M. Elaine Hammond, United States Bankruptcy Judge and Stephen L. Johnson, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
In February 2016, the judges of the San Jose Division required chapter 13 debtors to adopt the Chapter 13 Model Plan ("Model Plan"), which had been adopted by the remainder of the district in August 2013. In certain cases filed in the San Jose Division, counsel have modified the terms of the newly implemented Model Plan. The cases covered by this order include modified Model Plans.
The unvarnished purpose behind the proposed modifications is to perpetuate the apparently long-standing practice in the San Jose Division that permits confirmation of chapter 13 plans without a defined term,
Because the additional provisions are inconsistent with the plan in use in the remainder of the district and are contrary to the Bankruptcy Code
The cases covered by this decision involve issues that commonly arise in chapter 13 cases filed in the court's San Jose Division. Because of the wide application of this decision, the judges who preside over chapter 13 cases in San Jose have determined to act jointly in deciding these matters. The judges have either heard testimony in the submitted cases or have reviewed transcripts of trial proceedings and are familiar with the facts and arguments presented therein.
The court's authority to decide these cases jointly is found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, which permits the trial court to consolidate for hearing or trial matters that involve a common question of fact or law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42, made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7042. See In re Iron-Oak Supply Corp., 162 B.R. 301, 304 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.1993); In re Postconfirmation Fees, 224 B.R. 793, 794 (E.D.Wash.1998); 9A FED. PRAC. & PROC. Civ. § 2381 (A. Wright, A. Miller et al. 3d ed.) ("[the] objective [of Rule 42] is to give the district court broad discretion to decide
Chapter 13 of Title 11 of the United States Code spells out the requirements, process, and rewards of a chapter 13 case. A debtor achieves the most significant benefits of chapter 13 — such as, obtaining a discharge of most unsecured debt and elimination of underwater liens on a residence and other property — by filing, confirming, and completing a chapter 13 plan. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322, and 1325.
In the chapter 13 plan, a debtor agrees to submit some or all of his or her future earnings or other future income to a standing chapter 13 Trustee ("Trustee"). The Trustee accumulates this money and uses it to pay creditors' claims. § 1321(a)(1). The plan serves as the mechanism by which the debtor can alter certain contractual obligations such as, for example, modifying the rights of a secured creditor, curing a default on a home loan, or assuming an unexpired lease. § 1322(b). A chapter 13 debtor must begin making the payments called for in his or her plan to the Trustee within 30 days. § 1321.
A plan can be confirmed or approved by the court only if it meets stringent requirements. A chapter 13 plan must be proposed in good faith and must comply with applicable provisions of chapter 13 and the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, the plan must provide for full payment of all claims entitled to priority under § 507 (unless the claim holder otherwise agrees).
The length of a chapter 13 plan varies. See § 1325(b)(1)(B) and (b)(4). When the Trustee or a creditor objects to confirmation, the plan length depends on debtor's income level after payment of certain expenses. Id. A "below median" debtor cannot be compelled to have a plan that extends past 36 months; while a plan proposed by an "above median" debtor must be no longer than 60 months.
After a plan has been served on all creditors, it is set for a confirmation hearing. § 1324. If the plan satisfies all applicable requirements, then the court will confirm it.
Once a debtor completes the required payments under the confirmed plan, the debtor is entitled to a discharge. The chapter 13 discharge provides greater protection against creditors than is obtained in a chapter 7 liquidation. Compare § 1328(a) with § 727; United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 268, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 1376, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010) ("A discharge under Chapter 13 `is broader than the discharge received in any other chapter.'"). It is against this statutory background that we review the additional provisions proposed by Debtors.
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Local Rule 1007-1, the court may approve and require the use of practice forms. Practice forms may be adopted on a district-wide or division-wide basis. As the name suggests, practice forms are used to regularize practice and foster consistency throughout the district or division. Predictability as to where and how information is presented assists the court and the parties. Debtors do not challenge the court's ability to adopt a practice form or the process by which the Model Plan was created or adopted. But they argue that the Model Plan is a de facto local rule that abridges a debtor's rights and enlarge a creditor's rights.
In order to provide context to our discussion of the Model Plan we now address the history and adoption of the Model Plan. This discussion is not relevant to the holding and references information that is not part of the record.
The judges of this court determined to draft a model chapter 13 plan for the entire district in 2012. They sought to move away from the three forms and assorted individual plans then in use. During 2012 and 2013, three judges drafted the Model Plan for the Northern District. In the process, they solicited and received written comments on the draft Model Plan from the three chapter 13 trustees in the district, as well as from members of the debtor and creditor bar. The judges then met with members of the bar and interested trustees and received additional comments. A number of the recommendations received were incorporated into the Model Plan. The court designed the Model Plan with the goal of creating a practical, efficient, and effective plan.
In August 2013, the Oakland and San Francisco Divisions implemented the Model Plan. At the same time, the Santa Rosa Division allowed, but did not require, its use. The San Jose Division did not adopt the plan at that time.
Second, the United States Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules has proposed the creation of a National Chapter 13 Form Plan ("National Plan"). It is projected that as of December 1, 2017 every bankruptcy court will be required to use the National Plan, unless the district adopts a form plan consistent with certain parameters. Districts may adopt a form plan prior to adoption of the related rule. Use of the Model Plan anticipates this important change in district procedures.
Though Debtors do not challenge the court's formulation of the Model Plan, they contend that requiring its use is a de facto local rule that is inconsistent with acts of Congress and, therefore, must be invalidated. This argument is misplaced as the Model Plan is a form not a rule. Bankruptcy Local Rule 1007-1 approves the use of required practice forms. The Model Plan is neither unlawful nor a violation of any party's rights because it faithfully follows applicable law-unlike the proposed additional provisions. The analysis supporting this conclusion is set forth in Sections III, F and G, below.
Confirmation of the plans covered by this opinion was consistent with longstanding procedures in the San Jose Division.
When a chapter 13 plan is filed in the San Jose Division, creditors are given notice of the confirmation calendar to which that case has been assigned. Given the large number of chapter 13 cases, it is not always possible for the court to consider in a meaningful way objections filed by the Trustee and creditors at the initial confirmation hearing. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court created a system by which initial confirmation hearings are held, at which plans are confirmed only if they have not drawn an objection, the trustee has all information required to recommend confirmation, and they otherwise comply with the Bankruptcy Code. If an interested party interposes an objection, the court refers the case to the Trustee's Pending List (the "TPL"). If a case is placed on the TPL, and the debtor resolves outstanding objections, the Trustee restores the matter to the uncontested confirmation hearing calendar. Parties can always specially set an unresolved objection to confirmation for hearing when they are ready to argue the matter.
