MOSK, J.
J.G. (mother) appeals from orders of the juvenile court placing her child, K.C., in the custody of A.C. (father), and requiring that mother's visits with K.C. be monitored. Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to specify the frequency and duration of her visits with K.C., and ordering that mother's visits with K.C. be monitored. Father and K.C. disagree.
The Department's October 30, 2009, detention report provided that K.C. came to the Department's attention in October 2009, after it received a referral alleging that mother had an addiction to methamphetamine, shared a home with another methamphetamine user, failed to provide food for K.C., was physically abusive to K.C., and was involved in a physically violent relationship with her boyfriend, S.M., who was also abusing methamphetamine. Mother and father shared joint custody of K.C. Mother initially denied using drugs and stated that she was willing to undergo a drug test, but later stated, "to be honest" she and S.M. used drugs. K.C. was removed from mother and released to father.
According to the detention report, three years earlier—in September 2006—K.C. also came to the Department's attention and a voluntary maintenance case was opened due to emotional abuse by S.M. The family received family maintenance and family preservation services, but mother only partially complied with the case plan. In March 2007, mother lost custody of K.C., and he was placed in the custody of father.
On October 30, 2009, the Department filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b),
At the October 30, 2009, detention hearing, the juvenile court found father to be K.C.'s presumed father, and detained K.C. from mother and placed him with father. The juvenile court provided mother with monitored visits with K.C., and ordered the Department to provide mother with family reunification services, including domestic violence, drug, and individual counseling, parenting education, homemaking demonstration services, and random drug testing.
At the December 17, 2009, pretrial resolution conference and jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court granted the Department's motion to dismiss the count alleged under section 300, subdivision (a) and one of the counts alleged under subdivision (b). The juvenile court sustained two counts alleged under subdivision (b)—the two remaining counts alleged in the petition.
At the February 10, 2010, contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared K.C. a dependant of the juvenile court, and ordered K.C. be placed in father's custody. The juvenile court ordered that mother was to participate in domestic violence counseling, parenting education, conjoint counseling with K.C., individual counseling to address case issues, and Parents Beyond Conflict. The juvenile court stated that mother was no longer required to participate in drug counseling or random drug testing. The juvenile court also ordered that mother have unmonitored visits with K.C. in a neutral setting.
On May 5, 2010, mother signed an acknowledgment that she would test for alcohol and drugs. The Department's August 6, 2010, status review report stated that mother completed her domestic violence counseling, and was participating in, but had not completed, her parenting education counseling, and her conjoint counseling sessions with K.C. Mother's individual counseling had been terminated "due to [mother's] poor attendance," and although mother attended two sessions of Parents Beyond Conflict, the remaining three scheduled sessions had expired. From May 14, 2010 through July 21, 2010, mother missed five of the seven scheduled drug tests. The Department advised mother that a missed test is considered a positive test.
The Department's August 27, 2010, interim review report provided that mother stated she had not enrolled in the court-ordered programs, and her previous individual counseling agency did not accept her back. Mother missed a scheduled drug test for August 4, 2010, and a scheduled conjoint counseling session with K.C. on August 18, 2010. At the August 27, 2010, contested review hearing, the juvenile court advised mother that it was concerned that she was not cooperating, and warned her that if she continued to be uncooperative, it would terminate jurisdiction over K.C., and give father legal and physical custody of K.C. and mother visitation with K.C.
The Department's November 17, 2010, status review report stated that from August 24, 2010, through November 2, 2010, mother missed six of seven scheduled drug tests. The report also stated that, "It should be noted that [the Department] considers a `missed test to be a dirty test.'" Mother stated on November 1, 2010, that she is still not enrolled in individual counseling. The Department could not verify the mother's representation that she would soon be completing her parenting education counseling.
According to the status review report, mother failed to attend her four scheduled visits with K.C. from September 18, 2010 through November 6, 2010. The Department provided mother with $207 for use to attend the first three scheduled visits, but mother stated that she spent the money on food, lost her job, and no longer had the funds to use to visit K.C. The Department thereafter provided mother with $40 for use to attend the fourth scheduled visit. Father agreed to accommodate mother in visiting K.C. by arranging to meeting mother at a location half-way between mother and K.C. Mother stated that she was unable to meet even half way.
