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WALKER v. SOTO, 1:14-cv-00424-JLT. (2014)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20140807b03 Visitors: 12
Filed: Aug. 05, 2014
Latest Update: Aug. 05, 2014
Summary: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AS SUCCESSIVE ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE FILED WITHIN 21 DAYS ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF THE COURT TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO CASE JENNIFER L. THURSTON, Magistrate Judge. Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The instant petition was filed on March 13, 2014. On April 9, 2014, the Court ordered R
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AS SUCCESSIVE

ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE FILED WITHIN 21 DAYS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF THE COURT TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO CASE

JENNIFER L. THURSTON, Magistrate Judge.

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant petition was filed on March 13, 2014. On April 9, 2014, the Court ordered Respondent to file a response to the petition (Doc. 7), and, on June 9, 2014, Respondent complied by filing the instant motion to dismiss, contending that the petition should be dismissed as successive. (Doc. 12). Petitioner has not filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

As mentioned, Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition as being filed outside the one year limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it "plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court...." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed Respondent's to file a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an Answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the state's procedural rules. See, e.g., O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a Respondent can file a Motion to Dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is based on the contention that the petition is a second and successive petition in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) and that the petition is untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is similar in procedural standing to a Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default, and Respondent has not yet filed a formal Answer, the Court will review Respondent's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

B. Successive Petitions.

A federal court must dismiss a second or successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The Court must also dismiss a second or successive petition raising a new ground unless the petitioner can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive, constitutional right or 2) the factual basis of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence, and these new facts establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).

However, it is not the district court that decides whether a second or successive petition meets these requirements that allow a petitioner to file a second or successive petition, but rather the Ninth Circuit. Section 2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: "Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words, Petitioner must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive petition in district court. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must dismiss any second or successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave to file the petition because a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or successive petition. Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 794 (1997); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).

Because the current petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply to Petitioner's current petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). Respondent has submitted documents that establish that Petitioner has filed two previous federal habeas petitions in this Court challenging that same conviction, i.e., case nos. 1:01-cv-06289-NEW, and 1:14-cv-00332-SAB. The first petition was dismissed as untimely under the AEDPA, a decision that was affirmed by summary disposition on August 23, 2006 by the Ninth Circuit. The latter petition was dismissed as successive on March 26, 2014, and the matter is still pending in the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the Court finds that this petition, which challenges the same conviction and sentence as the two prior petitions cited above, is a successive petition as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).

Petitioner, however, makes no showing that he has obtained prior leave from the Ninth Circuit to file this successive petition attacking this conviction. That being so, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's renewed application for relief from that conviction under § 2254 and must dismiss the petition. See Greenawalt, 105 F.3d at 1277; Nunez, 96 F.3d at 991. If Petitioner desires to proceed in bringing this petition for writ of habeas corpus, he must first file for leave to do so with the Ninth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(3).1

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to assign a United States District judge to this case.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent's motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) be GRANTED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 21 days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten court days after service of the Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FootNotes


1. Respondent also contends that the petition, filed some 16 years after Petitioner's conviction, is also untimely under the AEDPA. While this may indeed be so, and in fact has previously been found to be the case, unlike the prohibition against successive petitions, which is jurisdictional, the defense of untimeliness under the AEDPA is not. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645, 130 S.Ct. 2549 (2010); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205, 213, 126 S.Ct. 1675 (2006). Since it is clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to proceed on this successive petition, it likewise has no jurisdiction to consider whether the petition is untimely.
Source:  Leagle

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