Filed: Nov. 22, 2017
Latest Update: Nov. 22, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 28, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 9, 2018, and to exclude time between November 28, 2017, and January 9, 2018, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The g
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 28, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 9, 2018, and to exclude time between November 28, 2017, and January 9, 2018, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The go..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 28, 2017.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 9, 2018, and to exclude time between November 28, 2017, and January 9, 2018, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes in excess of 3,000 pages, much of it consisting of voluminous tax records and bank records. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time in particular in order to continue reviewing and analyzing the discovery in this case, as well as to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, and to otherwise prepare for trial. Counsel for defendant Brasley has also been delayed in his ability to continue reviewing and preparing this case due to a currently ongoing state court trial that is likely to be completed by approximately Friday, December 1, 2017. The additional time is also warranted because counsel for defendant Dogan is currently scheduled for surgery on December 6, 2017 that will take 7 to 10 days for recovery.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 28, 2017 to January 9, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
