NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

YEGAN, J.

Earnest Alexander appeals his conviction, by jury, of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)1 and evading an officer. (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a).) He was also acquitted of one count of second degree robbery and one count of first degree burglary. The trial court sentenced appellant, under the Three Strikes Law, to a total term in state prison of 57 years to life. He contends the trial court erred because its instruction to the jury regarding robbery (CALCRIM No. 376) impermissibly lowered the prosecution's burden of proof, and because its instruction regarding circumstantial evidence (CALCRIM No. 224) improperly implied that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to direct evidence. Appellant further contends the trial court erred because it failed to instruct the jury regarding an uncharged perpetrator. (CALCRIM No. 373.) Finally, appellant contends his conviction of evading must be reversed because Vehicle Code section 2800.2 contains an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption. We affirm.

Facts

At about 1:45 a.m. on January 7, 2009, appellant robbed Connie Chung in the parking structure of the apartment building where she lived. Chung worked as a supervisor at the Hustler Casino in Carson, California and was on her way home from work at the time. She was walking through the parking structure toward her apartment and talking on her cell phone to her boyfriend when she heard appellant walking behind her. Although Chung tried to run away, appellant caught up to her, pushed her to the ground, grabbed her purse and ran away. The victim's boyfriend immediately called 911.

Fortuitously, two Torrance police officers were nearby in a marked patrol car. They spotted a silver Toyota Camry stopped partially in an intersection. Appellant was behind the wheel and was alone in the car. When the officers attempted to make a traffic stop, appellant slowed down and started to pull to the curb. Then, at the last minute, he accelerated. A chase began. Appellant made numerous illegal lane changes, made a u-turn against a solid red light, and drove between 60 and 80 miles per hour on surface streets where the speed limit is 35 to 40 miles per hour. He then drove onto the 110 freeway, weaving in and out of traffic lanes at very high speeds between 70 and 110 miles per hour.

Eventually, appellant transitioned to the westbound 91 freeway which turned into Artesia Boulevard. At one point, he threw what appeared to be a purse from the driver's side window of the Camry. The object landed in the open bed of a pickup truck. Appellant was arrested after he drove into a dead-end alley. In his pockets, appellant had a wallet, approximately $2712 in cash and some jewelry. A search of his car revealed other personal property including a Louis Vuitton bag. The purse appellant threw from his car window was also recovered. It belonged to Connie Chung, the robbery victim, and was returned to her.

Appellant was acquitted of the second degree robbery and first degree burglary of Young Ahn. On January 2, 2009, Ahn had been robbed inside her garage after she returned home from the Hustler Casino in Carson. Someone hit her from behind, knocked her down and stole her purse, a Louis Vuitton bag with a large chocolate stain inside. It had contained $5000 in cash receipts from the Ahn family's restaurant. Ahn identified the Louis Vuitton bag recovered from appellant's car as her own. She recognized it because of the large chocolate stain on the inside.

The defense theory at trial was that another man, Jay Stone, committed the Chung robbery. Appellant testified that, before his arrest, he was employed part time doing computer and cell phone repair at a swap meet in Gardena, California. Jay Stone worked in the same booth at the swap meet. On the night of the robbery, appellant was at a topless bar where he had been a regular customer for years. While he was at the bar, appellant got a cell phone call from Jay Stone who wanted to meet with appellant. Stone gave appellant directions to the apartment complex where the robbery occurred. When appellant got there, he parked and waited for Stone to show up. Eventually, Stone appeared. He tried to get into the passenger side of the car but could not because the door was locked. Stone threw a purse into the passenger seat through the open window and then ran off into the night. Appellant drove around the neighborhood looking for Stone but could not find him.

Appellant claimed that he was not aware, at first, that the police were following him. When he noticed the lights, he pulled over but the patrol car did not stop. Appellant continued on to the freeway. Once on the freeway, he again noticed the police cars. Appellant admitted to speeding on the freeway. He did not pull over "[o]ut of shock, fear" due to the purse being in his car. Eventually, appellant threw the purse out the window and then he stopped in an alley and was arrested.

Discussion

CALCRIM No. 376

The trial court instructed the jury: "If you conclude that the defendant knew he possessed property and you conclude that the property had in fact been recently stolen, you may not convict the defendant of Robbery based on those facts alone. However, if you also find that supporting evidence tends to prove his guilt, then you may conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove he committed Robbery. [¶] The supporting evidence need only be slight and need not be enough by itself to prove guilt. You may consider how, where, and when the defendant possessed the property, along with any other relevant circumstances tending to prove his guilt of Robbery. [¶] Remember that you may not convict the defendant of any crime unless you are convinced that each fact essential to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of that crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (CALCRIM No. 376.)

Appellant contends the instruction violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to have each element of the charged offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and his right under the Fourteenth Amendment to due process of law. We disagree.

