Order Screening Complaint, Dismissing Case with Prejudice, and Denying all other Pending Motions

[ECF Nos. 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 19, 24, 25, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41]

JENNIFER A. DORSEY, District Judge.

Pro se plaintiff Reginald Burgess is no stranger to litigation. He has already earned himself vexatious-litigant status in the United States District Court for the Central District of California,1 and he has generated 29 docket entries since he filed this case less than two months ago.2 Burgess sues a handful of defendants seeking to set aside a 2002 state-court judgment that declared his title to a Los Angeles residence void and to be declared the rightful owner of the property.3 Burgess has also submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis. I now screen Burgess's complaint under 28 USC § 1915(e), dismiss his complaint with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, deny all pending motions, and direct the Clerk to close this case.

Background

Though Burgess's filings are voluminous and difficult to understand, it appears that he is attempting to remove a case from California state court to this district because he believes that the California courts are biased against him and favor female attorneys.4 Although none of the defendants have been properly served, defendants RBEY Inc. and Title365 Company filed motions to remand this case back to the Superior Court of California.5 In support of its motion to remand, RBEY has filed a request for judicial notice of (1) the deeds and records relating to the L.A. residence from the Los Angeles County recorder's office and (2) the court records from Burgess's other lawsuits attempting to claim the L.A. residence.6 I will take judicial notice of the exhibits because they are matters of public record and their accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.7

RBEY's exhibits show that Burgess has unsuccessfully litigated his claim of title to the L.A. residence for more than a decade in multiple courts, including the Los Angeles Superior Court, California Court of Appeal, United States Bankruptcy Court, United States District Court, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. And Burgess currently has an identical case pending in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Burgess filed this case and then filed a notice of removal in that L.A. County lawsuit indicating that the case had been removed to this district and listing this case number.8 Burgess has also filed a "memorandum and notice of removal" in this case that purports to remove his California case to this court.9

RBEY and Title365 are correct that the right of removal is vested exclusively in defendants.10 Thus, Burgess has no right to remove his state-court case to a federal court. And even if Burgess could remove his case to a federal court, it wouldn't be this one; the proper district would be the district embracing the Los Angeles Superior Court—the Central District of California.11 Nonetheless, this case is not here on a petition for removal, so I deny RBEY and Title 365's motions to remand,12 and I instead screen Burgess's complaint as an action filed directly in this district.

Discussion

A. Screening standards under § 1915(e)

Section 1915 governs proceedings in forma pauperis and directs a court to dismiss a case at any time the court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue or that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from that relief.13 Pro se pleadings, of course, must be liberally construed.14

Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under § 1915 when liberally reviewing the adequacy of a pro se complaint. But when a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions for curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment.15

B. Burgess's complaint must be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

At the outset, I note that Burgess's complaint is both malicious and frivolous. It appears that Burgess filed this suit or attempted to remove his California case to this court because he is unhappy with how those proceedings are unfolding. In his opposition to RBEY's motion to remand, Burgess boldly asserts that "by March 22, 2016 it had become clear the State court was not going to honor" his rights, so he removed the case to this court.16 Burgess has a habit of forum shopping; this is not the first time that he has filed multiple proceedings as a litigation tactic to interfere with ongoing state-court proceedings.17

In all of his lawsuits, Burgess appears to challenge an August 2002 Los Angeles Superior Court probate order (issued following a four-day trial) that transferred legal title of the L.A. residence to John Williams, as conservator of the Estate of George Williams, and declared that the Quitclaim deeds purporting to convey title to Burgess were void.18 Burgess appears to believe that he gained title to the residence through his later-filed bankruptcy proceeding in which he claimed a homestead exemption. The California Court of Appeals rejected that argument.19 Burgess alleges that the California courts and defendants have repeatedly "ignored the bankruptcy discharge" that returned the residence to him.20 He seeks an order declaring him the rightful owner (or at least 50% owner) of the residence.21

I find that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes me from considering Burgess's claims. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.22 Throughout his complaint, Burgess asserts legal errors by the California state courts and seeks relief from the 2002 probate court judgment.23 The California state courts have determined that Burgess has no interest in the L.A. residence and that he did not gain an interest in the residence through filing for bankruptcy. This court lacks jurisdiction to reconsider those judgments and to grant Burgess the relief he seeks, and it lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders in Burgess's currently pending California state case. Because this is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured by amendment, I dismiss Burgess's complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend.

Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that RBEY and Title365 Company's motions to remand [ECF No. 19, 39] are DENIED, and all other pending motions [ECF Nos. 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 19, 24, 25, 35, 36, 40, 41] are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE THIS CASE.