NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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OPINION

MOORE, J.

The father and the mother separately appeal from termination of their parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent statutory references are to this code.) The father contends the juvenile court deprived him of due process of law by preventing him from calling his then five-year-old daughter as a witness. The mother argues the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We affirm the orders.

I

FACTS

In July 2015, officers with the Santa Ana Police Department brought two children, L.A., age three, and B.A., age two, into protective custody due to allegations of general neglect and caretaker absence, after their mother, A.J., had left them all night outside on a paternal relative's front porch. That same day, the children's mother was arrested and cited for violation of Penal Code section 271, abandonment, and nonsupport of a child under the age of 14.

Five months earlier, the mother had left the children with unrelated persons under an agreement it would be for a brief period of time. She "was gone for several days and she picked them up when she was physically forced to do so." An SSA report states the mother is homeless and has had an unresolved substance abuse problem since she was a teenager.

The father, Br.A., was incarcerated at Wasco State Prison. He also has an unresolved problem with substance abuse.

Eight days after the children were removed, the children's foster mother informed SSA she wanted the children removed from her home because they were "rowdy," and she could not understand them when they spoke. L.A. refused to eat. She also tried to run away, and the foster mother found her by the gate on a step stool trying to unlatch the gate.

L.A. was born in 2011. She "has a speech delay," and prior to the detention she was supposed to have speech services, but she was never taken to the program. While at a facility, after the children were removed from the foster home, at the request of the foster mother, L.A. was observed hitting the other children and trying to bite them. She cried every night for her mother.

Several incidents occurred prior to the present one. The first incident was 16 months earlier. Someone had contacted police to report seeing the mother slapping L.A. across the face with an open hand several times while using profanity. Police came to the scene and saw no marks on L.A. A report was taken. The following week, a report of neglect was found to be inconclusive. On another occasion, the father had come to the mother's apartment and engaged in a physical fight with a male friend of the mother's in the children's presence. The fight continued outside, and the father reportedly stabbed the friend three times, but the stabbing was not within the children's view. Ten months prior to the current event, a third report was made. That time, the mother and children were at a shelter, and another resident reported the mother threatened the children, and grabbed B.A. by the arm and picked him up by the arm. A fourth report was made nine months prior to the current incident. The mother and the children were staying at a shelter while the mother attended a domestic violence program, and the mother's friend stabbed the mother with scissors in front of the children during an argument.

A social worker wrote in one report about the visits in jail and how agitated the children become afterward. A therapist remarked that he observed the children's behaviors after jail visits and felt that the visits were becoming detrimental to both children.

On August 9, 2016, the juvenile court found that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the children, and identified adoption as the permanent placement goal. Thereafter, the court terminated parental rights.

II

DISCUSSION1

Requested Testimony of L.A.

The father contends the juvenile court's denial of his request to call L.A. as a witness violated his right to due process of law and constituted reversible error. He argues the court "should have required [L.A.] be made available to testify, at least in chambers, about the bond she shared with her father." The father explains what he thinks L.A. would have added to the evidence: "During her testimony, [L.A.] would have a chance to explain the cooling down described by the Agency, whether it was related to being too tired after having two jail visits in one day or because of attachment issues? Naturally, any child would be cranky and disinterred after having to attend two jail visits in two separate locations with mother and then father in the span of three hours, while loosing [sic] time in transportation, as happened in this case. [L.A.] would also explain who told her that her foster placement was a `forever home' and whether that made her withdraw emotionally from the visits? Finally, she could simply testify as to her wishes regarding whether she wanted to live with relatives and remain in contact with her father."

County counsel opposes the father's contention, stating "the juvenile court was within its discretion in determining that such testimony would be traumatic for the child, that [L.A.'s] general wishes could be ascertained through other evidence, and that evaluation of Father's claims did not require such live testimony."

"[D]ue process guarantees apply to dependency proceedings." (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 756.) "Due process is a flexible concept which depends upon the circumstances and a balancing of various factors. [Citation.] The due process right to present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of significant probative value to the issue before the court." (In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817.) Because due process is a flexible concept dependent on the circumstances, a party's right to present witnesses may be limited to evidence of significant probative value. (In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122.) "[I]n dependency proceedings, a parent's right to due process is limited by the need to balance the `interest in regaining custody of the minors against the state's desire to conclude dependency matters expeditiously and . . . exercise broad control over the proceedings. . . .' [Citation.] Trial courts are afforded discretion to work within existing guidelines to determine the admissibility of evidence. [Citation.]" (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1176.) The juvenile court is mandated to "consider the wishes of the child and shall act in the best interests of the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (h)(1).) "Where . . . the child's desires and wishes can be directly presented without live testimony, where the issues to be resolved would not be materially affected by the child's testimony, and where it is shown that the child would be psychologically damaged by being required to testify, we hold the juvenile court judge has the power to exclude such testimony. Those circumstances were present in this case, and we therefore uphold the court's ruling." (In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1089, italics added.)