Athough appellant did not object to the instruction in the trial court, he has not forfeited appellate review because "the issue raised asserts a violation of substantial constitutional rights." (People v. O'Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574.) We conclude, however, that no violation of those rights occurred. As the court noted in O'Dell, CALCRIM No. 376 is substantially similar to the previous pattern jury instruction on this issue, CALJIC No. 2.15. Our Supreme Court repeatedly approved CALJIC No. 2.15 in the face of constitutional challenges.2 (See, e.g., People v Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 676-677; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 37-38, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879.)

Like its predecessor, CALCRIM No. 376 prohibits the jury from drawing an inference of guilt based solely on evidence that the appellant knowingly possessed recently stolen property. The jury is allowed, however, to draw an inference of guilt where there is additional supporting evidence, even if the supporting evidence would not be sufficient, by itself, to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. "As long as the corroborating evidence together with the conscious possession could naturally and reasonably support an inference of guilt, and that inference is sufficient to sustain a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, we discern nothing that lessens the prosecution's burden of proof or implicates a defendant's right to due process." (People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1173 [referring to CALJIC No. 2.15].)

Appellant contends the reference to "slight" supporting evidence reduces the prosecution's burden of proof below that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. First, the instruction makes it clear that the "slight" supporting evidence is not to be considered in isolation, but together with all of the other evidence for purposes of determining whether there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed robbery. (See, e.g., People v. Solorzano (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1035-1036.) Second, the instruction expressly requires the jury to be "convinced that each fact essential to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of that crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (CALCRIM No. 376.) Thus, CALCRIM No. 376 did nothing to diminish the prosecution's burden of proof. (See, e.g., People v. Letner (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 189 [CALJIC No. 2.15 contains no "suggestion . . . that the jury need not find that all of the elements of robbery (or theft) had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt."].)

CALCRIM No. 224

The trial court instructed the jury on its consideration of circumstantial evidence using CALCRIM No. 224.3 Appellant contends this violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the instruction implied that the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden to prove facts beyond a reasonable doubt apply only to circumstantial evidence and not to direct evidence. This same argument was rejected in People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 931, which described it as "misread[ing] the instruction." We agree.

CALCRIM No. 224 does not define the burden of proof or the presumption of innocence; these are defined elsewhere, including in CALCRIM No. 220. The function of both this instruction and the preceding instruction, CALCRIM No. 223, is to explain the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence and to "`clarify the application of the general doctrine requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a case in which the defendant's guilt must be inferred from a pattern of incriminating circumstances. [Citations.]' (People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 629 [7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865].)" (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 826 [construing substantially similar pattern jury instructions, CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02].) When read together with CALCRIM Nos. 220, 222 and 223, the instruction at issue here benefits appellant by reinforcing both the requirement that the People prove each fact essential to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the requirement that the jury may not "rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty unless the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from it points to the defendant's guilt." (People v. Anderson, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 931.) There was no error.

Claimed Failure to Instruct with CALCRIM No. 373

Appellant's trial counsel requested that the jury be instructed concerning an uncharged perpetrator in terms of CALCRIM No. 373. Counsel argued the instruction was required because appellant testified that Jay Stone committed the robbery. The trial court concluded the instruction did not apply because no other person had been charged or implicated in the case. In his closing argument, defense counsel reminded the jury about the testimony concerning Jay Stone and blamed the robbery on him. Appellant now contends the trial court's refusal to instruct in terms of CALCRIM No. 373 deprived him of his due process right to have the jury instructed on the defense theory of the case. We are not persuaded.

CALCRIM No. 373 provides: "The evidence shows that (another person/other persons) may have been involved in the commission of the crime[s] charged against the defendant. There may be many reasons why someone who appears to have been involved might not be a codefendant in this particular trial. You must not speculate about whether (that other person has/those other persons have) been or will be prosecuted. Your duty is to decide whether the defendant on trial here committed the crime[s] charged."

"A criminal defendant has the right to instructions that pinpoint the theory of the defense case." (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 660.) A pinpoint instruction is one that does not involve a general principle of law but instead "relate[s] particular facts to a legal issue in the case or `pinpoint[s]' the crux of a defendant's case, such as mistaken identification or alibi.'" (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 675, quoting People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119.) CALCRIM No. 373 would not, however, have functioned as a pinpoint instruction in this case because it did not relate particular facts to the defense theory that Stone was responsible for the crime. As written, CALCRIM No. 373 does not require the jury to consider evidence that someone else committed the crime, nor does it prevent the jury from doing so. "It merely says the jury is not to speculate on whether someone else might or might not be prosecuted." (People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 918, overruled on other grounds, People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6; see also People v. Sanders (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 350, 360.) Because there was no evidence concerning other potential prosecutions, the trial court did not err when it declined to give this instruction.

