THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz.R.Sup.Ct. 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

IRVINE, Judge.

¶1 This appeal is filed in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). Counsel for Edmundo Sepulveda ("Sepulveda"), asks this Court to search the record for fundamental error. Sepulveda was given an opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona and has done so. After reviewing the record, we affirm Sepulveda's convictions and sentences, with a modification to the calculation of presentence incarceration credit.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's judgment and resolve all reasonable inferences against Sepulveda. State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 897, 898 (App. 1998). On November 25, 2009 at approximately 3:00 a.m., Sepulveda entered a gas station convenience store. He struggled with the victim, A., the store clerk, over a case of beer. A second victim, O., the store stock attendant, told Sepulveda to leave the store, at which point, Sepulveda pulled a black-handled knife out from his pocket and threatened O. After this, Sepulveda's partner entered the store and picked up the case of beer that Sepulveda and A. were previously fighting over. Sepulveda and his partner left the store together with the beer, at which time, O. attempted to close and lock the doors. Sepulveda and his partner, however, re-entered the gas station by pushing open the doors. Sepulveda again pointed his knife at A. and O., took an additional case of beer and left. He and his partner then drove away from the gas station.

¶3 A. called 9-1-1. Shortly thereafter police stopped a car containing Sepulveda and his partner. Officers found two cases of beer in the trunk of the car and one black-handled knife in the sun visor. Sepulveda and his partner were identified at the scene of the stop by O. and taken into custody.

¶4 The State charged Sepulveda with two counts of armed robbery, class 2 dangerous felonies. At the close of the evidence, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the offenses. Sepulveda was convicted as charged. The trial court conducted the sentencing hearing in compliance with Sepulveda's constitutional rights and Rule 26 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court sentenced Sepulveda to concurrent sentences of 10.5 years for each count of armed robbery. Sepulveda received credit for 124 days presentence incarceration. The trial court did not impose restitution at that time, but retained jurisdiction over the issue.

DISCUSSION

¶5 We review Sepulveda's convictions and sentences for fundamental error. See State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 155, 812 P.2d 626, 628 (1991). In his supplemental brief, Sepulveda raises five issues. We discuss each below.

Due process rights

¶6 Sepulveda argues that his due process rights were violated because the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office ("MCSO") failed to transport him to court. MCSO did not transport Sepulveda for his scheduled status conference on December 2, 2009. At that status conference, counsel for Sepulveda filed a motion to dismiss based on the absence of his client from the proceeding, which was denied. The status conference was vacated and rescheduled for the next day. We presume MCSO failed to transport Sepulveda again because the December 3 status conference was rescheduled to December 10.

¶7 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Violation of a substantive due process right requires that the government act in an arbitrary or wrongful manner that infringes upon the rights of the defendant. Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 314, ¶ 66, 987 P.2d 779, 800 (App. 1999). In this instance, Sepulveda's rights were not violated because no substantive rulings were made regarding his case without his presence. The two status conferences where he was not present were rescheduled and no rulings were made that would infringe on his rights at trial. Sepulveda was present and represented by counsel throughout his trial, at the return of the verdict and at sentencing. Therefore, we find Sepulveda's due process rights in regards to his presence at trial were not violated.

Availability of evidence

¶8 Sepulveda argues that he "had been told that a video surveillance had captured the alleged crime however could not view said tape unless he rejected plea offer."1 Before the start of trial, the State believed that video evidence of the incident existed based on a police report. The manager of the gas station, however, testified that there was no video evidence available for the time of the robbery. A review of the record shows no evidence that the State conditioned the availability of any evidence on Sepulveda's rejection of a plea offer. We find no error.

Witness unavailability

¶9 Sepulveda argues that both his due process and confrontation rights were violated. As we understand his argument, Sepulveda contends that the nature of O.'s testimony was such that O. was testifying on behalf of A. A., however, was never a witness at trial. Sepulveda contends that he should have the right to confront A. The Due Process Clause provides that no State shall deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Confrontation Clause affords all criminal defendants the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI.

¶10 A search of the record reveals that O. testified only to what he personally witnessed or experienced and did not testify to any of A.'s thoughts or feelings at the time robbery. For example, when O. was asked what happened between A. and Sepulveda, O. answered, "I didn't have any idea, no." Additionally, O. testified that "I didn't have any idea what was going on" regarding whether A. had illegally sold beer to Sepulveda. O.'s testimony was proper and was not inadmissible hearsay. Ariz.R.Evid. 801. Therefore, neither Sepulveda's due process rights nor his confrontation rights were violated.

Sufficiency of the evidence

¶11 Sepulveda argues that the State did not provide enough evidence to support the convictions of armed robbery. A person is guilty of armed robbery if five elements are fulfilled: (1) defendant took the property of another, (2) the taking was from that person or in his/her immediate presence, (3) the taking was against the will of the other person, (4) the defendant threatened to use force against any person with the intent to force the surrender of the property or to prevent resistance to taking or keeping the property, and (5) the defendant or accomplice in the course of committing the robbery, used or threatened to use a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1902, -1904 (2010).2 In this case, O. testified that Sepulveda and his partner came into the gas station and took two cases of beer from O. and A. Sepulveda physically struggled with A. and over O.'s objections took the beer. Additionally, Sepulveda threatened A. and O. with a knife during the course of the robbery. We find that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find Sepulveda guilty of two counts of armed robbery.

Review of the record

¶12 Sepulveda argues that because his "confrontational rights have been ignored a review of the entire record should be done." By virtue of filing this appeal, we review the entire record for fundamental error. Anders, 386 U.S. 738; Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878. We find none.

Sentencing order correction

¶13 Sepulveda was given 124 days of presentence incarceration credit. He is entitled to an additional day. Sepulveda was arrested on November 25, 2009. At sentencing, the parties agreed that he was released on bond on February 12, 2010, for a total of 79 days. The trial court calculated 78 days. Sepulveda was remanded into custody after the verdict was read on May 25, 2010 and he was sentenced on July 9, 2010, for a total of 46 days. Therefore, we find that Sepulveda is entitled to 125 days of presentence credit. We correct the sentencing minute entry to reflect the additional day of presentence incarceration credit.

¶14 Counsel for Sepulveda has advised this Court that after a diligent search of the entire record, he has found no arguable question of law. We have read and considered counsel's brief and fully reviewed the record for reversible error. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881. We find none. All of the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. So far as the record reveals, Sepulveda was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and the sentence imposed was within the statutory limits. We decline to order briefing and we affirm Sepulveda's convictions and sentences.

¶15 Upon the filing of this decision, defense counsel shall inform Sepulveda of the status of his appeal and of his future options. Defense counsel has no further obligations unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984). Sepulveda shall have thirty days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he desires, with a pro per motion for reconsideration or petition for review. On the Court's own motion, we extend the time for Sepulveda to file a pro per motion for reconsideration to thirty days from the date of this decision.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm.

PETER B. SWANN, Presiding Judge, MAURICE PORTLEY, Judge, concurring.