KRIEGLER, J.
Defendant and appellant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and respondent Iris Cohen in this action for failure to provide reasonable accommodation of Cohen's disability in violation the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.).
California State Prison, Los Angeles County in Lancaster, California, is divided into several yards with alphabetical designations. Lancaster has high desert conditions with winds up to 30 or 40 miles per hour and extreme temperatures. An electric cart driven by inmates provides transportation from the prison entrance to the yards. No cart service is available if there are custodial issues such as a lockdown, or the cart's battery needs charging. The mental health department has a small golf cart available for non-clinical staff to drive. No carts are permitted within the yards for security reasons.
The prison has a mental health program called Correctional Clinical Case Management System (CCCMS) for inmates who are essentially stable, but have some mental health problems that must be monitored. State law mandates that inmates in CCCMS be seen by a psychologist or a psychiatrist at least once every 90 days. There are two additional levels of mental health care for inmates who require a higher degree of monitoring and care: the EOP program and mental health crisis beds. In order to maintain compliance with state law mandates, staff members routinely cover patient responsibilities for other staff members who are on continuing education, sick leave, or vacation.
CDCR hired Cohen as a clinical psychologist for a different prison site. In February 2001, she began working at the Lancaster prison as a case manager in the CCCMS program for D yard. D yard houses approximately 1,000 inmates in five buildings. Cohen provided individual and group treatment, as well as taught classes to the administration. Her supervisor was Isaac Sharone.
In 2003, William Powers was appointed chief psychiatrist. A mental health building was constructed adjacent to D yard with offices for mental health clinicians and treatment rooms for inmates in the EOP program. However, the EOP program used only half of the available treatment and office space. Therefore, Powers assigned offices in the mental health building to Cohen and others based on geographical convenience to patients in D yard. Some mental health staff had offices in B yard. B yard was approximately one mile from D yard and was the farthest location from D yard in the prison. B yard office space was one large room without air conditioning or a telephone for the mental health staff.
Cohen was on an alternate work schedule which required her to work an average of 40 hours per week over four days. In 2005, Cohen took medical leave from February 16 to May 23, which was approved by Sharone. Cohen took an additional 442 hours of approved leave that year, which was 316 hours in excess of her leave credits.
Cohen took six days of leave in January and three days in February 2006. Timothy Belavich became the chief psychologist and acting health care manager at the Lancaster prison. He determined that the mental health staff was working only 20 to 30 hours per week and not meeting state law mandates. On March 16, 2006, Belavich notified mental health supervisors of his concerns that psychologists on alternate work schedules were not performing 10 hours of work per day or handling commensurate workloads. Sharone shared Belavich's memorandum with Cohen.
Cohen took four leave days in March and five days in April. On April 26, 2006, Belavich met with Cohen and noted that the union contract provided for staff to work a 40-hour week on average. After Belavich spoke with Sharone, Sharone counseled Cohen about keeping to her alternate work schedule.
Cohen took four days of leave in May 2006, six days in June, four days in July, three days in August, the entire month of September, and five days in October. In July 2006, Powers stepped down as chief psychiatrist and was assigned to D yard, where he worked with Cohen on a weekly basis through the end of the year.
In September 2006, there was a substantial increase in medical staff. As a result, mental health clinicians were no longer allowed to see patients in the medical clinic. No space was designated for the mental health staff to see CCCMS patients, and the mental health staff never knew where patients would be seen the following day. The prison administration agreed to let the mental health staff use a classification room for a few hours each day for case managers to see patients, but the administration often needed the room for purposes that superseded the patient visits. Clinicians often waited in their offices until space was available to see patients. They also reviewed patients' charts and documented treatment sessions in their offices in order to minimize use of the administration's space.
Inmates' charts continued to be delivered to the medical clinic, even though mental health clinicians could no longer see patients at the clinic. The charts had to be supervised or kept in a secure area. The mental health clinicians would pick up several boxes of charts from the medical clinic and carry them on carts or dollies to their offices or the locations where they were seeing patients.