The status review report stated that K.C. inquired why mother was not visiting, and that he would like for her to show up for the visits. K.C. stated that he was sad that mother is not visiting him. K.C. cried and stated that he wanted mother to put more effort into seeing him. K.C. stated that on one occasion, father took him to the bus station to meet mother for a scheduled visit, but mother did not show up. K.C. cried on the way home and did not understand why mother did not make him a priority.
According to the status review report, K.C. stated that mother only calls him on the telephone to tell him that she is not coming to visit him, and they only talk a little bit. K.C. said that on one occasion mother called him and was crying, and told him that she had lost her job and had no money. K.C. also stated that he attempted to contact mother by telephone, but mother often changed her telephone numbers or did not have a telephone, so he could not contact her.
The Department recommended in the status review report that the juvenile court terminate mother's reunification services, father be given full physical custody of K.C., mother continue to have unmonitored visits with K.C., and jurisdiction be terminated with a family law order. At the November 17, 2010, status review and section 366.21, subdivision (f) hearing, mother's counsel requested a contested hearing. The juvenile court continued the matter to January 3, 2011, and mother and father were ordered to attend.
The Department's January 3, 2011, last minute information for the court report stated that mother missed drug tests that were scheduled for November 15, 2010, and December 7, 2010, had not enrolled in any programs, and had not scheduled any visits with K.C. since November 17, 2010. Mother occasionally spoke with K.C. on the telephone.
At the January 3, 2011, status review and contested hearing, mother did not appear as ordered. Mother's counsel requested, without direction from mother, that if the juvenile court was inclined to terminate jurisdiction over K.C., mother and father be granted joint legal custody over K.C., and that mother be provided with unmonitored visits as recommended by the Department. Father's counsel stated that, "Father has gone to Bakersfield four times and the mother has not shown up, no phone calls to K.C. He doesn't want to see the mother. [¶] According to the father, [K.C.] is afraid of the mother."
During the hearing, mother's counsel advised the juvenile court that she did not know where mother was at that time. The juvenile court stated, "The fact that [mother] is not here and made no attempt to contact her counsel and the fact that she's not visiting and everything else makes me wonder her level of commitment. [¶] She is not testing and she is not doing any programs. I wanted to give her the opportunity to have a relationship with the children and she is not taking advantage of it. I want the added protection by having monitored visits. [¶] We will let her know, of course, I am very concerned about somebody in this situation who is making absolutely no efforts and the fact that she doesn't show for two tests tells me she is using. I can validly make that a conclusion."
At the hearing the juvenile court terminated mother's family reunification services. The juvenile court ordered father be given sole legal and physical custody over K.C., and mother be given monitored visits with K.C. Regarding the order of monitored visits for mother, the juvenile court explained, "I have no reason at all especially with the two no shows still at that late date on testing feeling that the children can be comfortable without monitoring especially when father expresses concerns about the visits himself."
The preprinted form final judgment provided, "Mother will have supervised visitation with [K.C.] according to the schedule . . . to be determined by the parents," and "[t]he visits will be supervised by . . . a monitor of father's choosing." The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over K.C.
Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to specify frequency and duration when it granted mother monitored visits, and by ordering that her visits with K.C. be monitored. We disagree.
"We review an order setting visitation for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]" (In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1284; accord, In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124.) "`The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.' [Citations.]" (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) We will not disturb a juvenile court's decision as an abuse of discretion unless the juvenile court exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (Id. at p. 318.)
There is no abuse of discretion when the record contains substantial evidence supporting the findings and the decision. (In re Kevin F. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 178, 186; In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 151.) "We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them." (In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395.)
Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to specify frequency and duration when it granted mother monitored visits, thereby failing to ensure that visitation would occur. We conclude the contention was forfeited, and in any event, is not meritorious.
When a juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, it may issue orders concerning a parent's visitation with the child. (§ 362.4; In re T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1122-1123.) "Such orders become part of any family court proceeding concerning the same child and will remain in effect until they are terminated or modified by the family court. [Citation.]" (In re T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.)
The power to determine the right and extent of visitation by a noncustodial parent in a dependency case, including orders issued when the dependency case is terminated, resides with the juvenile court and may not be delegated to nonjudicial officials or private parties. (In re Donnovan J. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1476; In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 213-214.) The juvenile court, however, may delegate "ministerial tasks of overseeing the right [to visitation] as defined by the court" (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757) such as the time, place and manner of the visitation. (In re T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.)