The initial confirmation hearing in Vick was held April 26, 2016. The initial confirmation hearings in Escarcega, Sisk, Mercado, and Candalla were held May 19, 2016. No one objected to confirmation in
At the confirmation hearings, the court expressed its concerns about the nature of the additional provisions and made some preliminary comments about the plans' confirmability. Counsel were given an opportunity to respond. Because of the complexity of the issues, the absence of a Trustee objection, and the need for certain factual findings, each case was scheduled for an evidentiary hearing or trial on confirmation. In advance of the hearings, the court issued orders directing counsel to address certain legal issues raised by the additional provisions. The Debtors filed initial and supplemental briefs addressing those questions.
Having completed an evidentiary hearing in each case, the court now issues this Memorandum Decision.
Before discussing its conclusions, the court must address the argument advanced by counsel in the Candalla, Escarcega, and Sisk cases that the confirmation process employed by the court in these cases violates the Bankruptcy Code.
Debtors first suggest it is not the court's place to substantively review plans as to which no interested party has objected.
Next, these Debtors argue that the delays of supplemental briefing and an evidentiary hearing "have postponed the opportunity for a substantive hearing on confirmation of the Debtor's proposed plan well beyond the limit of 20 to 45 days past the § 341 meeting imposed by § 1324."
Debtors further contend that placing cases with provisions that modify the Model Plan on the TPL is tantamount to the adoption of a local rule that violates the Bankruptcy Code. No one can reasonably argue that the adoption of a local rule that violates federal law is not permissible. But we do not face that situation here. The court has a duty to consider whether chapter 13 plans comply with the Bankruptcy Code and has adopted mechanisms to decide that question. Because Debtors' argument depends on a conclusion that the plans at issue are entitled to confirmation as a matter of law because the trustee has not objected — a point we do not accept — the argument cannot be sustained.
Debtors in the cases at bar started with the Model Plan. Each plan also includes standardized modifications, which were added to the plan in section 5, denominated "additional provisions." The additional provisions drafted by counsel appear in a "check the box" format. As initially filed, the additional provisions specified in each case were identical. Due to subsequent amendments in Vick and Mercado the additional provisions are no longer identical. Nevertheless, the result sought by the various proposed changes to the Model Plan do not materially differ.
The additional provisions that have been added to these plans were not previously approved by the court nor are they part of the Model Plan in use across the district. Instead, these provisions were drafted by Debtors' counsel to rectify perceived inadequacies in the Model Plan. After drafting them, counsel circulated the provisions to the local debtors' bar as an example of additional provisions that should be incorporated into their plans.
Counsel in these cases negotiated the use of additional provisions in advance with the Trustee, who testified under oath in the Escarcega trial that she discussed the provisions with counsel. She agreed that, if the provisions being advocated by counsel were employed to alter the Model Plan, she would not object to confirmation. She reasoned that yielding to the proposed additional provisions would avoid what she termed the "impactful" consequences of In re Flores, 735 F.3d 855 (9th Cir.2013). By
Before turning to the changes Debtors are attempting to make to the new Model Plan, it is helpful to understand how certain plans in the San Jose Division have been administered in the recent past. Only with an understanding of existing practice is it possible to understand the proposed additional provisions and how they violate the Bankruptcy Code.
Contrary to every other practice form plan previously used in this district, the prior San Jose form plan included language referencing an "estimated" term.
It has become clear that the plans were administered in a manner inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code. Once a debtor had completed payments to the Trustee sufficient to cover administrative expenses, such as counsel's fees, payment on secured debt (including arrears), and priority claims (e.g. taxes), the plans were considered completed, discharges issued, and the case closed. It did not matter if the plan had run the full "estimated" length or not. Thus, in some cases, plans terminated much earlier than their stated estimated length. The court is aware of cases that lasted only 11, 24, or 36 months instead of the stated 60 months.
The early termination of these "estimated term" plans was accomplished without compliance with the Bankruptcy Code. In these cases, when the Trustee determined that all required payments had been completed, she filed a document called notice of plan completion without notice to any affected creditors. At that point, the Clerk of Court processed the debtor's discharge. Later, the Trustee filed a final report and the case closed with the entry of a final decree.
The routine early termination of chapter 13 plans does not appear to have been actively concealed from the court, but the practice certainly was not made clear. Counsel and the Trustee take the view that plans which include an estimated term
To understand this practice better, the court reviewed cases assigned to Judges Hammond and Johnson in which a final decree was entered in the San Jose Division between April and July 2016. The primary source of information was the Chapter 13 Trustee's Final Report and Account filed contemporaneous to the submission of a proposed final decree.
In each of these cases, the holders of allowed, unsecured nonpriority claims either received no distribution or, if the plan provided for a minimum distribution, they received the stated minimum and nothing more. In none of these cases did the debtor or the Trustee file a motion requesting approval of a modification of the duration of the confirmed plan to permit its early termination and an early discharge without full or at least increased payment to unsecured nonpriority creditors.
Why were so many plans terminating early? It is difficult to determine the precise reason because an individual debtor's payment history does not appear in the record. Nonetheless, the court's analysis reveals two principal reasons behind early terminations. In some cases, the filed — and allowed — secured and priority claims sought lower amounts than debtors estimated in their schedules.
Debtors intend the proposed additional provisions to continue the practice of confirming plans with indeterminate lengths that can be terminated early upon payment. According to Debtor's briefs, "[t]he additional provisions proposed by Debtor's plan do not produce a result that is different from plans which were routinely confirmed by this Court since ascending to the bench in the San Jose."
To understand the argument Debtors are making, it is necessary to review the proposed changes they have offered to the Model Plan. An example of the initial additional provisions from Escarcega are attached as Exhibit B.
The Debtors have proposed two additional provisions which delete the standard Model Plan provisions and replace them with different provisions. The two provisions are found at § 5.02, which modifies § 1.01(a) of the Model Plan, and § 5.03, which modifies § 2.12 of the Model Plan. Plans incorporating these additional provisions do not comply with §§ 1328(a) and 1329 and, therefore, do not satisfy § 1325(a)(1) which conditions confirmation on a plan's complying with the provisions of chapter 13.