"[E]vidence need not be in the form of direct testimony in court or chambers; it can be found in court reports prepared for the hearing." (In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813 820.) In the instant case, the juvenile court admitted 11 SSA reports into evidence. And from the court's various remarks, it is obvious the court was familiar with their content.

The juvenile court explained its reasons for not granting the father's request to order L.A. to testify. In essence, the court stated it already had a great deal of evidence concerning how L.A. tolerated visits with the parents: "There is a lot of information in these reports. There's even a doctor that, her therapist had said that it's rather disruptive to her to have these visits as frequently as they are. [¶] Additionally, this new report, there's — it is chock-full of information and there's some negativity that's associated with these visits. [¶] Obviously — well, I don't know but I would imagine most children are going to say that they love their parents. But merely saying that they love mom or love dad, that does not establish the kind of bond that needs to be there — well, it would not establish what it is that you would need to prove. [¶] I don't — I'm not hearing anything additional to what has already been provided via the [SSA] reports. [¶] Additionally, the court has to consider the best interests of the child. And I can't fathom if [L.A.] was having tantrums, and crying and acting out after a visit with the parent, what kind of pressure that would put on her to come and testify in court?" After stating that L.A. was not yet six years old, the court also stated: "Those children should not be asked questions such as where they prefer to live, permanency, adoption; all of that stuff would be inappropriate for a child, let alone a child of this young age to testify to."

In addition to the content of the numerous SSA reports about the father's relationship with L.A., the father's older sister, L.A.'s aunt, testified L.A. cried for her parents. When L.A. drew pictures of her father, the aunt would display them on the refrigerator. According to the aunt, when the children were visiting her and the father telephoned, L.A. "literally leaped out of her chair" with her eyes bulging and a smile on her face.

The father's brother testified he saw the children every weekend since they were born. He said the children constantly spoke about their father. The children would cry and say, "I want to be with daddy."

The juvenile court had a great deal of information, both in SSA reports and through live testimony, about how the children felt about the father. The court also had evidence showing that L.A. has problems with her speech, observed both her parents engage in violent interactions, has been the victim of domestic violence, tried to run away from a foster parent and would not eat when she was upset. The father's argument concerning what additional evidence L.A. would have given had she testified involves complicated issues such as explaining the cooling down time after jail visits, whether she withdrew emotionally when she was told her foster placement was permanent and whether she wished to live with relatives and remain in contact with the father. The parts of these areas a child under six years old could be expected to explain are in evidence through other means.

Under the circumstances we find in this record, we cannot conclude that in not permitting L.A. to testify the juvenile court excluded any relevant evidence of significant probative value. Accordingly, the father was not denied due process of the law. Nor will we second guess the court's decision not to expose L.A. to any more emotional trauma.

Indian Child Welfare Act

The mother contends the juvenile court erred "by not requiring the agency, pursuant to the ICWA, to fully inquire and send sufficient notice to the tribes in the ICWA-030 notice, which was prejudicial error and subject to remand for further proceedings." She argues the court failed to require SSA to interview extended family members to obtain sufficient information to fill out the court form.

With regard to the claim of error that the juvenile court did not require the agency to fully inquire about Native American heritage, the mother's citations to the record are to an SSA report that discusses various interviews and objectives. We presume the mother wants us to infer none of these witnesses were asked about their heritage. There is no citation to anything in the record that indicates any ICWA notice issue was brought to the attention of the court. When not raised in the lower court, issues are waived and not preserved for appeal. (In re Marriage of Graham (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1328.) Nonetheless, we review the record independently. (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 254.)

During a prior child welfare investigation 15 months earlier, the father denied any Native American heritage to SSA. The day after the children were detained, the mother reported she has Native American heritage through the Apache Tribe on the maternal side of her family. She told SSA the maternal grandmother, M.M., may be able to provide further information, although she is not a registered tribe member. The mother provided SSA with the name and telephone number of the maternal grandmother.

Two days after the children were detained, a Judicial Council mandatory form, ICWA-020 entitled "PARENTAL NOTIFICATION OF INDIAN STATUS," was filed with the juvenile court. It states that the mother may have Indian ancestry with the Apache Tribe.