Moreover, any error in omitting the instruction was harmless. The jury was informed under other instructions that it could not convict appellant unless it was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant — rather than some other person — committed the crimes charged. Had the jury believed the testimony that Jay Stone committed the robbery, it would have been required to acquit appellant even in the absence of CALCRIM No. 373.

Felony Evading

Appellant was convicted of violating Vehicle Code section 2800.2. This statute provides that it is a felony to "flee[] or attempt[] to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of Section 2800.1 [where] the pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property . . . ." (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a).)4 Subdivision (b) of the same statute provides: "For purposes of this section, a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property includes, but is not limited to, driving while fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer during which time either three or more violations that are assigned a traffic violation point count under Section 12810 occur, or damage to property occurs." (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (b).)

The trial court instructed the jury that, to prove appellant had violated section 2800.2, the prosecution had to prove that, "1. A peace officer driving a motor vehicle was pursuing the defendant; [¶] 2. The defendant, who was also driving a motor vehicle, willfully fled from, or tried to elude, the officer, intending to evade the officer; 3. During the pursuit, the defendant drove with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property[.]" It further instructed the jury: "Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage. [¶] A person acts with wanton disregard for safety when (1) he or she is aware that his or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm, (2) and he or she intentionally ignores that risk. The person does not, however, have to intend to cause damage. [¶] Driving with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property includes, but is not limited to, causing damage to property while driving or committing three or more violations that are each assigned a traffic violation point. [¶] Running A Red Light, An Illegal U-Turn, Speeding, Reckless Driving, [and] Unsafe Lane Changes are each assigned a traffic violation point." (CALCRIM No. 2181.)

Appellant objects to the portion of the instruction informing the jury that, "Driving with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property includes, but is not limited to, . . . committing three or more violations that are each assigned a traffic violation point." (CALCRIM No. 2181.) He contends this creates an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption because a finding that he committed three or more traffic violations does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the defendant acted with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Appellant concedes this argument has been rejected in several recent cases. (People v. Mutuma (2007) 144 Cal.App.4th 635; People v. Laughlin (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1020; People v. Williams (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1440, People v Pinkston (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 387.) He contends these cases were wrongly decided. We are not convinced.

A mandatory rebuttable presumption tells the trier of fact that, if a specified fact has been proven, then the trier of fact must find that a specified factual element of the crime has also been proven, unless the defendant comes forward with evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts. (Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 [99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777].) Mandatory rebuttable presumptions raise due process concerns in a criminal case "since the prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157 . . . .) The prosecution `may not rest its case entirely on a [mandatory rebuttable] presumption unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' (Id. at p. 167 . . . .)" (People v. McCall (2004) 32 Cal.4th 175, 183.)

The rule against mandatory rebuttable presumptions does not, however, prevent the Legislature from creating substantive rules of law that define statutory terms or the elements of an offense. (Id. at pp. 185-186.) For example, a statute may provide that possession of chemicals which, when mixed, form a controlled substance "shall be deemed" to be possession of the controlled substance itself. Such statute creates a rule of substantive law rather than a mandatory presumption; it defines one set of facts (possession of the chemicals) as the legal equivalent of another (possession of the controlled substance). (People v. McCall, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 188.) "A rule of substantive law defines in precise terms conduct that establishes an element of an offense as a matter of law. [Citation.] There is no presumption and there is nothing to rebut." (People v. Laughlin, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1026.) Statutes that establish rules of substantive law do not raise the same due process concerns as mandatory presumptions. "Substantive due process allows lawmakers broad power to select the elements of crimes, and to define one thing in terms of another." (People v. McCall, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 189.)

People v. Pinkston, held that Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (b) is a definitional section rather than an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. As the Pinkston court explained: "Vehicle Code section 2800.2 uses the phrase `willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property' to describe an element of reckless evading, [and] the statute defines this element so that it may be satisfied by proof of property damage or by proof that the defendant committed three Vehicle Code violations. Thus, section 2800.2 subdivision (b) establishes a rule of substantive law rather than a presumption . . . . In other words, evasive driving during which the defendant commits three or more specified traffic violations is a violation of section 2800.2 `because of the substantive statutory definition of the crime' rather than because of a presumption. [Citation.] Since there is no presumption, due process is not violated." (People v. Pinkston, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 392-393.)

Appellant urges us to conclude that Pinkston was wrongly decided. We decline the invitation because we agree with Pinkston, supra, that Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (b) defines the term "willful and wanton" conduct for purposes of subdivision (a). The statute therefore establishes a rule of substantive law. It does not create a mandatory presumption. (People v. Laughlin, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1027-1028; People v. Williams, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1446.) As a consequence, the trial court did not deprive appellant of due process when it instructed the jury in the terms of the statute.

Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

PERREN, J.