Section 1.01(a) of the Model Plan requires debtors to state the number of months they believe will be required to complete the plan, as well as information about monthly payments that will be made to the Trustee to complete the plan.
Debtors have submitted a plan that seeks to obfuscate this provision. Their plan provides:
OR
In Escarcega, Sisk, and Candalla, Debtors have inserted a phrase that does not appear in the original Model Plan — that the length of the plans is only estimated. In Vick and Mercado, Debtors propose a different formulation — that payments to the Trustee will cease just as soon as certain required payments are completed, including those to administrative expense claimants, priority claimants, and secured creditors. Unsecured nonpriority creditors are deliberately omitted from this formulation.
In tandem with the additional provisions altering the term, Debtors have included an additional provision limiting distribution to unsecured nonpriority creditors beyond that provided in the Model Plan. The Model Plan provides:
By this formulation, the Model Plan communicates to creditors the total amount of unsecured claims anticipated by the debtor and allows the debtor to estimate
Debtors have determined to alter the result under their proposed plans. They leave Section 2.12's options blank and propose additional provision § 5.03. Their proposed plan language has been deliberately calculated to prohibit the Trustee from distributing excess funds.
OR
Debtors' stated reason for making this revision rests on their contention that the Model Plan "substantively abridges the Debtor's rights" by requiring a debtor "to make payments to general unsecured creditors in excess of the amounts required by the Bankruptcy Code" when the debtor is entitled "to propose a zero dollar dividend plan."
In their confirmation briefs, Debtors correctly assert that §§ 1322 and 1325 do not require a plan to provide a fixed term or a minimum distribution to unsecured nonpriority creditors in the absence of an objection to confirmation. They further argue that the precise length of the plan cannot be stated at the outset of the case. Subsequent events, such as the allowed amount of filed claims and changes in the Trustee's fee bear upon the time needed to complete a plan. For that reason, they argue that an estimated term is not only advisable but necessary.
Counsel correctly point out that the Trustee's fee can fluctuate and that claims can come in higher or lower than anticipated. As a result, plans may need to be adjusted to properly pay the affected claimants. But this eventuality cannot logically support a conclusion that a plan never has to have a specified length. The proper way to address these issues is to modify the plan using § 1329.
The proposed National Plan, for example, allows an extension of the plan beyond the stated term but no longer than 60 months.
But to be clear, the Bankruptcy Code anticipates that a plan may need to be modified. It provides, for example, that at any time after confirmation but before the completion of payments under a plan, the plan may be modified, upon the request of the debtor, trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim. § 1329(a). As relevant here, a plan may be modified to extend or reduce the time for payments under the plan. § 1329(a)(2). Plan modifications are subject to the plan requirements set forth in §§ 1322(a), 1322(b), and § 1323(c), as well as the requirements of § 1325(a). § 1329(b)(1). Plan modification requires that notice and an opportunity to be heard be provided to the trustee and all concerned creditors. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3015(g). The trustee or a party who is adversely affected by the modification may object, allowing the "court to consider the debtor's good faith in proposing early payoff modifications, as well as issues as to the debtor's overall financial circumstances, future earnings and income, and the elimination of future risks of nonperformance." In
Debtor's attempt to construct a plan that authorizes modifications without notice to parties in interest eliminates creditor's rights to object to the modification and flouts § 1329. In In re Anderson, the chapter 13 trustee required debtors to supply him with a "Best Efforts Certification" as a condition of plan confirmation. 21 F.3d 355, 358 (9th Cir.1994). This certification required debtors to pay their actual disposable income to the trustee rather than the projected disposable income as required by § 1325(b)(1)(B) (superseded). The debtors objected, contending this amounted to a requirement that their plan payments adjust regularly based on the trustee's calculations of their income. The Ninth Circuit rejected self-modifying plans in Anderson, concluding that the Bankruptcy Code prohibits such plans as contrary to congressional intent:
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
Debtors cavalierly state that creditors are not entitled to any notice of an early termination if the plan paid them nothing. Why would a creditor care, they argue, if the creditor received $0 in 30 months or $0 in 60 months. This line of argument is both illogical and contrary to the exacting provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
It is illogical because it stands to reason that creditors would be interested to know why a debtor who proposed a plan of 60 months, with no payments to unsecured creditors, was able to pay that plan off in only 30 months and receive a discharge. Has this debtor gotten a new job or found assets that were not disclosed? Moreover, the creditor may question whether the plan was proposed in good faith — and they are not required to have "specific knowledge about the finances of the debtor" to raise such a concern.
The argument makes little sense from a statutory standpoint, either. Congress included § 1329(a) in the Bankruptcy Code to allow the trustee and unsecured creditors to move to modify a plan. Such a motion presupposes that the facts of a debtor's case have changed since the time of filing or confirmation. The statute permits a reevaluation of the case to deal with changing facts. It is simply not true that a debtor has no obligation to give notice to creditors of his intent to terminate a chapter 13 plan early. As the Bankruptcy Court noted in Schiffman: "[T]here is nothing inequitable or contrary to the Bankruptcy Code in requiring that debtors go through the plan modification process in order to pay their chapter 13 plans off early without paying allowed creditor claims in full." Schiffman, 338 B.R. at 435.
Debtors further argue that after confirmation of a chapter 13 plan that calls for no payments to unsecured creditors the interests of those creditors in the chapter 13 case should be considered terminated. They contend "Unless the unsecured creditor objects to the plan under § 1325(b) for cause,
Res judicata is a legal principle that bars relitigation of a matter that was brought to judgment in a different case or controversy by a court of competent jurisdiction. The doctrine has no application to this case. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983), decision supplemented, 466 U.S. 144, 104 S.Ct. 1900, 80 L.Ed.2d 194 (1984) ("It is clear that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply if a party moves the rendering court in the same proceeding to correct or modify its judgment.")
Section 1327(a) does not support Debtors' argument, either. That section provides that a plan is binding on debtors and creditors provided for by the plan. Thus, the plan becomes law of the case, subject to the possibility of modification pursuant to § 1329(a). Section 1329(a) provides a statutory mechanism to modify confirmed plans to increase or reduce plan payments, to change the timing of payments, and to make other alterations. It makes no sense that those modifications would be authorized if particular creditors were barred from objecting because they failed to object to an entirely different plan. Thus, while one plan may be acceptable to the creditors, a later plan based on changes in income, assets, or other factors, may not. In any event, those creditors remain involved because the court must always pass on the good faith of any modified plan. In re Sunahara, 326 B.R. 768, 781 (9th Cir. BAP 2005) ("In determining whether to authorize a modification that reduces a plan term to less than 36 months without full payment of allowed claims, the bankruptcy court should carefully consider whether the modification has been proposed in good faith.").