The record before us shows a proof of service of mailing notice of child custody proceedings on Judicial Council mandatory form, ICWA-030 entitled "NOTICE OF CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS FOR INDIAN CHILD," to various entities on July 31, 2015. Along with the name and location of the juvenile court and the next hearing date, the form provided the names and dates of birth of the mother and father, as well as the name, address and place of birth of the maternal grandmother. In the box with the heading "Tribe or band, and location," the form states for both the mother and the maternal grandmother, "Apache." The preparer of the form, who signed a declaration under penalty of perjury, stated the form contained all the information SSA had about the relatives of the children.

On August 14, 2015, SSA filed a mail receipt, showing a Postal Service delivery to Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs (Department of the Interior) on July 27, 2015;2 to Bureau of Indian Affairs on August 3, 2015; to Yavapai Apache Nation on August 3, 2015; to Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma on August 3, 2015; to Apache Tribe of Oklahoma on August 3, 2015; to Tonto Apache Tribe on August 3, 2015; to Mescalero Apache Tribe on August 3, 2015; to San Carlos Apache Tribe on August 4, 2015; to Jicarilla Apache Nation on August 5, 2015; and, to White Mountain Apache Tribe on August 6, 2015.

Copies of responses were filed on August 31, 2015 and September 14, 2015. Mescalero Apache Tribe wrote that their records did not show the mother, the father nor the maternal grandmother as members of their tribe, and therefore the children were not eligible for membership. San Carlos Apache Tribe said neither of the children was eligible for enrollment in the tribe. Tonto Apache Tribe said neither B.A. nor the father are enrolled in the tribe. Yavapai Apache Nation said the children were not enrolled or eligible for enrollment in the tribe. The United States Department of the Interior wrote that neither the parents nor the children are members of the Apache Tribe of Oklahoma.

Title 25 United States Code section 1912(a) provides: "In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention. . . . No foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at least ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe. . . ."

"If the court, social worker, or probation officer knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the social worker or probation officer is required to make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and to do so as soon as practicable, by interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and extended family members to gather the information required in paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 224.2, contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying the names and contact information of the tribes in which the child may be a member or eligible for membership in and contacting the tribes and any other person that reasonably can be expected to have information regarding the child's membership status or eligibility. [¶] (d) If the court, social worker, or probation officer knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the social worker or probation officer shall provide notice in accordance with paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 224.2." (§ 224.3, subds. (c), (d).)

"[N]otice shall include all of the following information: [¶] (A) The name, birthdate, and birthplace of the Indian child, if known. [¶] (B) The name of the Indian tribe in which the child is a member or may be eligible for membership, if known. [¶] (C) All names known of the Indian child's biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, or Indian custodians, including maiden, married and former names or aliases, as well as their current and former addresses, birthdates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment numbers, and any other identifying information, if known. [¶] (D) A copy of the petition by which the proceeding was initiated. [¶] (E) A copy of the child's birth certificate, if available. [¶] (F) The location, mailing address, and telephone number of the court and all parties notified pursuant to this section." (§ 224.2, subd. (5).) Section 224.2, subdivision (5), requires additional advisements, all of which appear on the form ICWA-030, which was mailed to the various entities, as described above.

"`[C]ompliance requires no more than the completion of a preprinted form promulgated by the State of California, Health and Welfare Agency, for the benefit of county welfare agencies.'" (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 254.) If the tribe is unknown, notice must be given to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) When proper notice is not given under ICWA, the court's order is invalidated. (25 U.S.C. § 1914.)

Here notice was given to Apache Tribes, the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The notices contained all family information the parties have cited in the record. Return receipts for all of them were received by SSA, and many responded as well. The mother argues in her brief "there is no indication" in the agency's reports that any social worker ever called M.M. and interviewed her about the family's Indian lineage. Yet the record does reflect that two social workers telephoned the maternal grandmother, M.M., once in July and once in September 2015. The July conversation was made by the ICWA social worker and its purpose was "for further information regarding the family's American Indian heritage." The ICWA-030 form contains information about M.M. in addition to that provided to SSA by the mother, M.M.'s place of birth. Additionally, the ICWA social worker stated: "SSA has spoken to available family member in regards to ICWA [sic]. SSA has been provided with all information that the family was able or willing to provide at this time." Under the circumstances we find in this record, we do not infer that SSA did not make inquiries of relatives and independently conclude the ICWA notice requirements were satisfied.

III

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

O'LEARY, P. J. and FYBEL, J., concurs.