NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

IKOLA, J.

Defendants D.Y. (mother) and J.Y. (father) appeal from an order terminating their parental rights over seven-year-old T.Y. and six-year-old P.Y. and placing them for adoption. They contend the court erred by not applying the "sibling relationship" exception to adoption.1 The court did not abuse its discretion by finding the benefits of adoption outweighed any interference with the children's sibling relationships. We affirm.

FACTS

In 2007, the court asserted jurisdiction over mother and father's four children: older sister, older brother, T.Y., and P.Y. Police officers serving a warrant at the family home found "drug paraphernalia," a "large amount of marijuana on [a] dresser," and "empty methamphetamine baggies beneath the couch and on the kitchen table." There were "large steak knives lying within reach of the children," and "[r]otting meat, fruit, vegetables and milk . . . throughout the kitchen with flies." Older brother was found loading a BB gun. The court placed the children in a foster home.

The parents struggled during the reunification period. Mother and father participated in dependency drug court and entered a residential drug program. Mother was discharged from the residential program for rule violations, terminated from dependency drug court, and continued to test positive for drugs. Father was also terminated from dependency drug court, after he missed a drug test.

The older siblings had their own difficulties. Older sister was in therapy for post-traumatic stress disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. She heard "voices telling her to do things" and was "sexually acting out." Visits with mother and father caused her "severe anxiety, severe insomnia, visual hallucinations, and auditory hallucinations." She was placed on three psychotropic medications. Older brother also was in therapy for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and placed on a psychotropic medication. He was repeatedly suspended from kindergarten, where he bullied classmates and stole. He was "very aggressive" and "talked about killing himself or running away . . . ." He began soiling his pants and smearing the wall with his feces, and he told T.Y., "`One of these days I am going to kill you.'"

The court held a 12-month review hearing in January 2009. It terminated reunification services, declined to return the children to parental custody, granted visitation, and set a section 366.26 hearing (.26 hearing).

Meanwhile, the older siblings continued to struggle. Older sister continued taking psychotropic medications and undergoing therapy "to assist in her getting along with people and to help her sexualized behaviors." She reported father had molested her once by putting his finger in her vagina. Older brother received "intense therapy" and was placed on three psychotropic medications. Yet he continued stealing at school, bullying classmates, and defecating in his pants. Older brother was also caught kissing T.Y.'s penis. Older brother reported having been molested by an uncle, who would "`touch my privates'" and "`put his mouth on my privates.'"

T.Y. and P.Y. were placed with prospective adoptive parents in October 2009. The prospective adoptive parents bonded with the children, were able to meet their needs, and were eager to adopt them. After an adjustment period, the children began to settle into their new home. They were "extremely happy and comfortable," and wanted to live with their prospective adoptive parents forever. T.Y. called them "`my favorite mom and dad.'" The children asked about their former foster mother more than they asked about their older siblings. Visits with mother, father, and the older siblings were generally appropriate, but not always beneficial to the children. After some visits, the children's behavior worsened, sometimes for days. The older siblings stayed overnight once, but older sister bossed the children around and older brother defecated on the bed.

The court briefly commenced the .26 hearing in June 2009, continued it, and resumed it in August 2010. It admitted into evidence and reviewed social worker reports and visitation monitor notes. It heard testimony from mother, father, and a social worker. Mother stated T.Y. was "very close" to older brother and looked up to him. Mother noted P.Y. would ask older sister to braid her hair during visits. Father acknowledged T.Y. and P.Y. were "really happy right now where they" were, but he disagreed with "a few things" the prospective adoptive parents had done. The social worker testified T.Y. and P.Y. had fun with the older siblings, and shared "somewhat of a bond." Neither child had ever asked for more visits with the older siblings or volunteered that fewer visits would make them sad. The social worker noted the prospective adoptive parents wanted to maintain contact with the older siblings.

The court also heard from T.Y. and P.Y. in chambers. (See § 350, subd. (b).) T.Y. liked visiting with his older siblings and wished he saw them more because he loved them. He would be sad not to see them as much. P.Y. also loved her older siblings and had fun with them.

After taking the matter under submission, the court terminated mother's and father's parental rights and placed T.Y. and P.Y. for adoption. It found by clear and convincing evidence that doing so was in their best interests, and that they were specifically and generally adoptable. The court declined to apply the parental benefit exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)), finding mother and father did not consistently and regularly visit T.Y. and P.Y., and that continuing a relationship with drug-abusing parents would not promote the children's well-being.

The court also declined to apply the sibling relationship exception. It found: "[T]he evidence demonstrates that [T.Y.] and [P.Y.] enjoy their visits with their [older] siblings . . . that they look up to them as big brother and sister, respectively, and that they love their siblings. . . . [I]t can be inferred from this evidence that the children will suffer some detriment by severing the relationship with their siblings. However, without more, this evidence is not sufficient to meet the `heavy burden' of showing a `substantial interference' with their relationship, so as to constitute a `compelling reason' for not terminating parental rights."

DISCUSSION

"Adoption must be selected as the permanent plan for an adoptable child and parental rights terminated unless the court finds `a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to'" some specified statutory exception. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 (Bailey J.); accord § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) One such exception is the "substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship . . . ." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)

"[T]he `sibling relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption." (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61.) "[T]he application of this exception will be rare, particularly when the proceedings concern young children whose needs for a competent, caring and stable parent are paramount." (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.)