None of this prohibits a debtor from filing a motion to modify. A debtor may file a motion to modify any time it is warranted. The motion will be reviewed by the Trustee, and ultimately the court, to ensure that it satisfies the requirements of § 1329(b) and Sunahara. Here, we simply hold that Debtors cannot foreclose creditors' and the Trustee's rights to object by failing to move for modification when necessary.
The practice that has developed in this division is contrary to the Bankruptcy Code and will not be ratified by this court. Additional Provisions 5.02 and 5.03 are intended to implement administration of a chapter 13 case in a manner that is contrary to § 1329. Hence, this court finds that these additional provisions do not comply with the provisions of chapter 13, specifically § 1329, and render the plan unconfirmable pursuant to § 1325(a)(1).
It is important to address counsel's express argument that debtors with below median incomes need not provide any term to their chapter 13 plans. Because of the way the practice has developed in this division, we determine that each and every plan shall have a stated length and any substantive variation from that length will require a motion to modify. Although not cited by Debtors, several well-reasoned decisions have concluded
In In re Fridley, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") found that §§ 1328(a) and 1329(a) confer an implied temporal requirement that a plan remain in effect for its designated duration unless formally modified. 380 B.R. 538 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). Fridley was a post-BAPCPA
The BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying the motion for entry of a discharge. It concluded that debtors' confirmed plan required a 36 month term. The confirmed plan specified that length. To shorten the plan's length, a motion to modify under § 1329(a) would be required.
The BAP observed that under § 1328(a), a discharge is permissible "as soon as practicable after completion by debtor of all payments under the plan." Plan modifications, however, are authorized "at any time after confirmation of the plan but before the completion of payments under such plan." § 1329(a). This scheme set up a sort of race, the BAP concluded, for the discharge of unsecured debt, when a debtor's income has risen.
Fridley, 380 B.R. at 544 (notes omitted).
Fridley is consistent with pre-BAPCPA
In re Sunahara, 326 B.R. at 773, addressed whether the "three-year period" provided in then § 1325(b)(1)(B) was "a measure of the value that creditors must receive under the plan" (as argued by the debtor) or "a measure of the lapse of time that must occur" (as argued by the trustee). The BAP held that the three-year period was temporal but that a debtor could seek to modify the plan pursuant to § 1329 and that while the disposable income test does not apply to the motion to modify, the good faith standard of § 1325(a)(3) does. Id. at 781-82.
Similarly, In re Keller, 329 B.R. 697 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.2005), arose out of a case with a plan that called for 48 months of payments and a 31.5% dividend to unsecured creditors. The debtors sought to refinance their home and to pay off their chapter 13 plan in the 14th month of the plan. The bankruptcy court analyzed this question: "[A]fter having made only 14 of the 48 monthly payments the plan requires them to make, the debtors wish to "pay off" their plan and thereby preclude the trustee and unsecured creditors from ever modifying their plan. May they do so?" Id. at 699. The court concluded the debtors' proposal could not be approved.
The court observed that the attempt to alter a confirmed plan in this fashion was inconsistent with the way plans are evaluated and confirmed in the first instance. The court noted that when a plan is proposed, a debtor must demonstrate that it provides for a means of execution, respects the rights of secured creditors, and is proposed in good faith. "It makes little sense to require that a plan specify how it will be funded, and to require regular monthly payments that continue for at least 3 years, then verify that the debtor has the ability to make such payments only to permit the debtor to perform differently than required by the plan." Id. at 700.
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit endorsed Fridley's determination that a "minimum duration for chapter 13 plans is crucial to an important purpose of § 1329's modification process: to ensure that unsecured creditors have a mechanism for seeking increased (that is, non-zero) payments if a debtor's financial circumstances improve unexpectedly." In re Flores, 735 F.3d 855, 860 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc) (citing Fridley). Applying § 1329 to the applicable commitment period required by § 1325(b)(1)(B), the Flores court found that "creditors' opportunity to seek increased payments that correspond to changed circumstances would be undermined by an interpretation of § 1325(b)(1)(B) that relieves debtors from a minimum plan duration merely because they have no projected disposable income at the time of plan confirmation." Id.
One might reasonably argue the cases discussed above are different from the cases under submission because in the cases under submission, Debtors did not specify a particular length. The court cannot accept that argument. These decisions stand for the central proposition that a debtor who proposes a plan must perform under that plan over the term of the plan. And, if the debtor's circumstances change, creditors or the trustee are entitled to ask that the plan be modified.
Here, Debtors' counsel — and the Trustee in this division — assert that because there is no objection to confirmation by the Trustee (or creditors), there is no applicable commitment period.
Applying their interpretation to Mercado illustrates the error in this approach. Mr. Mercado is a married man who filed separately. The income of his non-filing spouse is figured into the determination of whether he is an above or below median debtor, and into the calculation of his disposable income.
This turns the Bankruptcy Code on its head. As the BAP described in Fridley, a debtor is entitled to chapter 13 relief and a discharge if the statutory standards are met. The mechanism of the Bankruptcy Code, read fairly, provides that a debtor will specify a length for their plan and will carry that plan out. If, during the life of the plan, modifications are warranted, they should be made. Once a motion to modify has been filed, the Trustee has a duty to ensure the modified plan complies with the requirements incorporated by § 1329(b), including that the modification is proposed in good faith. And as with confirmation, the court has an independent duty to evaluate these motions to determine if they are consistent with the law.
To be clear, the temporal requirement we find is distinct from the applicable commitment period imposed by § 1325(b) following an objection to confirmation. The bedrock of this temporal requirement is found in §§ 1328(a) and 1329(b), discussed above.
Having chosen to file chapter 13 and receive its benefits, a debtor may not draft a plan that makes the careful structure and protections of the Bankruptcy Code ephemeral. Altering the Model Plan so as to create an illusory term, obtaining the Trustee's agreement to the additional provisions so as to avoid an objection and
Before considering the remaining additional provisions, we must first address how Section 1.01(a) of the Model Plan is to be completed. This section asks a debtor to describe the source of plan payments and offers examples such as wages, rental income, etc. Instead of stating the source of funds, each Debtor initially completed the plan with "As shown on Schedule I." Schedule I is an official form required to be filed by all debtors with their petition or shortly thereafter. It provides information on the amount and sources of a debtor's income. But unlike the plan, Schedule I is not served on all creditors.