Mother forfeited her contention that the juvenile court erred by issuing a visitation order that did not specify the frequency and duration of her visits with K.C. because she did not object below, or ask the dependency court to specify the frequency and duration of the visits. At the hearing mother's counsel only objected generally to the orders, stating, "Please note the mother's objection." In addition, the record does not disclose that mother made an objection to the preprinted form final judgment. "A parent's failure to raise an issue in the juvenile court prevents him or her from presenting the issue to the appellate court." (In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 582; accord, In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880-881 [even constitutional rights may be forfeited "`"by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it."' [Citations.]"]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 ["a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court"], superseded on other grounds as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962-963; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221 [a "party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court"].)
Mother contends that she did not forfeit her contention because mother's counsel argued at the hearing that mother was entitled to unmonitored visits with K.C. and this expression of concern was sufficient to preserve the issue for review. This, however, was insufficient to preserve the issue because it did not concern the frequency and duration of the visits.
In the alternative, mother asks us to exercise our discretion to consider the issue because it raises a pure question of law and because of the magnitude of the interest involved. In dependency cases, discretion to consider forfeited claims "must be exercised with special care[.]" (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) "[T]he appellate court's discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue." (Ibid.) We decline to exercise such discretion here. "The purpose of [of the forfeiture] rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Even if we were to address the issue, the visitation order should not be deemed an abuse of discretion. The juvenile court did not have sufficient information with which to establish a specific visitation schedule because of mother's conduct, or lack thereof. Despite being ordered to appear, mother was not present at the January 3, 2011, hearing and therefore could not provide information to the juvenile court to establish a specific visitation schedule. The juvenile court also could not base a visitation schedule on a prior schedule of actual visits because mother failed to visit K.C. during the pendency of the juvenile court proceeding. There is evidence that scheduling visitation would also problematic because during the pendency of this case, although mother's custody status was uncertain, she made no substantial attempt to rehabilitate herself. She failed to appear for several drug tests, which she voluntarily agreed to undergo.
There is sufficient evidence that mother's interest in K.C. was ambivalent, at best, and her ability to visit uncertain. In these circumstances, specifying the rate and duration of visitation would serve no purpose, and it was reasonable for the juvenile court to leave those details to father and mother, if and when mother comes forward and requests visitation, even if the issue is not normally delegable. Thus, the juvenile court did not appear to abuse its discretion. Moreover, these circumstances support our conclusion not to exercise our discretion to overlook the forfeiture of the issue.
Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering that her visits with K.C. be monitored. We disagree.
There is evidence that mother had not completed her court ordered programs, including her individual counseling to address case issues and parenting counseling and that mother also missed numerous scheduled drug tests that she had voluntarily agreed to take. As the juvenile court stated, there was concern that "[mother] is making absolutely no efforts and the fact that she doesn't show for two tests [indicates] she is using [drugs]."
There is sufficient evidence in the record suggesting that mother was also unreliable. That evidence shows that in addition to missing numerous scheduled drug tests, mother failed to appear at the January 3, 2011, hearing, despite having been ordered by the juvenile court to appear and that mother had not even contacted her counsel that she was not going to attend the hearing, and her counsel did not know of her whereabouts. There is other evidence that mother also failed to appear at any of her scheduled visits with K.C., and spent monies that the Department had given her for use to attend the meetings for other purposes. On at least one occasion, K.C. had traveled to the bus station to meet mother, but mother failed to appear and K.C. cried on the way home stating that he did not understand why mother did not make him a priority. Mother often changed her telephone number and often did not have a telephone. She was also frequently unemployed.
There is also sufficient evidence that mother has displayed poor judgment. On at least one occasion, mother called K.C. and cried when she told him she had lost her job and had no money. In addition, K.C. was previously the subject of a maintenance case that was opened with the Department because he was emotionally abused by mother's boyfriend, S.M.
As stated by the juvenile court, these circumstances warrant "the added protection [of] having monitored visits." Based on the evidence, the juvenile court did not make an "arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination" (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318) that mother visits with K.C. be monitored.
The juvenile court's orders are affirmed.
TURNER, P. J. and KRIEGLER, J., concurs.
