due to the convenience factors under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. at 4. Namely, in terms of the 1404(a) convenience factors, none of the relevant parties have any connection to the EDTx and even Ericsson's presence in the EDTx is not relevant because under the Google case, only the location of evidence and witnesses pertaining to the true target of the infringement allegations (here, Amazon) matter. Id. at 4-5. Furthermore, GEMSA is an Australian company with no employees, operation or presence in Texas, and Amazon has strong connections to Virginia because it maintains offices and data centers there that provide and support the accused technology, and Amazon's offices and data centers in Virginia employ a large number of people, including employee witnesses who may have knowledge relevant to the issues in this case. Id. at 5. As a result, because the majority of relevant evidence in patent infringement cases usually comes from the accused infringer, the ease of accessing Amazon's sources of proof weighs in favor of transfer to EDVa. Id. Finally, Amazon states that several potentially important prior art witnesses are located on the east coast — including named inventors of prior art references cited on the face of the '677 and '400 patents and assignees of the patents, such as Lucent or IBM, are all located in New York, New Jersey and Illinois — making the EDVa more convenient overall. Id. at 5-6.
Amazon further asserts that this case falls squarely within the customer suit exception to the first-to-file rule because the Federal Circuit in the Google case rejected the "mere reseller" argument. Id. at 6. Amazon also argues that courts routinely stay cases brought against users of software pending resolution of claims between the patentee and the producer of the software, even where the end users are not "resellers" or have to take some action as part of the alleged infringement. Id. at 7. In addition, Amazon contends that the very point of their EDVa DJ action is to avoid duplicative action and GEMSA's argument that "litigating more than 30 cases in this district could somehow be more efficient than litigating a single case in Virginia" makes no sense. Id. at 8. Amazon further notes that it has over a million customers of its web services, of which GEMSA has chosen to sue just a few dozen; therefore, resolution of a single EDVa DJ action will moot litigation not only for the over 30 pending customer suits but also potentially hundreds if not thousands of future suits against Amazon customers. Id. at 9.
Amazon states that GEMSA identified only three of its more than 30 customer cases that involve anything other than Amazon technology (e.g. the actions against Alibaba, 2:15-cv-1702; E-Bay, 2:16-cv-98; and Booking.com, 2:15-cv-1703) — which Amazon argues is not a reason to have over 30 trials in the EDTx, particularly when Amazon's single EDVa DJ action will resolve all the issues in all the pending customer cases. Id. Amazon also points out that GEMSA's assertion that Amazon should have intervened in over 30 different lawsuits than filing a single DJ action is the "antithesis of efficiency" and staying the claims against Amazon's numerous customer defendants while EDVa resolves a single DJ action is the most efficient approach. Id. at 9-10.
Finally, Amazon asserts that "[i]f Amazon wins a judgment of non-infringement in the Virginia [DJ] action, GEMSA cannot prove infringement by Amazon customers. And if Amazon succeeds on its invalidity claims, GEMSA will have no patents to assert in the customer cases. If, on the other hand, GEMSA prevails on its anticipated infringement counterclaims, it will win a damages award from Amazon and would be unable to recover in any subsequent action against Amazon's customers based solely on their use of Amazon's technology—which is what GEMSA alleges in this district . . . Thus, whether Amazon's customers agree to be bound or not, GEMSA's customer claims will be resolved once Amazon's [EDVa DJ] action is resolved. GEMSA's customer claims should be stayed."
In sur-reply, GEMSA mainly repeats the same arguments it made before in its response, however more briefly. Specifically, GEMSA asserts that their EDTx suits conform to the firstfiled rule (Id. at 1-2), the customer suit exception does not apply to Amazon here, at least because the customer Defendants are not "merely resellers" and the principles of efficiency and economy would not be served by transfer (Id. at 2-3), that Amazon has not proven a proper DJ action in failing to prove that a substantial controversy exists for a DJ action,
"The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that under the doctrine of comity, when cases involving substantially overlapping issues are pending before two federal district courts, there is a strong preference to avoid duplicative litigation," a practice that "reflects an elementary principle of `wise judicial administration.'" In re Google Inc., 588 F. App'x 988, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2014), citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952).