Completing Section 1.01(a) with "as shown on Schedule I" may technically satisfy the form. Yet it is counter to one of the purposes of the Model Plan — to provide a single document setting forth information sufficient to support its feasibility and to satisfy the other confirmation requirements. This issue was raised at the initial hearing on plan confirmation in Vick. The Vick and Mercado plans have been amended accordingly.
The plans of Escarcega, Candalla, and Sisk continue to provide that the source of funds is as shown on Schedule I. Because creditors have not been served with a copy of Schedule I, these plans, together with Schedule I, will need to be served on all creditors before they can be confirmed. Preferably, the Debtors will amend their plans to include the required information. In the future, plans that refer to schedules that are not served will not be approved.
Similarly, Escarcega states that the amount of his plan payment will increase twice over the term of his plan. However, he adds the second increase in an additional provision. The blank provided in section 1.01(a) may be extended to state as many changes in payment as are required. Again, for ease of reference the scope of plan payments should be included in this provision without reference to another section of the plan.
Debtors filed an Additional Provision 5.01 stating that: "Debtor does not elect to participate in this Court's Mortgage Modification Mediation (MMM) Program pursuant to General Order 29." This provision is unnecessary as the Model Plan does not default to or require participation in the MMM Program. If a debtor chooses to participate in the MMM Program, then an Additional Provision provided by the court is required to be included in the plan (the "MMM Provision"). The required MMM Provision is available on the Court's website.
Although unnecessary, this Additional Provision does not interfere with confirmation. Going forward, if a debtor elects to participate in the MMM Program, the plan must include the MMM Provision. If a debtor chooses not to participate in the MMM Program, they may either make no mention of it or include a provision stating
Neither contested confirmation nor evidentiary hearings will be required for plans that include either of these references to the MMM Program as an Additional Provision.
In a case in which there is an applicable commitment period, Section 1.01(c) provides the required minimum term. It provides:
Debtors propose Additional Provision 5.02(b) that deletes the first sentence of this section. That is unnecessary.
Many cases do not have an applicable commitment period. In these cases, the blank may be completed with "N/A." Yet many cases do have an applicable commitment period as a result of an objection by the Trustee or by the holder of an allowed unsecured claim. See § 1329(b). At the filing of their plan, a debtor is unlikely to anticipate an objection, thus "N/A" is an appropriate response. If the applicable commitment period is triggered, then the debtor can file an amended plan with the appropriate term.
Deleting the sentence does not provide greater protection or clarification than stating "N/A." Instead, it is more likely to cause confusion. Even more, having provisions regarding the applicable commitment period in two sections of the plan is likely to create inconsistent revisions and unnecessary errors. For these reasons, the court declines to approve Additional Provision 5.02(b).
Included in the initial additional provisions is a request to delete Section 2.08 of the Model Plan,
The initial additional provisions include options to check a box indicating that "Class 7 claimants shall receive 100% payment
Additional Provision 5.03 seeks to amend Section 4.03 to change a reference from § 1328 to § 1328(a). The Model Plan states:
Debtors assert that the Model Plan language could require a debtor to waive his or her right to the standard chapter 13 discharge of § 1328(a). Their concern is that this language could be interpreted to mean that a debtor who is entitled to a full discharge under § 1328(a) has voluntarily agreed to accept the more limited hardship discharge provided in § 1328(b).
Debtors' feared interpretation does not consider the language referencing debt that is non-dischargeable as a matter of law, as opposed to a matter requiring adjudication of facts. This provision forecloses the discharge of debts that may be discharged only through an adversary proceeding, such as the student loan at issue in Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 176 L.Ed.2d 158. It does not limit the type of discharge to which a debtor may be entitled as a matter of law.
Since 2009, chapter 13 plans from the San Francisco Division applied substantially similar language. During this lengthy period, the court is not aware of any request to interpret this provision in the manner Debtors anticipate. In any case, the discharge granted by separate order at the conclusion of a case provides the ultimate determination of the scope of discharge.
Nevertheless, the proposed revision from § 1328 to § 1328(a) is consistent with the intent of this provision and is unlikely to cause confusion. So this additional provision is allowed. Future plans incorporating this additional provision will not require a contested confirmation or evidentiary hearing based on its inclusion.
The Escarcega, Candalla, and Sisk Debtors seek to modify the Model Plan's provision regarding vesting not at the time of confirmation. The Model Plan provides:
Debtor's proposed change to this section is found in Additional Provisions § 5.05, and provides:
Section 4 of the plan is modified as follows, if checked here:
Debtors assert that since § 1322(b)(9) provides for vesting "on confirmation of the plan or at a later time" the Model Plan substantially abridges Debtors' rights. Yet their additional provision provides little more than the Model Plan. Debtors seek to have property revest "upon discharge, dismissal, or the closing of this case, whichever is earlier." In comparison, the Model Plan provides for delayed vesting upon completion of the plan.
We look to the plan process to parse out this provision. Once a debtor successfully completes his or her plan payments, he or she will receive a discharge and the case will be closed. If the debtor is not entitled to a discharge, then upon plan completion the case will simply close without it. By providing for revesting upon completion of the plan, the Model Plan provides for revesting as soon as the debtor has completed their obligations. Case completion always precedes discharge or case closing where the debtor has fulfilled his or her obligations under the confirmed plan.
The remaining alternative, revesting upon dismissal, is not specifically contemplated in the Model Plan. Section 549(b)(3) specifies that upon dismissal, all property coming into the estate is revested in the title holder. Further, revesting in a debtor upon dismissal is consistent with the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of a debtor's rights upon conversion in Harris v. Viegelahn, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1829, 191 L.Ed.2d 783 (2015) (holding that undistributed plan payments made by a debtor must be distributed to the debtor and not the trustee upon conversion to chapter 7); and § 1326(a)(2)(providing for disposition of plan payments upon confirmation or failure of plan).
