NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CHANEY, J.
Pasadena Unified School District (the District) filed this petition for writ of mandate, asking this court to vacate the trial court's order overruling the District's demurrer to the third amended complaint of real party in interest Brycson Gaddis.1 The District demurred on grounds that Gaddis's third cause of action for dangerous condition on public property, asserted for the first time in the third amended complaint, is barred because there is no claim of dangerous condition asserted in the tort claim Gaddis presented to the District under the Government Claims Act.2 (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.)3
We conclude that the trial court erred in overruling the District's demurrer. Gaddis's third cause of action for dangerous condition on public property is barred because the facts supporting it are not fairly reflected in Gaddis's government tort claim. Thus, Gaddis failed to comply with the claims presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act (§ 900 et seq.) with respect to this cause of action. We grant the District's petition and direct the trial court to vacate the order overruling the demurrer and to issue an order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
BACKGROUND
At the time of the incident alleged in this action, four-year-old Brycson Gaddis was a student in a pre-kindergarten class at a District school. Gaddis's grandmother, Sharan Floyd, completed a District "Complaint Form" regarding the January 27, 2009 incident, and her attorney presented it to the District. Floyd described her "complaint" about the incident as follows:
"My Grandson Bryscon Gaddis attends Franklin Elementary[. H]e is in Pre-K in the afternoon session[. H]e is in Mrs. Roxy's class[. A]t some point between 3:00-3:10 he hurt his self [sic] on the tricycle[.] I was told he ran into a gate. My major complaint is that I was not notified, by the school. I was told about the incident, by my cousin and the day care provider. I went to the school the next day expressing my concern about not being contacted, at all. I did not receive [sic] a phone call or accident report. Mrs. Bermudez, apologized for not calling, but said they thought my day care provider would tell me. I was called by the day care provider, at work, which I left immediately to come and see about Brycson. His nose was severely swollen and he had major bumps + bruises on his forehead, temple area and elbow. I took him to Emergency at the [H]untington hospital, where he was seen right of way [sic] for his head injury[. H]is diagnosis was a [f]ractured nose. I don't know what the protocol is for students having head injurys [sic] at school, but I certinly [sic] think I should have been notified by the school nurse and they should have sent home a [sic] accident report."
Responding to the "Complaint Form," the District sent a "Notice of Insufficiency" to the attorney representing Floyd, explaining that she needed to use a District claim form to present the claim. Floyd's counsel completed and submitted the District claim form on behalf of Gaddis. In the claim form, which was dated May 22, 2009, counsel referenced the description of the incident and complaint prepared by Floyd, which we quoted above. The District sent Floyd's counsel a notice that it had rejected the claim.
On December 9, 2009, Gaddis filed this action through his guardian ad litem, Floyd. His complaint included causes of action for negligent supervision, negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In describing the incident, Gaddis alleged: "On the morning of January 27, 2009, Plaintiff attended his pre-kindergarten class as normal. That afternoon, while Plaintiff was in class, Plaintiff left the classroom and apparently went outside to the playground. As a result of the negligence of Defendants, Plaintiff got onto a tricycle, began to ride it, and then crashed to the ground, severely injuring himself. [¶] . . . Plaintiff was discovered a short while later, and taken to the school nurse. [The District] did not contact Plaintiff's guardian to inform the Guardian of the severity of the accident, and sent him home as if nothing happened. Presumably to hide the accident from Plaintiff's guardian. [Sic.] When Plaintiff arrived home, his guardian immediately noticed his swollen nose and severe cuts, scrapes and bruises. Plaintiff's guardian immediately rushed him to the emergency room, where he was treated for a broken nose, cuts and various bruises or abrasions and other injuries."
After the District filed demurrers, on grounds not relevant to the issues on appeal, Gaddis filed a first amended and then a second amended complaint.4 The second amended complaint, which the trial court amended by interlineation in response to the District's motion to strike Gaddis's prayer for attorney fees, included causes of action for negligent supervision and negligence, based on the same factual allegations regarding the incident that were alleged in the complaint and set forth above.
