WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, Jr., District Judge.
Plaintiff, Geneva B. Livingston, brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 405(g)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security, denying Plaintiff's claims for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social Security Act. The court has before it the certified administrative record and the parties have filed cross-motions for judgment.
Plaintiff protectively filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on July 11, 2008, alleging a disability onset date of November 2, 2007. (Tr. at 14, 117-27.) After her claims were denied initially (Tr. at 48-49) and upon reconsideration (Tr. at 50-51), Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which took place on April 13, 2010 (Tr. at 23). The ALJ ultimately found that Plaintiff was not under a disability from the date of her applications through the date of the decision. Specifically, the ALJ identified Plaintiff's right carpal tunnel syndrome, arthritis, and back and arm pain as severe impairments, but found that she nevertheless retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform the full range of medium work. (Tr. at 16, 18.) Because, based on vocational expert testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's RFC would allow her to perform all of her past relevant work, he concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Tr. at 20-22.) After unsuccessfully seeking review of this decision by the Appeals Council, Plaintiff filed the present action in this court.
Plaintiff now argues that the ALJ erred in formulating her RFC. Specifically, she alleges that the ALJ failed to (1) apply the correct standard to evaluate Plaintiff's pain, (2) properly consider the opinions of Plaintiff's "treating and examining physicians and other medical sources," (3) perform a "function-by-function analysis" of Plaintiff's functional limitations and restrictions, (4) consider the combined effects of all of Plaintiff's impairments, including non-severe impairments, and (5) further develop the record in light of ambiguous evidence surrounding Plaintiff's mental symptoms. Plaintiff further contends that the alleged errors in her RFC assessment and corresponding hypothetical questions to the vocational expert rendered the ALJ's finding as to past relevant work at step four of the analysis unsupported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ's credibility finding, arguing that the ALJ failed to articulate his reasons for discrediting her subjective pain testimony or consider her objective medical evidence of pain. (Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pleadings ("Pl.'s Br.") (Doc. 21) at 14, 16.) In
Notably, while the ALJ must consider Plaintiff's statements and other subjective evidence at step two, he need not credit them "to the extent they are inconsistent with the available evidence, including objective evidence of the underlying impairment, and the extent to which that impairment can reasonably be expected to cause the pain the claimant alleges she suffers."
Where the ALJ has considered these factors and has heard Plaintiff's testimony and observed her demeanor, the ALJ's credibility determination is entitled to deference.
In the present case, the ALJ determined at step one of
The decision first explains that Plaintiff was able to perform medium work prior to being laid off for "business-related" reasons in November, 2007, and that
(Tr. at 19.) Indeed, without the "significant deterioration" of a claimant's medical condition, the past ability to work with a persisting condition will preclude, as a matter of law, a finding of disability based on that condition.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to give due weight to the medical evidence provided by Plaintiff's treating physicians. The ALJ's decision recounted Plaintiff's medical records and opinion evidence at length. Plaintiff, however, contends that the ALJ "ignored" the opinions of her examining and treating physicians. Defendant correctly counters that "Plaintiff submitted no medical opinion from a treating or examining physician that reflected a judgment about what she could still do despite her impairment(s) and what her physical and/or mental restrictions were, if any." (Comm'r Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pleadings (Doc. 23) at 10.) In fact, Plaintiff fails to identify any physicians by name. Instead, her brief refers, more broadly, to various hospitals, clinics, and a consultative examiner, all of whom provided various diagnoses and clinical findings without evaluating the impact of those findings on Plaintiff's ability to work.
The state agency medical consultants provided the only such analysis of record. Dr. Ebosele X. Oboh's opinion incorporated the findings of all of Plaintiff's previous treating and examining physicians and concluded that Plaintiff's back and neck pain and other symptoms from her carpal tunnel syndrome and arthritis did not impair her ability to perform the full range of medium work as of August 19, 2008. (Tr. at 20, 257-64.) A second physician, Dr. Stephen Levin, affirmed Dr. Oboh's assessment after reviewing updated medical records on January 22, 2009. (Tr. at 294.) These opinions are consistent with the ALJ's above findings regarding Plaintiff's post-layoff condition.
