Filed: Mar. 30, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 30, 2018
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 3, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 8, 2018 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between April 3, 2018, and May 8, 2018, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The gove
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 3, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 8, 2018 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between April 3, 2018, and May 8, 2018, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The gover..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 3, 2018.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 8, 2018 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between April 3, 2018, and May 8, 2018, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes in excess of 3,000 pages, much of it consisting of voluminous tax records and bank records. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time in particular in order to continue reviewing and analyzing the discovery in this case, as well as to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, and to otherwise prepare for trial. In addition, as discussed when the parties appeared before the Court on February 13, 2018, counsel for defendant Dogan has recently entered the case in place of prior counsel, and is still in the process of reviewing discovery and analyzing the case.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 3, 2018 to May 8, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