In October 2006, Sharone was transferred to supervise another unit. Patricia Pope became Cohen's supervisor. In Pope's experience working with Cohen previously, she had found Cohen to be an exceptional clinician.
Cohen hurt her shoulder and neck loading patients' charts and carrying them to appointments. In November 2006, she visited a doctor for this injury and told him that she was so exhausted that she could barely get out of bed each day. He referred her to hematologist Edwin Jacobs. Jacobs diagnosed her with severe anemia and a profound, progressive iron deficiency. She began intravenous infusions of steroids and iron. She learned that her condition is permanent, but with treatment, her symptoms would improve.
Cohen took four days of leave in November and six days in December. For the year, she had taken 562 hours of leave, which was 392 hours in excess of her available leave.
From 2001 through 2006, Cohen's case load was high, her compliance rates were always above 90 percent, and she saw most of her patients more frequently than once every 90 days. She was known to be detail oriented and well prepared for meetings. Sharone gave her positive performance reviews and characterized her as hard working under difficult conditions, such as when there was a lockdown in place for several months and she had to see inmates in the housing unit buildings. Cohen covered a higher case load than most other case managers, equivalent to that of two full-time psychologists.
Jacobs wrote a letter dated January 3, 2007, explaining that Cohen was being treated for severe progress iron deficiency and anemia. He stated, "She may not walk long distances, no more than twice a day for 2 to 3 minutes. If walking is required for distances, she will require a cart to move around the prison. She may not lift anything heavier than 3 pounds, such as medical charts or UHRS boxes. She may arrive at work by 0900, 3 out of 4 days. One day a week will arrive by noon for 10 weeks, [then] once a month. She cannot walk to housing units or climb stairs to 2nd tier. No work in hospital [] area." CDCR's Return to Work Coordinator Patty Castillo was not in that day, so Cohen left Jacob's letter on her desk.
That same day, Belavich moved Cohen's office to B yard. Pope was on vacation and had not been consulted about the move. The office technician who worked with Cohen remained in the mental health building. Cohen was given one day to pack up her office. She was exhausted after packing 14 boxes of office materials. At 4:00 p.m., she approached the acting supervisor to explain that she needed to leave early. The acting supervisor told Cohen to go back to D yard immediately to interview a prisoner who was upset. Cohen explained her medical condition. She said that she could not walk back to D yard and do the interview, because she was sick, tired, and needed to go home.
Belavich later told Pope to write a letter of instruction for insubordination due to Cohen's failure to interview the prisoner. Pope refused. The staff member who was acting supervisor on January 3, 2007, wrote the letter of instruction. She explained that Cohen did not look sick and did not have anything in writing about a medical condition, so she had to give Cohen the letter of instruction.
On January 8, 2007, Cohen met with Castillo to discuss accommodation. Cohen authorized Castillo to speak with Jacobs about her medical condition. Belavich attended the meeting and agreed to temporarily transfer Cohen for one week to B yard reception center to perform screenings and evaluations. Cohen did not perform this assignment.
On January 17, 2007, Cohen brought a second letter from Jacobs. In addition to the restrictions that had been noted previously, Jacobs stated that Cohen was being treated twice a week for 10 to 12 weeks. Her treatments were Tuesdays between 9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. and Fridays between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. Castillo believed Jacob's letter was contradictory and additional information was still necessary. She told Cohen to use leave credits to go home or remain and perform her assigned duties. Cohen chose to remain at work, but needed assistance moving her files.
