CAROLYN K. DELANEY, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 48.)
This case proceeds on plaintiff's first amended complaint (ECF No. 9), which was screened by the court and found to state claims against defendants Rodriguez, Lewis, Saephan, and Gill (ECF No. 10). In screening the first amended complaint, the court simply held that it stated a cognizable claim and cited to the screening of the original complaint. (
Plaintiff alleges that he is, and was at all times relevant to the complaint, a practicing Rastafarian. (ECF No. 9 at 1, ¶ 2.) As a requirement of his faith, he must wear a head covering, or Crown, at all times when in public. (
Defendants argue that plaintiff's First Amendment rights were not violated because his religious practice was not substantially burdened since other methods of practicing his faith were available and the regulation was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. (ECF No. 48-2 at 3-7.) They also argue that he is not entitled to relief under RLUIPA because they did not infringe on a sincerely-held belief, his religious practice was not substantially burdened, the regulation was the least restrictive means of furthering the prison's compelling governmental interests in security and use of resources, and his claim for injunctive relief is moot. (
It is well-established that the pleadings of pro se litigants are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."
The court is mindful of the Ninth Circuit's more overarching caution in this context, as noted above, that district courts are to "construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly."
Plaintiff argues that defendants' motion should be denied because defendants misrepresent the religious practice that was burdened, his actual religious practice was burdened without any valid penological interest, that he was treated differently because of his religion, the burden was not de minimis, and defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because they should have known that refusing to let him wear his Crown was a violation of his rights. (ECF No. 53 at 12-27.) Plaintiff does not appear to disagree that his claim for relief under RLUIPA is now moot.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, "[t]he moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."
"Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case."
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.
In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor.
"In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact, [the court] draw[s] all inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party."
On June 15, 2018, defendants served plaintiff with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 48-1;
At all times relevant to the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and housed at CHCF. (Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts (DSUF) (ECF No. 48-3) ¶¶ 1-2; Response to DSUF (ECF No. 53 at 32-36) ¶¶ 1-2.) At all times relevant to the complaint, defendants Lewis, Saephan, Gill, and Rodriguez were employed at CHCF. (DSUF ¶¶ 3-6; Response to DSUF ¶¶ 3-6.)
On September 21, 2014, plaintiff was processed for a visit at CHCF. (DSUF ¶ 7; Response to DSUF ¶ 7.) When plaintiff arrived at visitation, he was wearing both a yarmulke and a Rastafarian Crown. (DSUF ¶ 8; Response to DSUF ¶ 8.) Both items were covered by the Religious Personal Property Matrix at that time. (Biggs Decl. (ECF No. 48-5) ¶ 5; Young Decl. (ECF No. 53 at 39-45) ¶ 23.) Plaintiff ultimately returned to his cell without seeing his visitors. (DSUF ¶ 10; Response to DSUF ¶ 10.)
Local Rule 260(a), requires that the statement of facts "enumerate discretely each of the specific material facts relied upon in support of the motion and cite the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, admission, or other document relied upon to establish that fact." However, though defendants' statement of facts cites the declarations of defendant Lewis and non-party Lt. Biggs as support for the facts that (1) Saephan and Gill stopped plaintiff pursuant to policy, (2) plaintiff was given an opportunity to return one item of religious headgear to his cell, (3) plaintiff chose to return to his cell after refusing to remove his religious headgear, and (4) plaintiff would have been able to go to visitation if he had worn only one piece of religious headgear (DSUF ¶¶ 9-10, 22), neither declaration establishes that the declarant was present for the interactions between plaintiff and Saephan and Gill (Biggs Decl.; Lewis Decl. (ECF No. 48-6)). Furthermore, plaintiff's opposition, which is consistent with the allegations in the complaint, clearly states that they were not (ECF No. 53 at 23, 26), and the declarants fail to offer any other basis for how they came by the knowledge they are testifying to in their declarations.
Additionally, although all four defendants seek summary judgment in their favor, any facts regarding Lewis and Rodriguez's involvement in the events of September 21, 2014, are noticeably absent from the statement of facts. Accordingly, based upon the facts contained in the statement of facts alone, there are insufficient facts regarding the conduct of Lewis and Rodriguez to determine that summary judgment in their favor is appropriate. However, even if the court were to overlook these issues, as set forth below, there are material disputes of fact that prevent granting summary judgment.
Although the parties are in agreement that plaintiff went to visitation wearing both a yarmulke and a Crown and left without seeing his visitors, they are in dispute as to what occurred in between.
