PHILIP A. BRIMMER, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the Recommendation on (1) Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendants James Falk, Lieutenant Hoffman, and JoAnn Stock (Docket No. 41); (2) Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Beverly Dowis (Docket No. 65); and (3) Plaintiff's Motion to Add Defendants (Docket No. 87) [Docket No. 89] (the "Recommendation"). The magistrate judge recommends (1) denying the Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendants James Falk, Lieutenant Hoffman, and JoAnn Stock with respect to the claims asserted by plaintiff Alexis Ortiz against Lieutenant Hoffman and granting it in all other respects; (2) granting the Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Beverly Dowis with respect to plaintiff's claim for monetary damages against Ms. Dowis in her official capacity and regarding any claims that accrued prior to March 6, 2011 and granting it in all other respects; and (3) denying plaintiff Motion to Add Defendants [Docket No. 87]. Docket No. 89 at 20. On February 5, 2014, plaintiff filed timely objections [Docket No. 90] to the Recommendation. The Court will "determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In light of plaintiff's pro se status, the Court reviews his filings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Sterling Correctional Facility ("SCF"). Mr. Falk is the Warden of SCF. Ms. Dowis is the Health Care Administrator of SCF. Ms. Stock is a physician assistant employed by SCF. Lieutenant Hoffman is a housing lieutenant employed by SCF. The relevant facts are set forth in detail in the Recommendation and will not be recited here.
Plaintiff objects to the finding that his claims against Ms. Stock and certain events supporting his claims against Ms. Dowis are barred by the statute of limitations.
In the Tenth Circuit, "[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived." Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1310 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996)). The "purpose of referring cases to a magistrate for recommended disposition would be contravened if parties were allowed to present only selected issues to the magistrate, reserving their full panoply of contentions for the trial court." Ridenour v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 679 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Borden v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1987) (Magistrate Act's intended purpose of "reliev[ing] courts of unnecessary work" would be defeated if a district court were "required to hear matters anew on issues never presented to the magistrate."); Garrett v. BNC Mortg., Inc., 929 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1129 (D. Colo. 2013).
Plaintiff waived the arguments that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled or that defendants engaged in a continuing violation by failing to raise them before the magistrate judge. See Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1310. The Court therefore declines to consider them. See Marshall, 75 F.3d at 1426; Borden, 836 F.2d at 6; 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq.
The parties do not raise any additional objections to the Recommendation. In the absence of an objection, the district court may review a magistrate judge's recommendation under any standard it deems appropriate. See Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) ("[i]t does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings"). In this matter, the Court has reviewed the parts of the Recommendation to which no one has objected to satisfy itself that there is "no clear error on the face of the record."