Plaintiff next challenges the RFC assessment by contending that the ALJ erred by failing to make a function-by-function analysis of Plaintiff's abilities as required by Social Security Ruling 96-8p,
Nevertheless, as this court explained in an analogous case,
Here, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's medical history in detail, and his finding that Plaintiff can perform medium exertional level work — meaning that Plaintiff can lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently during an eight-hour day — is supported by (1) the opinions of state agency medical consultants Oboh and Levin, (2) her work stoppage for reasons other than allegedly disabling impairments, and (3) her subsequent collection of unemployment benefits. The only possible suggestion of limitations not discussed by the ALJ stem from the reduced range of motion and right-hand strength and coordination identified by Dr. Elaine A. Staten in her consultative examination. (Tr. at 19-20, 251-56.) However, Dr. Staten mentioned no restrictions related to these findings, and the two state agency consultants who evaluated this information opined that her findings merited no further work restrictions. Again, Plaintiff points to no evidence contrary to the ALJ's decision other than her own subjective pain allegations.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to consider the combined effects of all of her impairments, including her non-severe impairments, when evaluating her RFC. In particular, she challenges the ALJ's omission of limitations related to her depression, which the ALJ classified as non-severe. In raising this challenge, Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in failing to further develop the record surrounding her alleged mental impairment.
As Defendant correctly notes, the ALJ explicitly considered Plaintiff's allegations of depression, which she raised for the first time at her hearing, and concluded that her depression was a medically determinable mental impairment. (Tr. at 17.) The ALJ then considered the extent to which depression interferes with Plaintiff's ability to function in four broad functional areas: activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, and pace; and episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(2)-(3) and 416.920a(c)(2)-(3). The ALJ found, based on Plaintiff's testimony, medical records, and the findings of two psychiatric consultants, that Plaintiff had no restrictions in terms of daily living or social functioning, mild limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace, and had experienced no episodes of decompensation. (
Plaintiff does not directly challenge the findings related to her depression, nor does she explain what, if any, limitations from depression should be included in her RFC. Instead, she suggests that evidence of depression existing prior to the hearing "indicated a severe problem relating to depression, as well as bipolar or maybe schizophrenia." (Pl.'s Br. (Doc. 21) at 21.) She argues that this evidence created an "independent, affirmative duty" for the ALJ to continue her hearing and further develop the record. (
Here, the supporting evidence cited by Plaintiff almost entirely post-dates the ALJ's decision and was not submitted to the Appeals Council. The only exceptions are records showing that Plaintiff was prescribed anti-depressant medication in late 2009 in response to her new complaints of depression and that her medications and dosages were adjusted over the following months. (Tr. at 296-98, 306.) Such evidence, without more, fails to indicate a worsening condition, let alone creates an affirmative duty for an ALJ to seek out further information.
The majority of evidence Plaintiff cites in her brief centers on her involuntary commitment for psychosis on June 17, 2010, shortly after the ALJ's June 7, 2010 decision. At that point, Plaintiff reported to an emergency room physician that "little green men were trying to hurt her." (Pl.'s Br. (Doc. 21-1) at 4-5.) Understandably, her arguments seek to tie this later evidence to the time period at issue here, yet, despite its existence at the time of her appeal, Plaintiff failed to submit this evidence to the Appeals Council. (
Plaintiff next argues that, because the hypothetical questions to the vocational expert were based on an erroneous RFC assessment, the ALJ's finding as to past relevant work at step four of the analysis was unsupported by substantial evidence. Because, as fully explained above, substantial evidence supports an RFC for medium work, the ALJ did not err in basing his disability determination on the vocational expert's testimony that Plaintiff could return to her past medium and light exertional level jobs.