On April 21, 2011, Gaddis moved the trial court for leave to file a third amended complaint. Gaddis represented that, "during recent depositions in this matter, Plaintiff's counsel determined that the facts in this action give rise to an additional cause of action for Dangerous Condition on Public Property (Government Code Section 835)." The proposed new third cause of action alleged, in pertinent part:
"The pre-kindergartner playground at [the District] school Plaintiff attended has a steep slope in one area of the playground leading down to a metal gate. Students, including Plaintiff, were permitted to ride tricycles on and around that slope. Indeed, the school even placed orange cones at the top of the slope and encouraged the pre-kindergarten students to ride tricycles around those cones in the area of the dangerous slope. This slope or ramp area was dangerous because the [the District] knew that children would be riding tricycles without helmets in the slope/ramp area. [The District] knew or should have known that tricycles without brakes would travel down the slope, not have brakes to stop, and crash into the gate at the bottom of the slope/ramp. [The District] therefore encouraged students to regularly ride into the area with the dangerous slope on tricycles with no brakes. Accordingly, the slope or ramp area constituted a dangerous condition to the pre-kindergarten children on the playground at the time of Plaintiff's accident, and created a reasonably foreseeable risk of students riding tricycles down the slope, being unable to stop the tricycle given they have no breaks [sic], and crashing into the metal gate."
The District opposed the motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, arguing that the proposed new cause of action was barred because Gaddis did not comply with the claims presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. The District asserted that Gaddis's tort claim did not include a claim for dangerous condition. The District asked the trial court to take judicial notice of Gaddis's government tort claim and related documents.
On May 13, 2011, the trial court granted Gaddis's motion, and the third amended complaint was deemed filed and served as of that date. In its ruling, the court addressed and rejected the District's arguments in opposition to the motion, concluding: "The proposed amended complaint, alleging danger surrounding the physical condition of the gate, is predicated on the same fundamental actions or failures to act by defendant as were suggested in the administrative claim, and the claim therefore appears to have provided adequate information to enable the public entity to investigate the area surrounding the gate and the circumstances leading to the injury claimed." The court explained that it "cannot find that the proposed new cause of action is barred as a matter of law at this juncture."
The District demurred to the third amended complaint, arguing again that the cause of action for dangerous condition on public property "is fatally at variance with Plaintiff's Claim Form and [therefore] fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." The District asked the trial court to take judicial notice of Gaddis's original "Complaint Form," the District's "Notice of Insufficiency," Gaddis's May 22, 2009 tort claim and the District's letter rejecting that claim.
Gaddis opposed the demurrer, arguing (1) the court may not "interpret a document outside of the pleadings" [the tort claim] on a demurrer, (2) the court previously rejected the same arguments made by the District in opposition to Gaddis's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, and (3) "Plaintiff's tort claim for a dangerous condition was fairly reflected in Plaintiff's tort claim form and Plaintiff's claim form submitted to the district did put the district on notice to investigate the school grounds for a dangerous condition in the event that a claim was made for a dangerous condition on school property."
At the June 24, 2011 hearing, the trial court considered the District's demurrer on the merits. The court stated, in part: "[T]he claim identified that the accident occurred when plaintiff hit a gate, and that should have put the District on fair notice to investigate the area where the tricycles were being ridden near the gate. [¶] It does not seem a completely new theory from the claim to now argue that the area surrounding the gate was in a dangerous condition for the riding of tricycles. Accordingly, the cause of action is sufficiently stated, the court should not find as a matter of law on demurrer that the new theory is barred and the demurrer is overruled."
We issued a temporary stay of trial, and an order to show cause to review the trial court's June 24, 2011 ruling overruling the District's demurrer to Gaddis's third amended complaint.
DISCUSSION
The District contends that the trial court erred in overruling its demurrer to Gaddis's third amended complaint based on a finding that Gaddis satisfied the claims presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act with respect to the third cause of action for dangerous condition on public property. The District argues that Gaddis's dangerous condition cause of action is barred because "it is at variance with" the facts presented in Gaddis's government tort claim.
With certain exceptions not relevant here, the Government Code requires a claimant to file a claim against a local public entity before the claimant may file an action for money or damages against the entity. (§§ 905 & 945.4.) The claim must include, among other things, "[t]he date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted," and "[a] general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim." (§ 910, subds (c) & (d).)
The purpose of a claim "is `to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.' [Citation.] Consequently, a claim need not contain the detail and specificity required of a pleading, but need only `fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done.' [Citations.]" (Stockett v. Association of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Insurance Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 446 (Stockett).)