As outlined in his complaint, and reiterated in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff asserts that he was denied the ability to wear his Crown during visitation. Specifically, he asserts that after defendants Saephan and Gill gave him a clothed body search, he proceeded to the visitation room but was stopped by Saephan, who pointed at plaintiff's Crown and told him that he could not wear "that." (ECF No. 9 at 3, ¶¶ 16-17; Young Decl. ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff explained to Saephan and Gill that he was a Rastafarian and his religion required him to wear his Crown while in public, and when they both continued to tell him that he could not wear it, he asked them to contact their supervisor. (ECF No. 9 at 3, ¶¶ 18-19; Young Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) After calling their supervising sergeant, who was initially identified as "Stewart," but was later determined to be defendant Lewis, Saephan and Gill relayed to plaintiff that the sergeant said that he could not wear his Crown. (ECF No. 9 at 3, ¶¶ 20-21; Young Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff then told Saephan and Gill that his visitor was his only child, whom he had not seen in thirteen years, and asked them to call back their sergeant, which they refused to do. (ECF No. 9 at 3-4, ¶ 23; Young Decl. ¶ 8.)
After being told he could not wear his Crown, plaintiff returned to his unit where he spoke with non-defendants Ornelas and Biggs, and eventually returned to the visitation area to request to speak to the sergeant again. (ECF No. 9 at 4-5, ¶¶ 24-28; Young Decl. ¶¶ 9-12.) While he was speaking to Saephan and Gill, defendant Rodriguez arrived and instructed plaintiff to wait while Rodriguez went into the visiting room with Saephan and Gill. (ECF No. 9 at 5, ¶¶ 31-32; Young Decl. ¶ 12.) When Rodriguez returned to where plaintiff was, he informed plaintiff that he could not wear his "beanie" to visit, at which point plaintiff informed Rodriguez that plaintiff was a Rastafarian and that it was his Crown, which he wore for religious reasons. (ECF No. 9 at 5, ¶¶ 32-34; Young Decl. ¶¶ 12-14.) In response, Rodriguez denied having heard of Rastafarianism and implied that plaintiff had made it up. (ECF No. 9 at 5, ¶ 35; Young Decl. ¶ 15.) After pleading with Rodriguez some more, plaintiff eventually removed his Crown to show Rodriguez his hair, and when Rodriguez saw the yarmulke underneath he told plaintiff that he could wear the yarmulke, but not his Crown. (ECF No. 9 at 6, ¶¶ 36-37; Young Decl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was never told that he could wear either the yarmulke or his Crown; he was only given the option of returning his Crown to his cell and wearing the yarmulke. (Young Decl. ¶¶ 17, 22.)
Defendants' version of events, as set forth in their undisputed statement of facts, is noticeably bare and sets out that "Saephan and Gill stopped Plaintiff pursuant to policy, and he was given the opportunity to return one item of religious headgear to his cell before returning to visiting." (DSUF ¶ 9.) They further state that plaintiff "refused to remove his religious headgear and instead returned to his cell," and that he would have been able to see his visitors if he had worn only one piece of religious headgear. (DSUF ¶¶ 10, 22.)
The factual statements defendants make regarding what happened after plaintiff arrived at visitation on September 21, 2014, are technically in line with both parties' versions of events. (DSUF ¶¶ 9-10.) However, this apparent lack of conflict is due solely to the vagueness of the statements. Paragraph 9 states that "Defendants Saephan and Gill stopped Plaintiff pursuant to policy, and he was given the opportunity to return one item of religious headgear to his cell before returning to visiting," while Paragraph 10 states that "Young refused to remove the religious headgear and instead returned to his cell." Paragraph 22 further asserts that "[h]ad Plaintiff complied with CDCR policy and only wore one piece of religious headgear, he would have been permitted to go to visiting."
The construction of these statements of fact is problematic because they are presented in such a way that the reader is left to presuppose that because plaintiff's Crown was recognized by policy as an item of religious headgear, it was recognized and treated as such by defendants on September 21, 2014. By referring to plaintiff's Crown and yarmulke collectively as "religious headgear," the further implication is that plaintiff was given a choice as to which item he would wear and which one he would return to his cell. Defendants' motion makes clear that this is the interpretation they are advancing, but it lacks foundation in the evidence.
According to the interview summaries contained in the response to plaintiff's grievance, Gill "remember[ed] Inmate Young refusing to remove his beanie," while "Saephan stated, `I informed Inmate Young he would not be allowed to wear his beanie in visiting. Young stated the beanie was his religious crown. I informed Young beanies were not allowed in the visiting room.. . . I informed Young he could wear his Yarmulke but not his beanie.'" (ECF No . 48-6 at 16.) The summary further quotes defendant Rodriguez as saying that "`I told Young he could wear his Yarmulke but not his beanie, which he referred to as his religious crown. . . . I gave Young a choice to remove his beanie and wear his Yarmulke or refuse his visit.'" (
As addressed below, the difference in how these facts are understood is material.
The First Amendment protects the right to the free exercise of religion. A religious claim must satisfy two criteria to merit protection under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment: (1) "the claimant's proffered belief must be sincerely held and (2) "the claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical concerns."
