KRISTEN L. MIX, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Vigil's and Defendant Apodaca's
Among other things, the moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Motion [#22] at 3-7. Specifically, they maintain that while he did file a grievance regarding the alleged incident, he did not do so "until July 8, 2014, 126 days after the alleged incident occurred." Id. at 6. They argue that because Plaintiff did not file his step one grievance form within 30 days after the alleged incident, he did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. In his Response, Plaintiff states that he
Response [#29] at 3.
There is a recognized exception to the exhaustion requirement when an inmate has been prevented from filing a grievance. See Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002). "When prison officials block a prisoner's access to the grievance process, the administrative remedies are not `available' to the prisoner and, therefore, do not need to be exhausted prior to initiation of [an] ... action." Main v. Martin, No. 06-cv-00232-WDM-MJW, 2009 WL 215404, *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 22, 2009). Plaintiff, however, has provided no more than his unsupported, unsworn conclusory allegation that he was not permitted to file a grievance concerning the claims raised in this civil action. The Court may not consider such unsworn statements when considering a Rule 56 motion. Instead, the Court may only consider evidence that complies with the evidentiary requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Nasious v. Robinson, No. 08-cv-00262-CMA-KMT, 2010 WL 1268135, at *7 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2010) ("Plaintiff has attached grievances filed by other inmates in an attempt to set forth evidence of such a custom. However these statements are not sworn or certified and therefore run afoul of Rule 56(c) and the court need not consider them on summary judgment."); Sparks v. Rittenhouse, 2007 WL 987473, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2007) (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 n.17; Sofford v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 954 F.Supp. 1459, 1462-63 (D. Colo. 1997)) ("Unsworn assertions are not sufficient grounds to oppose a motion for summary judgment.").
Pursuant to Rule 56(e), the Court may "give [parties] an opportunity to properly support or address the [improperly supported] fact[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In this matter, the Court will give Plaintiff another opportunity to submit a response that can be considered by the Court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) because of Plaintiff's status as a pro se prisoner litigant, cf. Adams, 223 F. App'x at 764 n.7; Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 1985), and because of the particular circumstances of this case. Thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff additional time in which to submit a new response to the Motion in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56. Cf. Applied Capital, Inc. v. Gibson, 2007 WL 5685131, at *24 (D. N.M. 2007) (noting that the Tenth Circuit has "encouraged district courts to decide motions for summary judgment on the merits[.]").
Plaintiff should take note of the testamentary guidelines in 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
IT IS HEREBY