In maintaining the conservation of judicial resources, both the Federal Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have utilized the "first-to-file rule" which "stands for the common sense proposition that, when two cases are the same or very similar, efficiency concerns dictate that only one court decide both cases" and where "the overlap is complete or nearly complete, the usual rule is for the court of first jurisdiction to resolve the issues." In re Telebrands Corporation, 824 F.3d 982, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2016); See Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997); West Gulf Mar. Ass'n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 730 (5th Cir. 1985). Therefore, as a doctrine intended to avoid conflicting decisions and promote judicial efficiency, the first-to-file rule "generally favors pursuing only the first-filed action when multiple lawsuits involving the same claims are filed in different jurisdictions." Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The first-to-file rule should also not be applied rigidly. See Kerotest, 342 U.S. at 183 ("Wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation, does not counsel rigid mechanical solution of such problems."); Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (exceptions to the first-to-file rule may be made if justified by "considerations of judicial and litigant economy, and the just and effective disposition of disputes.") (internal quotations omitted).
"Under the first-to-file rule, a district court may choose to stay, transfer, or dismiss a duplicative later-filed action, although there are exceptions and the rule is not rigidly or mechanically applied — `an ample degree of discretion, appropriate for disciplined and experienced judges, must be left to the lower courts.'" Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2012), citing Kerotest, 342 U.S. at 183-84; See Futurewei Technologies, Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp., 737 F.3d 704, 708 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("Application of the first-to-file rule is `generally a matter for a district court's discretion, exercised within governing legal constraints.'); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005).
A customer suit exception exists to the first-to-file rule which provides that "litigation against or brought by the manufacturer of infringing goods takes precedence over a suit by the patent owner against customers of the manufacturer." In re Dell Inc., 600 F. App'x 728, 730 (Fed. Cir. 2015), citing Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The customer suit exception is also "based on the manufacturer's presumed greater interest in defending its actions against charges of patent infringement; and to guard against possibility of abuse." Spread Spectrum Screenings LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 657 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011), citing Kahn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 889 F.2d 1078, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); see also Katz, 909 F.2d at 1464 (stating that "the manufacturer is the true defendant in the customer suit" and that it "must protect its customers, either as a matter of contract, or good business, in order to avoid the damaging impact of an adverse ruling against its products") (citation omitted). The "guiding principles in the customer suit exception cases are efficiency and judicial economy." Spectrum Screenings, 657 F.3d at 1357, citing Tegic Commc'ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006). "Generally speaking, courts apply the customer suit exception to stay earlier-filed litigation against a customer while a later-filed case involving the manufacturer proceeds in another forum." Spectrum Screenings, 657 F.3d at 1357.
Applying the first-to-file rule, the Court finds that Amazon's EDVa DJ action (E.D. Va Case No. 3:16-cv-619) was first filed. Thus, Amazon's EDVa DJ action shall proceed first while 21 GEMSA EDTx suits shall be STAYED, pending resolution of Amazon's EDVa DJ action.
Considering the balancing of equities and the degree of discretion afforded district courts in applying the first-to-file rule, the Court finds that Amazon has sufficiently proven that its EDVa DJ action was "first filed" on
Furthermore, even though GEMSA's
GEMSA's reliance and citation of Kerotest is also not relevant, persuasive or on point here, and is distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
Regardless of the first-to-file analysis, venue is also proper in EDVa for two main reasons.
First, 35 U.S.C. § 293 states that "the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia shall have jurisdiction" over non-resident patentees, and the parties do not dispute that GEMSA is an Australian company with a principal place of business located at 458 Morphett Road, Warradale, South Australia (Dkt. No. 8 at 1, ¶ 1), with no designated service representative in the U.S., and no employees or operations in Texas. (Dkt. No. 10 at 7; Dkt. No. 17 at 5).
Second, a court may consider venue considerations and depart from the usual first-to-file analysis in determining which case to first try when "judicial and litigant economy, and the just and effective disposition of disputes, require otherwise." Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed.Cir.1993). Specifically, a court can look to the "the convenience and availability of witnesses, [the] absence of jurisdiction over all necessary or desirable parties . . . the possibility of consolidation with related litigation, or considerations relating to the real party in interest." Futurewei, 737 F.3d at 708, citing Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F. 2d at 938.
In other words, a court can consider the convenience factors under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) in determining which case to try first. Both Amazon and GEMSA do not appear to have any connections or ties to the EDTx. Even though GEMSA argues that Ericsson has a "presence" in the EDTx, the Federal Circuit has rejected contacts of a customer Defendant being adequate to establish venue over a key Defendant (such as Amazon) who provides technology to various Defendant customers. Google, 588 F. App'x at 990. Instead, more focus is given to the location of evidence and witnesses relevant to this key technology Defendant, here Amazon (and in the Google case was Google, who provided the Android source code for many customer defendants and who also designed, created and tested products in the Northern District of California, a clearly more convenient forum). Id. Furthermore, § 1404(a) serves to "prevent the waste `of time, energy and money' and `to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.'" Nintendo, 756 F.3d at 1365-66, citing Katz, 909 F.2d at 1464.