In order to determine whether a policy is reasonable, analysis under
Defendants' motion rests on analyzing the reasonableness of the policy allowing prisoners to wear only one item of religious headgear to visitation, demonstrating that they are clearly espousing the interpretation of the facts that involves plaintiff having a choice between his Crown and yarmulke. (ECF No. 48-2 at 3-7.) But the policy regarding how many pieces of religious headgear a prisoner could wear becomes irrelevant when these facts are interpreted in the context of plaintiff's version of the facts and the documentary evidence. As explained above, understood in this light, although plaintiff's Crown was a recognized item of religious headgear under CDCR policy, it was not treated as such by defendants and their arbitrary refusal to recognize plaintiff's Crown placed him in the position of having to choose between compliance with his religious beliefs or going to visitation. These factual disputes mean that with respect to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, the policy limiting religious headgear to one item becomes irrelevant. Instead, the challenged action is defendants' refusal to allow plaintiff to wear his Crown, which was a recognized item of religious headgear, and defendants have provided no analysis showing that the denial was "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Because defendants' motion does not address this issue, summary judgment should be denied.
"[T]he Equal Protection Clause entitles each prisoner to `a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.'"
The factual disputes that exist are equally fatal to defendants' claim that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's Equal Protection claim. In their motion, they argue that plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he was subject to disparate treatment because no other religious group was allowed to wear multiple pieces of religious headgear. (ECF No. 48-2 at 11-12.) But under plaintiff's version of the facts, the proper question is whether he was discriminated against when he was told he could wear a yarmulke, but not his Crown, even though both were recognized under CDCR policy as religious headgear. Defendants fail to address this question and summary judgment on this ground should also be denied.
Though defendant Lewis's involvement is not addressed in the statement of facts, review of her declaration reveals additional facts. According to her declaration, Saephan and Gill reached out to her to confirm that policy allowed only one item of religious headgear to be worn to visitation. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 4.) Lewis confirmed this fact and instructed Saephan and Gill "to allow Plaintiff to return an item of headgear to his cell and process him through visiting if he complied." (
Defendants argue that plaintiff's First Amendment claim fails because the infringement on his rights was de minimis. (ECF No. 48-2 at 7.) However, the cases they rely on in support of this proposition are clearly distinguishable.
Under RLUIPA, "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution" unless the government shows that the burden furthers "a compelling governmental interest" and does so by the "least restrictive means." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
Because money damages are not available under RLUIPA, that leaves plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. (ECF No. 9 at 10.) But "when a prisoner is moved from a prison, his action will usually become moot as to conditions at that particular facility."
In their motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that plaintiff's transfer has in fact made his RLUIPA claims moot because he is no longer subject to the alleged conditions that violated RLUIPA. (ECF No. 48-2 at 11.) In opposing the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff neither disputes the mootness of his RLUIPA claims nor offers any evidence that he is still subject to the conditions that formed the basis of his claims. (ECF No. 53 at 1-27.)
As this court previously noted, plaintiff's transfer away from CHCF likely rendered his RLUIPA claims moot because the complaint appeared to challenge how CDCR policy was enforced at CHCF, rather than challenging CDCR policy itself. (ECF No. 43 at 2 n.1.) Furthermore, the complaint specifically requested injunctive relief in the form of a restraining order against officials at CHCF. (ECF No. 9 at 10.) In light of these facts and plaintiff's failure to dispute the mootness of his RLUIPA claim, the court finds that any claims for injunctive relief against defendants in their official capacities under RLUIPA are moot. Furthermore, to the extent plaintiff is attempting to bring individual capacity claims against defendants under RLUIPA, they must fail. Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted in defendants' favor on plaintiff's RLUIPA claims.
"Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"
These questions may be addressed in the order most appropriate to "the circumstances in the particular case at hand."
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they were simply following policy, which a reasonable officer would have believed was lawful, and Saephan and Gill were further deferring to their superior. (ECF No. 48-2 at 13-14.) However, as set forth above, under plaintiff's version of the facts, defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional rights when they refused to allow him to wear his Crown to visitation without any justifiable reason, but would have allowed him to wear a yarmulke. As to whether a reasonable officer would have believed this conduct to be lawful, at the time, the Rastafarian Crown was recognized by CDCR policy as an item of religious headgear and prisoners were permitted to wear one item of religious headgear to visitation. Accordingly, defendants' conduct was not in line with policy. Furthermore, Saephan and Gill did not simply defer to their superior; they also made an independent decision to refuse to let plaintiff go to visitation wearing his Crown when he first arrived at visitation.
It was well established at the time that prison officials could not prevent a prisoner from "engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."
Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted as to plaintiff's RLUIPA claims and denied as to the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted as to your RLUIPA claim because you are no longer at CHCF and you were only complaining about how the policy was carried out at CHCF. It is being recommended that your RLUIPA claim be dismissed. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on your First and Fourteenth Amendment claims should be denied because there is a disagreement between you and defendants as to what happened on September 21, 2014, and that disagreement affects the outcome of the case.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 48) be granted in part and denied in part as follows:
1. Granted as to plaintiff's RLUIPA claims.
2. Denied as to plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within