On January 17, 2007, Castillo sent Jacobs a summary of the essential functions of a clinical psychologist and a questionnaire, which he completed and returned on January 26, 2007. The summary of essential functions stated the physical demands of Cohen's job were: occasional walking through the institution to meeting rooms; frequent to constant sitting during meetings, assessments, and paperwork completion; occasional lifting of items weighing less than a couple pounds, such as files and pens; and occasional carrying of items weighing less than a couple pounds throughout the office. The questionnaire asked if Cohen was able to perform the essential functions of the job as a clinical psychologist. Jacobs answered, "Yes." The questionnaire asked Jacobs to explain the medical limitations on Cohen's ability to perform the essential functions of the position. Jacobs stated that Cohen should not be required to walk long distances; should not walk for more than five minutes at a time; should not climb stairs; should not lift heavy objects; and should avoid areas of high risk exposure to illness, such as a hospital. He stated that the limitations were temporary and the expected duration was 10 weeks, after which Cohen could return to full duty. If possible, Cohen should be provided with the assistance of a cart for traveling long distances and lifting heavy medical records. He also stated that Cohen was ready and capable of performing the essential functions of her job as a clinical psychologist.
For the month of January 2007, Cohen took eight days of leave. On January 30, 2007, Castillo obtained approval from Belavich for a light duty assignment for Cohen as follows: she could rest between periods of walking as needed in order to be in compliance with the walking limitation and a staff member would deliver and pick up inmate charts. Cohen would be responsible for the security of the charts throughout the day and would have to acknowledge receipt and release of the charts. She was not required to climb stairs or work in a hospital setting for her position. The assignment would be in effect for 10 weeks beginning January 31, 2007. Cohen's hours would be 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Cohen was not in the office that day to discuss the accommodation.
Cohen met with Castillo, Pope, and Belavich to discuss accommodation of her disability. Pope recommended that Cohen's office be relocated to the mental health building. Cohen's former office was vacant. Charts could be delivered to the office, and Cohen could take the ones that she needed to appointments. Belavich stated, "Absolutely not," without providing any explanation. Initially, he rejected any suggestions to accommodate Cohen. He suggested that Cohen should take unpaid medical leave, because he was concerned that she was too fragile to work in any area of the prison. Castillo told him that Cohen was capable of performing her essential job duties, and therefore, was allowed to work and receive reasonable accommodations. He was told that if he had serious concerns about Cohen's safety, he could place her on paid administrative leave. Belavich decided not to prohibit Cohen from working.
Belavich did not consider the location of Cohen's office to be relevant to her disability accommodation. He did not believe that it made any difference whether Cohen had an office in the mental health building or B yard, because she could not see patients in her office. Therefore, her inability to walk the distance between B and D yards did not preclude Cohen from doing her job. In his view, Cohen could wait in the yard for a treatment space to be available to see patients. Cohen could use the inmate shuttle, and if the shuttle was not available, Cohen could request a ride from an office technician in mental health in the mental health cart. Within the yards, where carts were not permitted, Cohen could use benches as she walked throughout the facility to stop and rest as needed. They discussed giving Cohen the keys to a mental health golf cart.
Belavich agreed that charts would be delivered to Cohen instead of the medical clinic. However, Cohen would need to notify the medical records staff by 7:30 a.m. of the office where she would be working that day so that the medical records staff could deliver the charts to that location. Cohen had to be present to meet the charts when they were delivered and supervise the charts during the day. At the end of the day, she would call the records department to have the charts picked up. Cohen and Pope signed a form acknowledging Cohen's 10-week light duty assignment on February 7, 2007.
On February 14, 2007, Castillo asked Cohen where she would be working, in order to let Belavich know where to arrange transportation of the inmate charts. Cohen said that she had no work location and it would be impossible to predict where she would be working from day to day. Castillo made several attempts to reach Cohen to finalize her light duty assignment concerning delivery of the inmate charts.
The walk from B yard to D yard took Cohen 25 minutes. Cohen could not walk back to her office between visits to document patients' charts, so she had to look for places that she could use to do charting. The inmate-driven cart service was unreliable. Mental health staff who drove the cart often were not in their offices to take Cohen's call. She used coworkers' offices to document her patients' charts when possible. She also used an empty conference room until Belavich saw her using it one day and ordered it locked.
On February 21, 2007, Cohen filed a disability discrimination complaint with CDCR. She stated that she was fearful, stressed, could not sleep, and had nowhere to do her work or put her belongings. She was taking psychiatric medication for stress, including antidepressant medication, and her medical condition was deteriorating.