Nonetheless, the proposed additional provision specifically addresses the common occurrence of dismissal and is unlikely to cause confusion. Accordingly, the
The findings of fact for each case are as follows:
Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition on February 6, 2016. He scheduled unsecured claims of $65,331. He indicated his monthly income was $3,171, including a contribution from a significant other of $800 per month. He scheduled expenses of $2,821. He indicated on schedule J, that if he received a pay increase, his living expenses would be "increased accordingly." Debtor indicated on Form 122C-1 that his income was below median. He stated that he hoped to obtain a permanent job offer within six months. Debtor indicated he owned real property (his residence) with a value of $369,006 on schedule A and stated that it was encumbered by a lien with a value of $271,089. He claimed $100,000 of his equity in that property as exempt under California law. He disclosed ownership of two vehicles with a total value of $2,900 on schedule B, which he claimed were exempt under California law. He also owned a recreational vehicle with a value of $17,000. He scheduled and exempted other household items. Debtor's amended chapter 13 plan proposed to pay $350 per month to the Trustee to cover his lawyers' fees, the Trustee's fees, and a payment on the recreational vehicle. Debtor proposed to maintain payments on his residence loan separately. He proposed no payment to unsecured creditors.
Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition on February 11, 2016. He scheduled unsecured claims of $21,833. He indicated his monthly income was $3,049, and his expenses were $2,404. Debtor indicated on Form 122C-1 this his income was below median. He disclosed ownership of one vehicle with a value of $24,000, and a lien of $23,200. He also disclosed ownership of a RV trailer with a value of $12,000, and a lien of $3,450. Debtor resides in the RV. He exempted any value in the vehicle, RV, and other personal property. Debtor's amended chapter 13 plan proposed to pay $645 per month to the Trustee for 59 months to cover his lawyers' fees, the Trustee's fees, and payments of $80 per month for the vehicle, $320 per month for the RV, and $5 per month for electronic goods. He proposed no payment to unsecured creditors.
Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition on February 26, 2016. She scheduled unsecured claims of $55,082. She indicated her monthly income was $2,552, and her expenses were $2,477. These figures were net of her business income and expenses as a sole proprietor. She indicated on schedule J, "As Debtor's self-employment income varies, so with [sic] the living expenses she can afford to pay." Debtor indicated on Form 122C-1 that her income was above median, and her plan would last 5 years. She disclosed ownership of one vehicle with a value of $5,500, which she claimed as only exempted $5,100 under California law. Debtor's chapter 13 plan proposed to pay $75 per month to the Trustee to cover her lawyers' fees and the Trustee's fees. She proposed no payment to unsecured creditors.
Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition on March 4, 2016. He scheduled unsecured claims of $18,831. He indicated his monthly income was $3,068, and his expenses were $2,893. Debtor indicated on Form 122C-1 that his income was below median. He disclosed ownership of one vehicle with a total value of $25,000, and a lien of $24,297, as well as some personal property that was offered as collateral. He exempted any value in his personal property and other household items. Debtor's amended chapter 13 plan proposed to pay $175 per month to the Trustee for 36 months to cover his lawyers' fees, the Trustee's fees, and payments of $5 per month to Kay Jewelers and an exercise equipment company. He proposed no payment to unsecured creditors.
Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition on March 4, 2016. He scheduled unsecured claims of $60,348. He indicated his monthly income was $5,741, and his expenses were $5,186. He indicated on schedule J, "As Debtor's income varies, so will the funds available for living expenses." Debtor indicated on Form 122C-1 that his income was below median. He disclosed ownership of one vehicle with a value of $22,310, and a secured claim of $22,310. He claimed any equity in the vehicle and the household goods as exempt under California law. Debtor's chapter 13 plan proposed to pay $555 per month for 60 months to the Trustee to cover his lawyers' fees, the Trustee's fees, a $225 vehicle payments, and a small amount of priority tax debts. He proposed no payment to unsecured creditors.
Orders consistent with this decision are issued in each case contemporaneous with entry of this decision.