Just as the Northern District of California was more convenient for Google because it was the location of witnesses and evidence relevant to the Android source code, the EDVa is where Amazon maintains offices, employees, and data centers that provide, support and create the accused technology. Potential employee witnesses who have relevant knowledge regarding the accused technology are also based in the EDVa. Therefore, the ease of access to evidence and witnesses from the primary accused infringer (here, Amazon) appear to weigh in favor of EDVa being the proper venue. Amazon has also shown that several potentially critical prior art witnesses are located on the east coast, including inventors of patents cited on the faces of the '677 and '400 patents living in New York, New Jersey and Illinois, and assignees of the asserted patents such as Lucent and IBM also being based in New Jersey and New York.
As an analysis performed independently from the first-to-file rule, and irrespective of which suit was technically "filed first," the Court finds that under the customer suit exception, GEMSA's EDTX patent suits should be stayed while Amazon's EDVA DJ action should proceed.
Because the Federal Circuit has stated that the guiding principles in applying the customer suit exception are efficiency and judicial economy, there is overwhelming justification in staying the over 30 pending GEMSA EDTx patent suits in favor of allowing Amazon's EDVa DJ action to go forward, especially if there is a possibility or likelihood that all of GEMSA's pending patent cases can be resolved once Amazon's EDVa DJ action is resolved.
Furthermore, the Court finds unpersuasive GEMSA's argument that the customer suit exception does not apply because the Amazon customer Defendants are not "mere resellers" of Amazon technology. As the Federal Circuit ruled in the Google case (in response to a nearly identical argument raised by patentee Rockstar stating that Google's customer defendant Samsung was not a reseller of Google technology because Samsung manufactured the accused mobile device hardware while Google did not), a "flexible approach" should be applied, regardless of whether a customer Defendant is really a reseller of another Defendant's technology, which includes "staying proceedings if the other suit is so closely related that substantial savings of litigation resources can be expected." 588 Fed. App'x at 991. Therefore, in Google, the Federal Circuit reasoned that "staying proceedings in Texas [would] likely further these objectives [e.g., saving litigation resources, judicial efficiency] by mooting or at least advancing the `major premises' being litigated in the Texas actions." Id., quoting Katz, 909 F.2d at 1464; see also Nintendo, 746 F.3d at 1365-66 (where the Federal Circuit stayed the retailer defendant suits because "the issues of infringement and validity [were] common to Nintendo and the Retailer Defendants").
The "customer-suit" exception also exists to avoid, if possible, "imposing the burdens of trial on the customer, for it is the manufacturer who is generally the `true defendant' in the dispute." Id. at 1365. Consequently, because the resolution of Amazon's EDVa DJ action will likely resolve the "major issues" in GEMSA's EDTx customer suits, and Amazon for all practical purposes can be considered the "true defendant" here, GEMSA's EDTx customer suits should be stayed as a matter of judicial efficiency and economy. After all, "the customer-suit exception . . . [is] designed to facilitate just, convenient, efficient, and less expensive determination." Id. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1; Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964).
In considering a motion to stay, this Court considers: "(1) whether a stay will unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the nonmoving party; (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case; and (3) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set." Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 490 F.Supp.2d 749, 754 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (citation omitted).
First, a stay will not unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to GEMSA because "major issues" relevant to their EDTx suits will be heard, namely patent validity and infringement issues pertaining to the '400 and '677 patents. Furthermore, if GEMSA prevails in the EDVa DJ action, they will still be able to pursue the customer patent suits in the EDTx. Second, a stay would also vastly simplify the issues in question and trial of the case, and resolution of the single EDVa DJ action could singlehandedly resolve the 30 or more pending EDTx patent suits. Third, at least in the cases consolidated under 2:16-v-618, a trial date has not been set and a Docket Control Order ("DCO") has not even been posted — although GEMSA has filed a proposed DCO (Dkt. No. 92) suggesting that the close of fact discovery be January 29, 2018, more than a year from now. Therefore, a motion to stay GEMSA's 22 EDTx patent suits consolidated under 2:16cv-618 pending resolution of Amazon's EDVa DJ action is warranted and should be granted.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby