NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

OPINION

MOORE, Acting P. J.

Plaintiff Leann D. Wilson sued defendants Aram Bonni, M.D., Valley Surgical Center (VSC) and Garden Grove Hospital Medical Center for negligence and medical malpractice. Bonni is the only party to this appeal. Bonni and VSC moved to compel arbitration and stay court proceedings pursuant to multiple arbitration agreements Wilson had signed. The court granted the motion, and Bonni and VSC prevailed at arbitration. Subsequently, the case was dismissed. Wilson now appeals, arguing the court should not have granted arbitration as to Bonni because he, under Wilson's theory, was not a party to any arbitration agreement with her. Due to the language in the agreements stating they applied to a broad class of persons associated with VSC, we disagree and therefore affirm the judgment.

I

FACTS

Bonni is a licensed urogynecologist. He saw Wilson at VSC on at least four occasions between June and October 2010 on a nonemergency basis. Before at least four of those visits, Wilson signed an arbitration agreement. As best we can tell, and the parties do not claim otherwise, the four agreements are substantively identical. The agreements were signed by representatives of VSC and by Wilson, but not by Bonni.

The agreements stated, among other things, that "any dispute as to medical malpractice . . . will be determined by submission to arbitration." They also stated that "[i]t is the intention of the parties that this agreement bind all parties whose claims may arise out of or relate to treatment or service provided by the physician. . . . [¶] All claims for monetary damages exceeding the jurisdictional limit of the small claims court against the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association, corporation or partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of any of them, must be arbitrated. . . ."

Wilson filed the instant case in August 2011, alleging negligence and medical malpractice, against all three defendants. While we need not delve into the details of the malpractice allegations here, the complaint did allege that "each and every defendant was an employee, agent, and/or ostensible agent of every other defendant, and each and every defendant had advance knowledge of and/or ratified the actions of each and every other defendant."

At a case management conference in April 2012, Bonni represented to the court that Wilson had signed an arbitration agreement applicable to her complaint. The court continued the conference to allow Bonni to file a petition to compel arbitration. He did so in June, with a hearing set for September. As relevant here, Bonni argued that he was bound by the arbitration agreements as an "associate" of VSC.

In July, while the petition was pending, Wilson filed a first amended complaint. Her agency allegations, as quoted above, were repeated verbatim. She also added new allegations about VSC, claiming it was negligent in granting Bonni "staff privileges."

In August, while Bonni's petition was still pending, VSC filed its own petition to arbitrate, set to be heard the same day as Bonni's petition.

There is no evidence in the record that Wilson ever filed an opposition to either petition to compel arbitration. Six days prior to the hearing, VSC filed a notice that it had not received any opposition. The hearing was continued from September 25 to October 16, but again, there is no evidence Wilson ever filed a written opposition.

At the hearing, the court was initially inclined to find that Bonni was employed by VSC. VSC's position was that Bonni was not an employee, but an independent contractor with staff privileges, and was therefore covered by the arbitration agreement "because it specifically mentions physicians in the context of claims being made for medical malpractice." Wilson, having submitted no opposition in writing, argued for the first time that if VSC wanted to admit Bonni was an employee, he was subject to the arbitration agreements; but if he was not an employee, he was not covered. Bonni's counsel argued that "associates of [VSC] are also swept up into the arbitration agreement. And that's the argument that we made." The court reread the provision and agreed. The court subsequently granted the petitions as to Bonni and VSC, and stayed the case against them, as well as the case against Garden Grove Hospital Medical Center, which was not subject to the arbitration agreements. Wilson dismissed her cases against VSC and Garden Grove Hospital Medical Center in January 2015.

Bonni and Wilson proceeded to arbitration. Apparently at some point during the arbitration, there was a discovery dispute that Bonni lost. In July 2014, Bonni filed a petition with the court to vacate the discovery order. In her introduction to the opposition to that petition, Wilson stated: "Plaintiff and Defendants consented to binding arbitration."

Ultimately, Bonni prevailed at the arbitration. After the court was advised of the outcome, Wilson's case against Bonni was dismissed without prejudice.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Appealable Order

On April 15, 2016, Bonni filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal did not arise from an appealable order. We denied that motion, and need not revisit the issue here.

