NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

IKOLA, J.

Defendant Robert Alan Wilson challenges a court security fee and a court facilities assessment imposed in his sentence. The fee and assessment apply only to convictions occurring after their authorizing statutes became effective. But defendant was convicted before then. We modify the judgment to strike them, and affirm.

FACTS

In January 2003, a jury found defendant guilty of resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 69)1 and battery on an officer resulting in serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), We affirmed the judgment. (People v. Wilson (Oct. 4, 2004, G032161) [nonpub. opn.].) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted defendant's habeas petition and reversed the resisting an officer conviction in March 2010. (Wilson v. Clark (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2010, No. 08-55758) 2010 WL 1192409.)

After remand, the court resentenced defendant on the battery conviction in October 2010. Over defendant's objection that the fee and assessment "didn't exist back in 2003," the court also imposed a $30 court security fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)).

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the court wrongly imposed the court security fee and a court facilities assessment when it resentenced him. He notes the jury returned its guilty verdict on the underlying battery conviction in January 2003. But section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), authorizing the court security fee became effective after that, in August 2003. (Stats. 2003, ch. 159, § 25, p. 1513; see also id., § 29, p. 1513 [effective immediately].) And section 70373 authorizing the court facilities assessment became effective in January 2009. (Stats. 2008, ch. 311, § 6.5, p. 2113.)

The question is whether those statutes apply prospectively or retroactively. "It is a widely recognized legal principle . . . that in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary statutory enactments apply prospectively." (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1193-1194.) The Penal Code provides, "No part of it is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." (§ 3.) "We have previously construed the statute to mean `[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the Legislature intended otherwise.'" (People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753.)

Nothing in the authorizing statutes indicates they apply retroactively. Section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), provides the court security fee "shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense . . . ." Government Code section 70373 provides the court facilities assessment "shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense . . . ." The statutes do not declare a retroactive effect. Nothing clearly and compellingly implies the Legislature intended the statutes to apply retroactively. Nothing suggests the Legislature used the phrase "imposed on every conviction" to mean "imposed on every conviction ever, however distant in the past."

Thus, like most statutes, the statutes authorizing the fee and assessment apply prospectively to convictions after their effective date. That is what Alford suggested with regard to the court security fee. It held the fee could be imposed even though the statute became effective after the defendant committed the underlying crime. (People v. Alford, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 752.) But in so doing it explained, "Section 1465.8's legislative history supports the conclusion the Legislature intended to impose the court security fee to all convictions after its operative date." (Id. at p. 754.)

And that is what the court held in People v. Davis (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 998, with regard to the court facilities assessment. There, like here, the defendant was convicted before the assessment became operative but sentenced thereafter. (Id. at p. 1001.) The court held "the new . . . court facilities fee imposed by Government Code section 70373 does not apply to cases in which the defendant's conviction, by plea or jury verdict, was rendered before the January 1, 2009 effective date of the statute." (Id. at p. 1000.) It noted the assessment applies upon conviction, and "[i]t has been settled law for over 250 years that a person stands `convicted' upon the return of a guilty verdict by the jury or by the entry of a plea admitting guilt." (Id. at p. 1001.) Because "the defendant was convicted when he entered his plea" and "the statute only applies to cases in which the conviction occurs on or after its effective date, it does not apply to this case." (Ibid.)

The Attorney General offers no argument to the contrary. Instead, the Attorney General knocks down a straw man — that imposing the fee and assessment on defendant is ex post facto punishment. The Attorney General rightly notes the fee and assessment have no punitive intent or effect, and may apply to crimes committed before they became operative. These correct observations are beside the point. Defendant is not making an ex post facto claim. He does not claim applying the fee and assessment retroactively would violate the ex post facto clauses. Instead, citing People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749 and People v. Davis (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 998, defendant persuasively contends the fee and assessment do not apply retroactively at all to convictions preceding their operative dates.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to strike the court security fee and a court facilities assessment. The court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

O'LEARY, ACTING P. J. and FYBEL, J., concurs.