Confirmed Actual Length Difference
Last name Case number Length (mos.) (mos.) (mos.) Final Decree
O'Brien 14-53914 60 11 49 5/17/16
Perez 14-53580 60 15 45 5/17/16
Timm 14-53233 60 20 40 7/20/16
Watterson 14-51053 60 21 39 5/18/2016
Banse 13-56515 60 24 36 4/18/16
Ebell 13-56280 60 24 36 4/13/2016
Matias 13-55030 60 27 33 6/14/16
Peralta 13-55149 60 28 32 4/13/2016
Thompson 13-55059 60 29 31 5/23/16
Peralta 13-54128 60 30 30 6/15/2016
Mendoza 13-52380 60 32 28 5/18/2016
Castaneda 14-51457 48 21 27 5/23/16
Koch 12-57538 60 34 26 4/1/2016
Munoz 13-51584 60 35 25 6/15/16
Foster 13-52277 60 35 25 7/20/16
McNair 13-51176 60 35 25 7/21/2016
Torres & Escamilla 12-58087 60 35 25 5/18/2016
Bailey 13-50309 60 36 24 4/13/16
Garcia 12-57725 60 36 24 6/16/2016
Hernandez 12-56909 60 36 24 4/1/2016
Montanez 12-56242 60 37 23 4/1/16
Miletak 12-57520 60 37 23 4/1/16
Tu & Huynh 13-50455 60 37 23 6/16/2016
Khinno 12-57197 60 37 23 4/13/2016
Dinh 12-58703 60 37 23 5/17/16
Dickson 13-52370 55 32 23 4/13/2016
Harris 12-57246 60 38 22 4/18/16
Lee 13-50068 60 38 22 7/20/16
Corona 12-56649 60 38 22 4/1/2016
Bosteder 12-57886 60 38 22 7/20/16
Smith 12-55653 60 38 22 4/13/2016
Ellis 13-50078 60 38 22 7/21/2016
Mendoza 14-50450 48 26 22 6/14/16
Bladow 12-56039 60 39 21 4/1/2016
Pardini 12-58035 60 39 21 7/20/16
Denos 12-54279 60 39 21 4/1/2016
Fritz 12-56454 60 39 21 5/18/2016
Singh & Kaur 12-57208 60 39 21 7/21/2016
Delpasen 12-57490 60 40 20 5/17/16
Aguilar 12-56397 60 40 20 4/13/16
Nguyen 12-53539 60 40 20 4/13/2016
Delgado 12-58091 60 40 20 7/20/16
Legaspi 12-56412 60 40 20 7/20/16
Street 12-55567 60 40 20 5/18/16
Verduzco 11-57820 60 41 19 4/13/16
Neumann 12-54068 60 41 19 4/13/16 Roberson 12-54172 60 41 19 5/18/16 Verceles 12-55675 60 42 18 5/19/16 Velez 12-56208 60 42 18 6/15/2016 Walsh 12-56689 56 38 18 5/18/16 Castro & Romo 11-58153 60 42 18 6/22/2016 Fernandez 12-53564 60 42 18 4/1/16 Delgado 12-54957 60 42 18 6/30/2016 Karst 12-52703 60 43 17 5/17/16 Basanty 12-55849 60 43 17 7/21/2016 Preston 12-55025 60 43 17 5/19/2016 Hashemi 12-51543 60 43 17 6/15/16 Anaya 09-61289 58 41 17 5/23/16 Texon 13-52077 50 33 17 5/18/2016 Edem 12-52916 60 43 17 4/1/16 Cooper 12-55539 60 43 17 5/18/2016 Penoringan 11-55616 60 54 16 4/18/16 Roman 11-59254 60 44 16 4/1/2016 Smith 11-56094 60 54 16 4/18/16 Madrigal 12-51659 60 44 16 6/16/2016 Huerta 12-55884 60 44 16 7/21/16 Mena 12-52838 60 44 16 7/21/2016 Paredes 12-51535 60 45 15 7/7/2016 Casica 12-52188 60 45 15 4/13/16 Chateauvert 12-53210 60 45 15 6/1/16 Ramirez 12-52609 60 45 15 6/16/16 Ahmed 12-53885 58 43 15 5/19/2016 Dang & Phan 12-51561 60 45 15 4/13/16 Nguyen 11-60472 60 45 15 4/1/16 Condori 12-51729 60 45 15 4/13/2016 Hernandez 12-51210 60 45 15 6/22/16 Beuttler 12-51886 60 46 14 7/20/16 Cervantes 12-52950 60 46 14 6/15/2016 Velazquez 12-50844 60 46 14 4/1/2016 Powers 12-53449 60 46 14 7/21/2016 Argo 12-53090 60 46 14 7/22/16 Ybarra 11-61287 60 47 13 4/13/16 Blue 12-50454 60 47 13 4/18/2016 Orozco & Romo-Orozco 12-50869 60 47 13 5/18/2016 Sepulveda 11-59341 60 47 13 4/13/16 deVolo 11-61359 60 47 13 4/1/16 Martin 12-51792 60 47 13 6/15/2016 Canchola 12-50470 60 47 13 5/18/2016 Gutierrez 12-50166 60 48 12 6/16/16 Lewis 13-51822 57 45 12 5/18/2016
Lam 11-56728 60 48 12 4/13/16 Carandang 13-55963 36 28 12 7/20/16 Samano 12-51252 60 48 12 7/21/2016 Castulo 12-53821 52 40 12 4/1/2016 Filipe 12-50310 60 48 12 4/13/2016 Brady 11-60369 60 49 11 4/13/16 Lucero 11-57530 60 49 11 5/18/2016 Paniagua 11-57254 60 49 11 4/1/2016 Whitcomb 11-61374 60 49 11 7/21/2016 Jaquith 12-51952 60 49 11 7/20/16 Mladineo 13-54594 36 27 11 4/16/16 Bracamontes 14-50664 36 25 11 7/21/2016 Flaherty 11-59579 60 49 11 5/18/2016 Howard Tiggs 11-59144 60 49 11 4/1/2016 Chang 11-59768 60 49 11 4/13/2016 Sauce 11-57365 60 49 11 5/19/2016 Murga 12-56248 53 42 11 6/15/2016 Tapia 11-59277 60 50 10 4/13/16 Rodriquez 11-60680 60 50 10 5/17/16 Bayquen 11-61397 60 50 10 6/30/2016 Leach 12-50032 60 50 10 6/15/2016 Guagliardo 11-56471 60 50 10 4/13/2016 Michel 12-52158 55 45 10 4/13/16 Sikora 11-60216 60 50 10 4/18/16 Parrish & Romero 11-61775 60 50 10 7/20/2016 Cullen 11-61736 60 50 10 6/16/16 Wong & So 11-60925 60 50 10 7/20/2016 Yanit 11-61089 60 51 9 7/22/16 Sakuragi 11-59739 60 51 9 5/18/2016 Granada 11-57739 60 51 9 4/1/16 Medellin 11-55112 60 51 9 4/1/2016 Chavez 12-51083 55 46 9 4/1/2016 Odom 11-58476 60 51 9 4/1/16 Lagdamen 11-59080 60 51 9 5/17/16 Rocha & Acosta 11-55592 60 51 9 6/15/2016 Perales 11-58635 60 52 8 5/19/16 Gutierrez 11-56478 60 52 8 4/1/16 Lee 10-62094 60 52 8 4/20/2016 Blanco 13-53441 37 29 8 4/13/2016 Lozano 11-58461 60 52 8 4/13/2016 Wallis 11-58870 60 52 8 7/20/16 Jenott 11-56259 60 52 8 4/13/2016 Garza 11-57142 60 52 8 5/18/16 Blute 11-56214 60 52 8 4/1/2016 Radilla 11-56522 60 53 7 4/1/2016
