NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ROTHSCHILD, J.

1680 Vine Investment Company, LLC (1680 Vine), a defendant in a personal injury action brought by Kennedi Martin, appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of its codefendant Amtech Elevator Services (Amtech). Amtech moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that 1680 Vine is not an aggrieved party and therefore lacks standing to appeal from the judgment in Amtech's favor. We agree and thus dismiss the appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Martin's Complaint and 1680 Vine's Cross-complaint Against Amtech

On September 12, 2008, Martin filed a personal injury lawsuit against 1680 Vine for premises liability and negligence.1 Martin alleged that, on June 27, 2007, while a visitor in a building owned by 1680 Vine, she "was seriously injured when her right arm was trapped in a malfunctioning and/or unreasonably dangerous elevator door in the building's lobby."

1680 Vine answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint against Amtech, alleging causes of action for declaratory relief, equitable indemnity, contribution and express indemnity. According to the cross-complaint, Amtech serviced the elevators in the building at which Martin was injured under a contract with 1680 Vine and thus was responsible for any damages attributed to 1680 Vine as a result of Martin's injury.

After the filing of 1680 Vine's cross-complaint, Martin amended her complaint to substitute Amtech for a doe defendant.

2. The Order Granting Summary Judgment and Judgment for Amtech on Martin's Complaint, 1680 Vine's Dismissal of Its Cross-complaint and the Appeals

On June 1, 2009, Amtech filed a motion for summary judgment against Martin, contending that (1) the premises liability cause of action failed as a matter of law because Amtech did not own, possess or control the premises and (2) the negligence cause of action failed as a matter of law because Martin could not establish evidence of negligent conduct by Amtech that contributed to her injuries. In response, Martin withdrew her premises liability cause of action, but opposed summary resolution of her negligence cause of action, arguing that Amtech owed her a duty of care and breached that duty based on the manner in which it had serviced the elevator. 1680 Vine did not oppose Amtech's motion for summary judgment, join it or move for summary judgment on its cross-complaint against Amtech to be heard at the same time.

After considering the parties' briefing and evidence, hearing argument and taking the matter under submission, on September 9, 2009, the trial court granted the motion. That same day, Martin filed a notice of appeal purporting to appeal from an order granting summary judgment. The following day, on September 10, 2009, 1680 Vine filed a request for a dismissal without prejudice of its cross-complaint against Amtech, and the clerk entered the dismissal as requested.

On September 11, 2009, the trial court entered a formal order granting Amtech's motion for summary judgment. As to the negligence cause of action, the court determined that Amtech was not liable to Martin as a matter of law because "[t]he evidence submitted in support of Amtech's motion for summary judgment establishes that Amtech performed its obligations under the elevator maintenance contract by providing routine maintenance and emergency call back service. The evidence also establishes that the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety inspected the subject elevator within days after the incident and found no code violations, and no problems with the door sensor. The declaration of [Martin's] elevator expert is inadmissible. [The expert's] opinions that the subject elevator was in violation of the Code of Regulation[s] at the time of the incident, and that it was negligently maintained at the time of the incident, are not supported by the site inspection conducted over two years after the incident. [Martin] has not satisfied her burden of producing evidence of a triable issue of material fact." On September 24, 2009, the court entered judgment in favor of Amtech.

On November 20, 2009, 1680 Vine filed a notice of appeal from the September 24, 2009 judgment in favor of Amtech.2

3. The Trial and Judgment Against 1680 Vine and Its Appeal from the Judgment After Trial

Martin's case proceeded to a jury trial against 1680 Vine. On September 25, 2009, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of Martin, finding that 1680 Vine was negligent and that its negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to Martin. The jury found 1680 Vine 97 percent at fault and Martin 3 percent at fault. After reducing to present value the components of the special verdict for future economic and noneconomic loss and accounting for Martin's comparative fault, the trial court, on November 6, 2009, entered judgment in favor of Martin for $1,681,456.70.

1680 Vine moved for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied both motions. On January 19, 2010, 1680 Vine filed a notice of appeal from the judgment in Martin's favor and from the order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.3

On July 2, 2010, before the filing of any briefs, Martin requested that we dismiss her appeal from the judgment in Amtech's favor. That same day, we ordered the dismissal of her appeal, and the clerk issued the remittitur.

On February 25, 2011, 1680 Vine filed an appellant's opening brief, addressing both its appeal from the judgment in favor of Amtech and its appeal from the judgment in favor of Martin. Several months later, on June 14, 2011, after 1680 Vine had reached a settlement with Martin, 1680 Vine filed a request to dismiss its appeal from the judgment in favor of Martin. On June 15, 2011, we ordered the dismissal of 1680 Vine's appeal as to Martin, and the clerk issued the remittitur that same day.

Based on the dismissals, the only appeal that remains is 1680 Vine's appeal from the judgment in favor of Amtech.

