NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CHAVEZ, J.

Defendant and appellant Jack Friedman (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered in favor of Silvia Barron (plaintiff) on her causes of action for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of covenant to repair. Defendant contends the judgment must be reversed because the trial court erred by denying his timely request for a further statement of decision and because the judgment is ambiguous and includes an improper award of prejudgment interest. We affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced the instant action against defendant after a ceiling caved in on her during a rain storm at the premises she was renting from defendant. After a bench trial the trial court found in plaintiff's favor on three of her five causes of action. In a statement of decision issued on October 29, 2007, the trial court found that plaintiff had informed defendant orally and in writing of the leaking roof and that it was more likely than not that she had asked defendant to repair the roof. The trial court further found that defendant had a duty of care to maintain and fix the roof and that defendant's failure to do so was negligent, a breach of contract, and a breach of the covenant to repair. The trial court found the evidence insufficient to support plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and constructive eviction. The trial court noted that there were various inconsistencies in plaintiff's testimony and considered them in determining her damages. Although plaintiff sought $200,000, the court awarded her $50,000, plus seven percent interest from the filing of the complaint, as well as her costs.

On November 8, 2007, defendant filed a request for further statement of decision, asking the trial court to explain the factual and legal basis for (1) the monetary amount awarded for plaintiff's personal injuries; (2) the monetary amount awarded for property damage; (3) the factual basis for the court's award of damages for personal injuries; and (4) the factual basis for the court's award of damages for property damage.

On November 9, 2007, the trial court issued a minute order stating that it had received a request for further statement of decision and that it had denied that request as untimely. Judgment was entered in plaintiff's favor on September 25, 2009. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court failed to provide an adequate statement of decision explaining the factual and legal bases for its decision and that the court erred by refusing to clarify or amend the statement of decision after defendant requested it to do so. We review this claim of error under an abuse of discretion standard. (Hernandez v. City of Encinitas (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1077, 1078-1079.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 632 requires a trial court to issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision upon the request of any party appearing at trial.1 "In rendering a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632, a trial court is required only to state ultimate rather than evidentiary facts; only when it fails to make findings on a material issue which would fairly disclose the trial court's determination would reversible error result. [Citations.] Even then, if the judgment is otherwise supported, the omission to make such findings is harmless error unless the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in the complaining party's favor which would have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings. [Citation.]" (Hellman v. La Cumbre Golf & Country Club (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1230 (Hellman).)

The trial court in this case issued a statement of decision despite the absence in the record of any request for a statement of decision by either party. The statement of decision issued by the trial court adequately sets forth the factual and legal bases for its decision. It states in relevant part:

Defendant contends the statement of decision is inadequate because it fails to allocate the damages award among the three causes of action on which plaintiff prevailed. He claims that such an allocation was necessary because any award of prejudgment interest on plaintiff's claim for personal injury damages was improper. Defendant maintains that plaintiff was not entitled to prejudgment interest on the damages awarded for her personal injuries because she made no claim for prejudgment interest in her complaint and made no offer to compromise pursuant to Civil Code section 3291.2

As indicated in the statement of decision, the trial court also awarded damages for breach of contract. It accordingly had the discretion, under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (b), to award prejudgment interest on the damages awarded for that claim. Section 3287, subdivision (b) provides: "Every person who is entitled under any judgment to receive damages based on a cause of action in contract where the claim was unliquidated, may also recover interest thereon from a date prior to the entry of judgment as the court may, in its discretion, fix, but in no event earlier than the date the action was filed." The trial court's award of interest at the rate of seven percent from the date the complaint was filed was consistent with that statute. The trial court's failure to allocate the damages award among plaintiff's various causes of action does not make the statement of decision fatally flawed by ambiguity and does not warrant reversal of the judgment.

The trial court's award of prejudgment interest is supported both factually and legally, and the statement of decision adequately sets forth the bases for the trial court's decision. The denial of defendant's request to clarify or amend the statement of decision was not an abuse of discretion, whether or not that request was timely made, and despite the trial court's stated reason for denying the request as untimely. (Hellman, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230.) An appellate court may affirm a trial court judgment on any correct basis presented by the record, even if that basis was not invoked by the trial court. (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32.) There can be no prejudicial error from erroneous reasoning if the trial court's decision itself is correct. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980-981.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff is awarded her costs on appeal.

We concur:

DOI TODD, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST, J.