Bozzo 12-55305 48 41 7 5/19/16 Valencia 11-56563 60 53 7 4/13/16 Brantveyn 11-53741 60 53 7 4/13/2016 Lopez 11-59045 60 53 7 6/17/2016 Pope 11-56089 54 53 7 4/13/2016 Velez 11-54840 57 50 7 4/1/2016 Edge 11-54767 60 53 7 5/18/2016 Lopez 11-57679 60 53 7 7/22/16 Noriega 11-56611 60 53 7 4/13/2016 Vasquez 11-59529 60 53 7 7/20/2016 Morgensen 11-55931 60 54 6 4/13/16 Aragon 11-54981 60 54 6 4/1/2016 Dunn 11-55036 60 54 6 4/1/2016 Fernandez 11-57692 60 54 6 6/15/2016 Ibarra 11-54578 60 54 6 4/1/2016 Jaklevick 11-57340 60 54 6 6/15/2016 Mendoza 11-55064 60 54 6 4/1/2016 Gochangco 11-57069 60 54 6n 7/22/16 Manuleleua 11-57058 58 52 6 7/20/16 Nevarez 11-58292 58 52 6 4/18/16 Main 11-58533 60 54 6 6/15/16 Hood 11-57809 60 54 6 6/16/16 Alamillo 11-55216 60 54 6 4/1/16 Mapalad 11-56453 60 54 6 6/15/2016 Velazquez 12-53034 48 42 6 6/15/2016 Alvarez 11-54039 60 55 5 4/13/16 Green 11-54954 60 55 5 4/18/2016 Rader & Sanchez 11-54678 60 55 5 5/18/2016 Labra 11-57598 60 55 5 6/14/16 Arriaga 11-57988 60 55 5 7/20/16 Ferraz 11-54062 58 53 5 6/15/16 Deem 13-52180 37 32 5 7/20/16 Raynov 13-51319 37 32 5 4/13/16 Hernandez 11-56925 60 55 5 7/20/2016 Raynova 13-51320 37 32 5 4/13/2016 Garcia 11-55970 60 55 5 5/17/16 Davidson 12-57417 45 40 5 6/16/16 Jensen 11-54080 60 55 5 6/1/16 Gaudette 10-50123 60 55 5 4/28/2016 Pashut 13-54607 36 31 5 7/21/2016 Smith 11-54685 60 55 5 4/18/2016 Clark 11-59550 60 54 4 7/20/2016 Kosmorsky 11-55415 60 56 4 6/17/2016 Niufar 11-51090 60 56 4 4/13/2016 Urbina 11-56995 60 56 4 7/20/2016
Sanchez & Salas 11-52935 60 56 4 4/18/2016 Garner 12-54455 49 45 4 6/16/16 Howe 11-52792 60 56 4 4/18/2016 Singca 11-50335 60 56 4 4/18/2016 Graham 11-57139 60 56 4 7/20/2016 Lockett 11-54113 60 56 4 4/13/2016 Rojas & Aranda 11-52776 60 56 4 4/18/2016 Tran 10-62095 60 56 4 4/13/16 Garcia 11-56118 60 56 4 6/30/2016 Nguyen 11-50165 60 56 4 4/13/2016 McDougall 11-55916 60 56 4 6/16/16 Clark 11-59849 54 50 4 4/13/2016 McIntyre 11-59086 58 54 4 7/20/2016 Bajala 11-56016 60 56 4 6/16/16 Mateo 11-51857 60 57 3 4/4/16 Humble 11-53883 60 57 3 6/15/16 Sargenti 10-63220 60 57 3 5/16/16 Caballero 11-50780 60 57 3 4/1/16 Flonnoy 11-56575 60 57 3 7/20/16 Oliver 11-57018 60 57 3 7/20/2016 Soto & Garibay 11-52475 60 57 3 4/18/2016 Lamboy 10-62826 60 57 3 4/13/2016 Gump & Coral 11-50057 58 55 3 4/13/16 Roth 11-57059 58 55 3 7/20/2016 Sanchez 12-58543 37 34 3 5/17/16 Demayo 11-59495 57 54 3 7/20/16 Mack 11-56365 60 57 3 7/20/2016 Carvajal 11-50664 60 57 3 4/28/2016 Toledo 11-54649 60 57 3 6/16/2016 Tran 11-51764 60 57 3 4/18/2016 Shorter 11-57300 54 51 3 4/1/16 Aguilar 13-53266 37 34 3 7/21/2016 Brundege 13-52348 38 35 3 7/21/2016 Gaska 11-55426 60 57 3 6/16/2016 Lopez 11-50967 60 57 3 4/13/16 Caberto 11-52549 60 57 3 4/13/2016 Sawamura 11-54338 60 57 3 6/14/16 Flores 11-54493 60 57 3 7/20/2016 Adams 11-53923 60 57 3 6/15/16 Sayson 11-52723 60 58 2 5/17/16 Tallerico 11-52918 60 58 2 6/14/16 Sparkman 11-51314 60 58 2 7/21/16 Ramirez 11-52066 60 58 2 7/20/2016 Williams 11-54939 60 58 2 7/20/2016 Ogana 11-50152 60 58 2 4/18/2016
Hawkins 11-59983 55 53 2 7/20/16 Skeen 12-52713 60 48 2 7/20/16 Herrera 11-50316 60 58 2 7/20/16 Ivey 11-54204 60 58 2 7/21/2016 Gentle 11-55082 60 58 2 7/20/16 Do 11-54201 60 58 2 7/20/2016 Kuhlow 13-53047 36 34 2 7/20/16 Harnden 13-51015 36 34 2 4/18/2016 Watterston 13-50021 36 35 1 4/13/16 Carrillo 11-53444 60 59 1 7/21/16 Culbertson 11-52912 60 59 1 6/16/16 Casias 11-50731 60 59 1 5/18/16 Contreras 11-50726 60 59 1 4/18/16 Diaz 11-51494 60 59 1 7/21/16 Shroff 10-62999 60 59 1 7/22/16 Rael 11-54269 60 59 1 7/20/2016 Barragan 12-59010 36 35 1 6/30/16 Hensley 11-51617 60 59 1 5/18/16 Gonzalez 10-63287 58 57 1 4/13/16 Djebroun 11-51274 60 59 1 6/15/2016 Nguyen 12-50356 49 48 1 6/16/16 Albano 12-58904 36 35 1 4/28/2016 Morgia 13-50572 36 35 1 7/21/2016 Castillo 11-53116 57 56 1 5/19/16 Ramirez 10-63286 60 59 1 5/19/16 Kuntaeodjanjun 11-53976 60 59 1 7/20/2016 Arguello 11-55142 60 59 1 7/20/16 Sawant 11-50168 60 59 1 7/20/16 Nguyen 11-50479 60 59 1 6/3/16 Vuong & Lam 11-51302 60 59 1 6/16/2016 Gulas 12-54433 42 41 1 4/1/16 Brown 11-51481 60 59 1 5/18/16 Chandler 11-52437 60 59 1 7/20/2016 Menchaca 11-50980 60 59 1 7/20/2016 Mesa 11-52493 60 59 1 6/15/16
EUGENE EDWARD VICK
Attorney James S.K. Shulman is counsel for Debtors in two cases: In re Eugene Edward Vick, Case No. 16-50401, and In re Jeri Lyle Saldua Mercado, Case No. 16-50651. Attorneys Jim Gold and Norma Hammes are counsel for Debtors in three cases: In re Dennis Michael Escarcega, Case No. 16-50368, In re Mark Irvin Candalla, Case No. 16-50659, and In re Nanette Marie Sisk, Case no. 16-50548. The briefs filed by each counsel assert the same arguments in each case represented by that counsel. References in this decision to positions asserted in the Vick and Escarcega pleadings are representative of the related briefs unless otherwise stated.