On February 26, 2007, Castillo told Cohen in passing that she needed to come to Castillo's office to discuss her work location. Cohen explained that it was impossible for her to give Castillo a work location because she did not have one, and therefore, she had no work location for the charts to be delivered to her. Later that day, Cohen wrote a letter to Castillo explaining that the accommodation was not working. She did not know in advance where she would be meeting patients each day, so she could not have records delivered anywhere but the clinic, which required her to pick them up. She had received no assistance in carrying her charts from the clinic to the location where she was stationed for the day, and she still had no access keys to any of the mental health carts. She thanked Castillo for all her efforts to resolve Cohen's difficulties and hoped they could come to a better resolution soon.
Castillo discussed Cohen's letter with Belavich. Belavich said he would discuss the situation further with Pope and they would take care of it. Castillo was not involved any further.
In February 2007, Cohen worked seven full days, one of which was jury duty, and two partial days. In March 2007, Cohen completed three days of clinical work. Pope was transferred to the developmentally disabled prisoners program in B yard and Cohen had a new supervisor. On April 11, 2007, Cohen's performance review stated that she had produced a lower quantity of work than clinicians in similar positions due to her excessive absences, training, and union activities, and that she demonstrated no concern for her treatment of team members, focusing on her own needs to the detriment of clinicians who covered her caseload. Cohen took nine days of leave in April. She took five full days and five partial days of leave in May 2007. She requested 15 days off for a vacation in September 2007, which her new supervisor denied.
On May 29, 2007, Belavich reassigned Cohen to the B yard reception area. She was told for the first time that her absences were creating compliance issues for CCCMS patients. The mental health tracking system is in the mental health building, so she had not been able to monitor compliance after her office moved. In the B yard assignment, she screened new inmates in a large reception area. New inmates took a screening examination and an intelligence test. No clinical practice was involved. Cohen was very depressed and distraught about the reassignment, because she enjoyed clinical practice and viewed the B yard reception assignment as equivalent to a highly paid clerk.
Cohen worked four full days in June 2007. Carmen Reed became her supervisor in June 2007. He notified Cohen that her absences were leaving the B yard reception center without assistance. He had spoken with Castillo, who informed him that there were no approved special accommodations on file for Cohen. He requested that she report to work in the morning before appointments and arrange her medical appointments to interfere as little as possible with her work schedule.
In July 2007, Cohen was reassigned to the developmentally disabled prisoner program with Pope. This position required reviewing patients' charts and interviewing them to assess whether they were truly developmentally disabled. The prisoners were located in B yard, but their files were located in a trailer near D yard. To relieve Cohen from walking around the yard, Cohen and Pope agreed that Pope would interview prisoners and Cohen would do the research in their charts. Pope's name appeared on the productivity reports.
In July, Cohen fell twice at work and injured herself. She also acquired a painful antibiotic-resistant staph infection. Cohen worked three full days and seven partial days in July 2007. On July 23, 2007, Cohen resubmitted her request to take a 15-day vacation in September. Reed noted that her previous supervisor had denied the request and she had no leave credits, so Reed denied her request.
Belavich wrote a memorandum in August 2007 stating that Cohen had no work productivity for two and a half months. He requested that she be investigated for dishonesty and inefficiency. Cohen was reassigned to B yard reception. In August, she worked one full day and four partial days. On August 24, 2007, her doctor placed her on medical leave for a month. She was psychologically unable to work, which exacerbated her physical health problems. Cohen went to Israel for the first three weeks of September 2007. She received disability payments equal to half of her salary for six months and no further payments or benefits. In 2008, she remained disabled due to orthopedic conditions.
On February 27, 2009, Cohen filed a complaint against CDCR. She filed the operative amended complaint on May 26, 2009, alleging causes of action for discrimination in violation of the FEHA, based on her physical disability, retaliation in violation of the FEHA, and violation of Labor Code section 132a. On August 22, 2009, Cohen informed Castillo that given her medical restrictions, she could not consider a full-time position, would not work in a state correctional facility, and could not drive to work. Cohen provided a medical note stating that she was disabled through June 1, 2010.