DISCUSSION

Notwithstanding the existence of an appealable judgment or order, only a party with standing may pursue an appeal. (Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947.) The standing requirement is jurisdictional (ibid.), and it cannot be waived (Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 295). A party has standing only if it is aggrieved by the judgment or order. (Sabi, at p. 947; see also County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 736 ["`Any aggrieved party' may appeal from an adverse judgment"]; Code Civ. Proc., § 902 ["Any party aggrieved may appeal in the cases prescribed in this title"].) "One is considered `aggrieved' whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment. [Citations.] Appellant's interest `must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not a nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment.' [Citation.]" (County of Alameda, at p. 737.)

Amtech moved to dismiss 1680 Vine's appeal from the judgment in its favor, contending that 1680 Vine does not have standing to appeal because it is not an aggrieved party. We agree.

1680 Vine argues that it has standing to appeal because the summary judgment in favor of Amtech, its codefendant in Martin's action, erroneously removed a liable party from the case. But 1680 Vine, which has no pending cross-complaint against Amtech, cannot use the exoneration of Amtech, whether erroneous or not, as a basis to claim it is aggrieved and thus has standing to appeal from the judgment in Amtech's favor. "[T]he exoneration of a joint tortfeasor from liability does not `aggrieve' the other individually liable tortfeasor(s) insofar as that word is understood to apply to a party's standing to appeal. [Citation.] `A defendant who is individually liable is not aggrieved by the exoneration, even though erroneous, of a codefendant.' [Citation.]" (Holt v. Booth (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1080, fn. omitted.)

1680 Vine also argues it is aggrieved by the judgment in favor of Amtech because, once the trial court granted summary judgment for Amtech, under Code of Civil Procedure, section 437c, subdivision (l ), it could not argue at trial that Amtech was negligent. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subdivision (l) ["In actions which arise out of an injury to the person or to property, if a motion for summary judgment was granted on the basis that the defendant was without fault, no other defendant during trial, over plaintiff's objection, may attempt to attribute fault to or comment on the absence or involvement of the defendant who was granted the motion"].) 1680 Vine is correct that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (l ), it could not argue during the jury trial that Amtech was negligent. But 1680 Vine cites no authority, and we know of none, to suggest that this provision renders inapplicable the rule that an individually liable defendant is not aggrieved by the exoneration of a codefendant and gives 1680 Vine standing to appeal from the judgment in Amtech's favor.

1680 Vine further contends that, under res judicata principles, the judgment in Amtech's favor may prevent it from pursuing its claims against Amtech, thereby demonstrating that it is an aggrieved party with standing to appeal. Although the doctrine of res judicata can serve as a basis for a party to demonstrate standing to appeal (Leoke v. San Bernardino County (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 767, 771), 1680 Vine cannot use it to establish standing in this case.

At oral argument, 1680 Vine relied on Columbus Line, Inc. v. Gray Line Sight-Seeing Companies Associated, Inc. (1980) 120 Cal.App.3d 622 (Columbus Line), a case that did not address standing to appeal, but that determined that a summary judgment in favor of a defendant and against the plaintiff on the ground that the defendant was not negligent bars under res judicata principles a codefendant from pursuing a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity against the exonerated defendant. According to 1680 Vine, Columbus Line means that, under res judicata principles, the summary judgment for Amtech may bar it from pursuing claims against Amtech and thus 1680 Vine is aggrieved by the judgment in favor of Amtech. As noted, the question of standing to appeal was not at issue in Columbus Line, and the case, therefore, does not undermine the rule that in a tort action a defendant like 1680 Vine, without a pending cross-complaint, is not aggrieved for purposes of establishing standing to appeal by the exoneration of its codefendant.

In addition, Columbus Line applied the doctrine of res judicata in part because the defendant seeking to pursue a cross-complaint against the exonerated defendant had failed to oppose the exonerated defendant's motion for summary judgment, despite the opportunity to do so, and, as a result, was "`sufficiently close to the original case to afford application of the principle of preclusion.'" (Columbus Line, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 630.) Similarly, in this case, 1680 Vine was served with Amtech's motion for summary judgment, yet did not oppose it, join it or make its own motion for summary judgment on the then pending cross-complaint to be heard at the same time. Consequently, 1680 Vine should not be considered aggrieved and thus have standing to appeal from the judgment in favor of Amtech when a basis for the potential application of res judicata is 1680 Vine's own failure to participate in the summary judgment proceedings. To hold otherwise would be to permit a party to stand by idly to await the outcome of proceedings against its codefendant and then use its failure to participate in the proceedings, despite being able to do so, as a basis to apply res judicata and thus as a bootstrap to establish standing. Such a result would be contrary to standing principles requiring a party to be aggrieved in an immediate, pecuniary and substantial way, not by its own inaction.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. Amtech is entitled to recover its costs incurred in 1680 Vine's appeal from the judgment in Amtech's favor.

MALLANO, P. J. and JOHNSON, J., concurs.