To serve its purpose, the claim must include the material facts supporting the alleged wrongdoing. "If a plaintiff relies on more than one theory of recovery against the [public entity], each cause of action must have been reflected in a timely claim. In addition, the factual circumstances set forth in the written claim must correspond with the facts alleged in the complaint; even if the claim were timely, the complaint is vulnerable to a demurrer if it alleges a factual basis for recovery which is not fairly reflected in the written claim." (Nelson v. State of California (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 72, 79, 80-81 [demurrer properly sustained without leave to amend where amended complaint of inmate alleged a cause of action for failure to summon medical care, but the inmate's government claim only alleged negligent examination, diagnosis and treatment (medical malpractice)]; Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 447.)5
"The claim, however, need not specify each particular act or omission later proven to have caused the injury. [Citation.] A complaint's fuller exposition of the factual basis beyond that given in the claim is not fatal, so long as the complaint is not based on an `entirely different set of facts.' [Citation.] Only where there has been a `complete shift in allegations, usually involving an effort to premise civil liability on acts or omissions committed at different times or by different persons than those described in the claim,' have courts generally found the complaint barred. [Citation.] Where the complaint merely elaborates or adds further detail to a claim, but is predicated on the same fundamental actions or failures to act by the defendants, courts have generally found the claim fairly reflects the facts pled in the complaint. [Citation.]" (Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 447 [claimant who alleged in his government claim that he had been wrongfully terminated by defendant for, among other things, supporting a female employee's complaint of sexual harassment was not precluded from alleging in his complaint additional theories for his wrongful termination (that he objected to a conflict of interest and exercised his free speech rights by objecting to his employer's business practices), theories which were not included in his claim].)
Gaddis's government tort claim alleges that the District failed to notify Gaddis's guardian after Gaddis hurt himself on a tricycle by running into a gate.
Gaddis's third amended complaint alleges that he was not being supervised when he "got onto a tri-cycle [sic], began to ride it, and then crashed to the ground, severely injuring himself." The third cause of action alleges that there was a "steep slope" or "ramp area," "leading down to a metal gate," and that this "slope or ramp area constituted a dangerous condition" which caused Gaddis's injuries.6
Gaddis's government tort claim did not put the District on notice that it should investigate a claim of dangerous condition. The only wrongdoing by the District identified in the claim is the failure to notify. The District had no reason to speculate that, nearly two years after filing his claim, Gaddis would allege that a dangerous condition contributed to his injuries.
We note that Gaddis's guardian was represented by counsel in this matter at the time she filed the government tort claim on behalf of Gaddis. She could have amended Gaddis's claim within six months of the date Gaddis's cause of action for dangerous condition accrued. (§§ 910.6 & 911.2.)
We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the statement in the claim that Gaddis "ran into a gate" should have put the District on notice of a potential claim of dangerous condition. It is common for children to have accidents and to crash into things while riding tricycles. Nothing in the claim indicates that a dangerous condition on the District's property contributed to this accident.
The material facts supporting Gaddis's cause of action for dangerous condition were not included in the claim. Gaddis's third amended complaint alleges that "the slope or ramp area constituted a dangerous condition to the pre-kindergarten children on the playground at the time of Plaintiff's accident, and created a reasonably foreseeable risk of students riding tricycles down the slope, being unable to stop the tricycle given they have no breaks [sic], and crashing into the metal gate." (Italics added.) Gaddis did not reference the slope/ramp area in his claim or in the first three versions of his complaint.
As set forth above, a claim must "`fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done.' [Citations.]" (Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 446.) Here, the claim alleges that the District failed to notify Floyd that her grandson had been injured at school. To comply with the claims presentation requirements, a cause of action must be "predicated on the same fundamental actions or failures to act by the defendants" that were alleged in the claim. (Id. at p. 447.) There is nothing in the claim indicating that the District maintained a dangerous condition on its property that contributed to Gaddis's accident (e.g., Gaddis rode his tricycle down a hill and crashed into a gate). In fact, there is nothing in the claim indicating that the District did anything wrong which contributed to the accident. In the claim, Floyd was not faulting the District for causing her grandson to get injured. She was faulting the District for not notifying her about the accident and the injuries, and precluding her from seeking immediate medical attention for her grandson.
Because Gaddis failed to comply with the claims presentation requirements with respect to his third cause of action for dangerous condition on public property, the trial court erred in overruling the District's demurrer to Gaddis's third amended complaint.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate its order of June 24, 2011, overruling Pasadena Unified School District's demurrer to the third amended complaint, in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. GC044260, entitled Brycson Gaddis v. Pasadena Unified School District, and to issue a new and different order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. The temporary stay order is hereby vacated. Petitioner is entitled to recover costs on appeal.
MALLANO, P. J. and JOHNSON, J., concurs.