A jury trial commenced on April 19, 2010. At the time of trial, Cohen's doctors still had not authorized her to return to work. She was unable to drive to the prison or perform full-time clinical duties in a state prison. Cohen testified that her former monthly income at the prison was $8,820. She estimated that between March 2008 when her disability payments ended and the date of trial, she would have earned $220,500.
On May 14, 2010, the jury found that CDCR did not discriminate against Cohen on account of her disability, nor did CDCR retaliate against Cohen. However, the jury found that Cohen was able to perform the essential duties of her job with reasonable accommodation and CDCR failed to provide reasonable accommodation under section 12940, subdivision (m). The jury found Cohen's damages were $275,000. The trial court entered judgment on June 22, 2010. CDCR filed a timely notice of appeal.
"When a party contends insufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. [Citations.] `"[T]he power of [the] appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the [verdict]." [Citations.]' [Citation.] We must `view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor . . . .' [Citation.]" (Wilson v. County of Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188 (Wilson).)
Under the FEHA, an employer must make reasonable accommodation for the known physical disabilities of employees, unless the employer shows accommodation would impose an undue hardship. (§ 12940, subd. (m); Wilson, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192; Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1003.)
In this case, CDCR does not dispute that Cohen had a physical disability covered by the FEHA. However, CDCR contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the jury's findings that Cohen is a qualified individual and CDCR failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. We examine each contention in light of the standard of review.
CDCR contends that even with accommodation, Cohen could not perform the essential functions of her job due to her excessive absences, and therefore, she was not a qualified individual under section 12940, subdivision (m). However, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that Cohen was a qualified individual when she requested accommodation of her disability.
The essential functions of a position are "the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. `Essential functions' does not include the marginal functions of the position." (§ 12926, subd. (f).)
"Numerous courts have held that attendance at work is an essential job function. See, e.g., Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1998) (Plaintiff did not establish that he could perform essential functions of his job without accommodation because he was unable to attend work on a regular basis); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (coming to work regularly was an `essential function'); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (`[A] regular and reliable level of attendance is a necessary element of most jobs')." (Diaz v. Federal Express Corp. (2005) 373 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1060.)
When the evidence in this case is viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, there is substantial evidence that Cohen performed the essential functions of her position in 2005 and 2006, despite significant absences. Sharone was Cohen's supervisor during this time until October 2006, and Powers, the former chief psychiatrist, worked with Cohen until the end of 2006. At trial, both doctors testified that Cohen was a hard worker with a case load equivalent to two full-time psychologists. Powers testified that despite legitimate absences for medical conditions and her undiagnosed disability, Cohen was always well-prepared and her compliance rates were above the required percentage. It was clear from Powers' testimony that he considered it acceptable for patient responsibilities to be covered by other staff members during a clinician's legitimate absences, such as an approved vacation or medical leave, in order to maintain compliance rates. We note that daily attendance was not an essential function of Cohen's position, because her alternate work schedule permitted her to take one day off every other week.
When Cohen's disability was identified at the end of 2006, her doctor explained her significant physical limitations and prescribed a 10-week treatment regimen to improve her symptoms. It was reasonable for the jury to infer from this evidence that if CDCR had reasonably accommodated Cohen's physical limitations, at the end of the 10-week treatment regimen, Cohen's attendance would likely have improved and been sufficient to meet the requirements of her job as a case manager for D yard. Instead, CDCR moved her office a mile away from the patients that she was treating, increasing her physical and psychological strain, and her attendance suffered proportionally. Based on the evidence, the jury could reasonably find that if CDCR had reasonably accommodated Cohen's limitations in 2007, her attendance would have been sufficient to meet the requirements of her job.
CDCR contends that the accommodations offered to Cohen were reasonable as a matter of law. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that CDCR failed to provide Cohen with a reasonable accommodation for her disability.
