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U.S. v. Coilton, 2:18-CR-00069-GEB. (2019)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20190329b35 Visitors: 17
Filed: Mar. 28, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2019
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND [PROPOSED] ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. , Senior District Judge . IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED between the parties through their respective counsel, Assistant United States Attorney ROSANNE RUST, Assistant Federal Defender LINDA C. ALLISON, attorney for BRIDGET COILTON, MICHAEL E. HANSEN, attorney for WILLIAM BENNETT, and CANDICE L. FIELDS, attorney for CHRISTINA BENNETT, as follows: 1. By previous order, this m
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND [PROPOSED] ORDER

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED between the parties through their respective counsel, Assistant United States Attorney ROSANNE RUST, Assistant Federal Defender LINDA C. ALLISON, attorney for BRIDGET COILTON, MICHAEL E. HANSEN, attorney for WILLIAM BENNETT, and CANDICE L. FIELDS, attorney for CHRISTINA BENNETT, as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 29, 2019.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has produced more than 33,000 pages of discovery in this case. b) Defense counsel requires additional time to review the discovery, consult with their clients, examine possible defenses, research and analyze applicable Sentencing Guidelines, and continue investigating the facts of the case. c) Defense counsel believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d) The government does not object to the continuance. e) Based upon the above-stated findings, ends of justice are served by the Court excluding such time, so that counsel for the defendants may have reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 29, 2019 to June 7, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) and Local Code T4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence, or that the same provision of the Speedy Trial Act dictates future exclusions.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the status conference hearing set for March 29, 2019, at 9:00 a.m., be vacated and continued to June 7, 2019, at 9:00 a.m.

For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period from the date of this order though June 7, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) and Local Code T4, because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Source:  Leagle

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