Application of the sibling relationship exception calls for a two-step analysis. "[T]he court is directed first to determine whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship . . . ." (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951-952 (L.Y.L.).) It does so "by evaluating the nature and extent of the relationship, including whether the child and sibling were raised in the same house, shared significant common experiences or have existing close and strong bonds." (Id. at p. 952; accord § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) "[T]he parent must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child." (L.Y.L., at p. 952.) "Second, "[i]f the court determines terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is then directed to weigh the child's best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption." (Ibid.; accord § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)

Mother and father bear the burden of establishing the sibling relationship exception. (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) We review the court's finding on whether adoption substantially interferes with sibling relationships for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) Thus, we "draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings [and] consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court's order," without "evaluat[ing] the credibility of witnesses, reweigh[ing] the evidence, or resolv[ing] evidentiary conflicts." (L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) We review the court's "`quintessentially' discretionary" balancing of the benefits of adoption against the interference with sibling relationships for an abuse of discretion. (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)

Here, the court acknowledged adoption would interfere with the children's relationships with their older siblings, but found the interference was not "`substantial'" and did not "constitute a `compelling reason' for not terminating parental rights." Each of these determinations is sufficiently warranted.

First, substantial evidence shows adoption would not substantially interfere with the children's sibling relationships. After the children were placed with the prospective adoptive parents, they asked more about their former foster mother than about their older siblings. The children never volunteered to the social worker they would be sad not to see their older siblings. To be sure, the children testified otherwise and had lived with the older siblings virtually their entire lives, up until their placement with the prospective adoptive parents. Even so, "there was no evidence [the children], other than being sad, would suffer detriment if the relationship ended." (L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.) Thus, without more, mother and father failed to show "the severance of [the sibling relationships] would be detrimental to the [children]."2 (L.Y.L. at p. 952.)

Second, the court did not abuse its discretion by finding the benefits of adoption outweighed any interference with the sibling relationships. "If parental rights are terminated here, [the children] gain[] a permanent home through adoption. If parental rights are not terminated, [they] lose[] the permanent home [their] . . . prospective adoptive parents are ready to provide for [them] . . . . Valuing [the children's] continuing relationship with [the older siblings] over adoption would deprive [them] of the ability to belong to a family, which is not in [their] best interests." (L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 953.) This is especially true given the older siblings' own challenges. They suffer from psychological disorders, which require therapy and multiple psychotropic medications. Older sister has heard voices and acted out sexually. Older brother has bullied classmates, threatened to kill T.Y., and sexually abused T.Y. Visits with the older siblings had caused T.Y.'s and P.Y.'s behavior to backslide, sometimes for days. The court reasonably concluded adoption best served the interests of T.Y. and P.Y.

Mother and father raise three primary contentions, each of which falls flat. First, parents contend the social worker's opinion the children had "somewhat of a bond" with the older siblings lacked foundation because she had not personally monitored any visitation. But mother and father did not raise a timely objection to the social worker's opinion, waiting until the next day to attack her credibility at closing argument. At any rate, the court stated that while the social worker was credible, her credibility was largely immaterial because the material facts were undisputed and mother and father presented insufficient affirmative evidence to establish the sibling benefit exception. We agree — mother and father simply have not shown the exception applies.

Second, mother and father criticize the prospective adoptive parents, most ardently for telling P.Y. that the temporary tattoo on her back is called a "tramp stamp," and for telling the children mother and father are drug addicts. But if anything would be arbitrary, it would be to deny T.Y. and P.Y. an otherwise loving and supportive adoptive home over a few poorly chosen words. At any rate, complaints about the prospective adoptive parents carry little weight because T.Y. and P.Y. were found generally adoptable, not just specifically adoptable.

Finally, mother and father assert the court should disregard the prospective adoptive parents' intention to allow the children to visit with the older siblings. But mother and father rely on inapt cases. Their cited cases apply the "parental relationship" exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) and note that exception is not preempted by a prospective adoptive parent's "unenforceable promise of future visitation . . . ." (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 300; accord In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 128.) In contrast, those cases recognize the prospective adoptive parents' intentions are relevant to "the sibling relationship exception . . . in which the court considers future sibling contact and visitation. [Citation.] Unlike the parent-child relationship, sibling relationships enjoy legal recognition after termination of parental rights." (In re S.B., at p. 300; accord In re C.B., at p. 131, fn. 8 ["The determination that the sibling relationship exception is inapplicable does not necessarily prevent postadoption sibling contact," citing statutes].)

We have rigorously reviewed the decision here. And we have had to take an honest look at everyone involved, including the older siblings. We have not meant to be judgmental of them. Older sister and older brother are but children themselves. They did not ask for the hurt inflicted by mother and father, and they can handle that trauma only as best as they can. We wish them well, and trust time and treatment will help them. Until then, however, we cannot fault the court for concluding T.Y. and P.Y. would be better served by the stability of adoption, than by maintaining parental rights to protect the children's relationships with their older siblings.

DISPOSITION

The postjudgment order is affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

O'LEARY, ACTING P. J.

ARONSON, J.