Under the FEHA, "reasonable accommodation" means "a modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired." (Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 974 (Nadaf-Rahrov).) The FEHA provides examples of potentially reasonable accommodations, including: making facilities accessible and useable by disabled individuals; job restructuring; offering part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition of equipment or devices; and similar accommodations. (§ 12926, subd. (n).)
Reasonable accommodation can include providing a disabled employee with a finite leave for treatment, either accrued paid leave or unpaid leave, provided the employee is likely to be able to perform at the end of the leave. (Wilson, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1193-1194.) "If the employee cannot be accommodated in his or her existing position and the requested accommodation is reassignment, an employer must make affirmative efforts to determine whether a position is available. [Citation.]" (Raine v. City of Burbank (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1223.)
"`As long as a reasonable accommodation available to the employer could have plausibly enabled a handicapped employee to adequately perform his job, an employer is liable for failing to attempt that accommodation.' [Citations.]" (Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 226 (Hanson).) "`The law and the regulations clearly contemplate not only that employers remove obstacles that are in the way of the progress of the disabled, but that they actively re-structure their way of doing business in order to accommodate the needs of their disabled employees. There are limits on the re-structuring that an employer needs to do. Accommodations need only be "reasonable." An employer need not undertake an accommodation that would create an "undue hardship." [Citation.] But to read into the law a hard and fast rule that its effects stop at some artificial boundary would be to ignore the broad sweep of the law.' [Citation.]" (Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 935, 948.)
"[A]n employer is not required to choose the best accommodation or the specific accommodation the employee seeks. Instead, `"`the employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations, and may choose the less expensive accommodation or the accommodation that is easier for it to provide.' [Citation.] . . . [A]n employee cannot make his employer provide a specific accommodation if another reasonable accommodation is instead provided. [Citation.]" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Wilson, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1194.)
Substantial evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, supports the jury's finding that the accommodation offered to Cohen was unreasonable. Pope testified that every clinician working with patients needed an office space in order to contact the administration, contact other clinicians, keep handouts used in individual and group therapy, and most importantly, to keep their charts. Everyone had their charts delivered to their offices, wrote all of their notes in their offices, and had an appropriate place to work, except Cohen. The various cart services used for transportation between B and D yard were unreliable. Powers testified that allowing Cohen to rest every five minutes while walking between yards was an unreasonable accommodation, because of the wind conditions and extreme temperatures. Pope similarly testified that it was unreasonable to suggest Cohen find a table or bench outdoors in the yard to write her notes in patients' charts. Inmates were in the yard and the wind would blow away her materials. The evidence was that a clinician performing Cohen's job needed office space to work out of and it was unreasonable to suggest an employee sit outside for any period of time.
Substantial evidence also showed that delivery of inmate charts to Cohen was an unworkable accommodation under the circumstances. There was no regularly scheduled treatment space to which charts could be delivered. Under the accommodation that CDCR provided, Cohen was expected to find space each day to do her office work, such as a bench in the yard, as well as find space to see her patients. This required Cohen to transport all of her patients' charts for the day back and forth between two temporary locations. At least one day per week, Cohen had a medical appointment which prevented her from being present to receive inmates' charts at 7:30 a.m., and therefore, she was required to pick up the charts at the medical clinic on those days and move them around with her during the day. The jury could reasonably find from the evidence that the accommodation provided by CDCR, requiring Cohen to either work outside on a bench or borrow an empty room and then physically transport all of her patients' charts back and forth from that location, was unreasonable.
In addition, the evidence showed that the accommodation which Cohen had requested was reasonable and available. Cohen's office in the mental health building was unoccupied. Powers opined that a clinician with walking limitations should have priority over almost anyone for an office in the EOP program building. No reason was provided that Cohen could not have an office in the mental health building. Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that CDCR failed to provide reasonable accommodation.
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Iris Cohen is awarded her costs on appeal.
ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J. and MOSK, J., concurs.