B. Standard of Review and General Principles

"We use general principles of California contract law to determine the enforceability of [an] arbitration agreement." (Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates v. Beta Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1153.) "`If the court's order is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard. [Citations.] Alternatively, if the court's denial rests solely on a decision of law, then a de novo standard of review is employed. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 60.) When there is no conflicting evidence regarding the meaning of the agreement, its interpretation is a question of law. (Ibid.) The parties here, unsurprisingly, disagree on the proper standard of review. Ultimately, however, it will make little difference; under either standard of review, the outcome will be the same.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 requires a court to order arbitration "if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate . . . exists." California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as an expeditious and cost-effective way of resolving disputes. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9.)

C. Wilson's Failure to Contest Allegations of Bonni's Petition

Bonni's first argument — which is not addressed at all in Wilson's reply brief — is that by failing to submit written opposition to Bonni's petition to arbitrate in the trial court, Wilson has admitted all of the allegations of the petition. The factual allegations included that the arbitration agreements "covered all the medical care and treatment rendered to Ms. Wilson by Dr. Bonni, as an associate of [VSC]."

Code of Civil Procedure section 1290 is entitled "Commencement of proceedings by filing petition; response; allegations." It states that a proceeding seeking arbitration "is commenced by filing a petition. Any person named as a respondent in a petition may file a response thereto. The allegations of a petition are deemed to be admitted by a respondent duly served therewith unless a response is duly served and filed." (Ibid; see Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 19, 28, overruled on other grounds by Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 407; A.D. Hoppe Co. v. Fred Katz Construction Co. (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 154, 158.)

We agree with Bonni that Wilson's failure to file any opposition papers at all in the trial court results in deeming the factual allegations of Bonni's petition, including his status as an associate of VSC, admitted. While we would be fully justified in affirming on this basis alone, we shall briefly address Wilson's substantive argument.

D. Associate vs. Independent Contractor

Wilson's main argument is that if Bonni is an independent contractor, he cannot also be an "associate," and while associates are listed in the arbitration agreements, independent contractors are not. Even if we accepted the unsworn argument of VSC's counsel during the hearing on the petition as binding or conclusive, which we do not, we would still find this argument to be fundamentally flawed. An individual can be both an independent contractor and an "associate" of another entity; there is no law, no maxim of jurisprudence, or common definition providing those statuses are mutually exclusive. Indeed, Wilson provides no case law supporting this contention.

When interpreting an arbitration clause, we use "`the usual and ordinary meaning of the contractual language.'" (Vianna v. Doctors' Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189.) There is no one legal definition of "associate." We therefore turn to the plain meaning, guided by common sense. Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) at page 147, column 2 defines associate, as relevant here, as "[a] colleague or companion." Nonlegal sources are more expansive; dictionary.com defines "associate" as "a person who shares actively in anything as a business, enterprise, or undertaking; partner; colleague; fellow worker." (Dictionary.com <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/associate> [as of Aug. 9, 2017].) This source also states the word derives from late Middle English, via the Latin root "associatus," which means "join" or "unite."

Merriam-Webster.com suggests the meaning: "partner, colleague," or "companion, comrade," or as an adjective, "closely connected (as in function or office) with another: sharing in responsibility or authority." (<https://www.Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary/associate> [as of Aug. 9, 2017].) The Oxford Dictionary.com defines the word as "[b]e involved with" and "[a] partner or companion in business or at work." (<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/associate> [as of Aug. 9, 2017].)

What all of these definitions have in common is their breadth. They encompass a broad variety of situations, people, and relationships. Thus, when we read language that states the agreements include the "physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association, corporation or partnership," which itself is broad language, we have no legal basis to assume independent contractors are excluded. It is undisputed that Bonni had "staff privileges" at VSC. He was involved with VSC, worked in their facility, and treated their patients. He was, by any plain language definition, an "associate" of VSC.

What Wilson essentially asks us to do here is to redraft the arbitration agreements in her favor. That we cannot do. "`A heavy presumption weighs the scales in favor of arbitrability; an order directing arbitration should be granted "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration [provision] is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."' [Citations.]" (Gravillis v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 761, 771.)

Wilson also argues, in contradiction of the language in her complaints, that "there is no evidence that [VSC] had authority to act as an agent for Dr. Bonni and entered into the agreement on his behalf." Her complaints state the opposite, alleging that "each and every defendant was an employee, agent, and/or ostensible agent of every other defendant." Under the rules pertaining to pleadings, Wilson's allegations regarding agency are binding on the pleader. (See Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 746.) Thus, even if we did not agree that under a common sense, plain reading of the arbitration agreements that Bonni was an "associate," we would be required to conclude that Wilson's own allegations as to agency are true and affirm on that basis.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Bonni is entitled to his costs on appeal.

ARONSON, J. and IKOLA, J., concurs.