RAYMOND P. MOORE, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the United States' "Supplemental Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant Lee Gladding" (the "Supplemental Motion") (ECF No. 108) and United States' Request for Entry of Order of Sale (the "Request for Order") (ECF No. 109) (collectively, "Second Motions"). The Second Motions were filed after the Court denied, without prejudice, the United States' initial motions concerning the same subject matter (collectively, the "First Motions") (ECF Nos. 104, 105).
The factual and procedural background which gives rise to the Second Motions is set forth in the Court's previous Order dated September 13, 2017 (the "First Order") (ECF No. 103), so it will not be repeated here. In summary, as relevant here, in the First Order, the Court granted the United States summary judgment as against Defendants Fleming and Van Eden Corporation as to certain matters related to 2314 Van Eden Road, Idaho Springs, Colorado 80452
As stated, the Court denied the United States' request for a default judgment against Defendant Gladding as it failed to advise the Court of the remedy sought. As alleged in the Amended Complaint, and supported by the evidence, Defendant Gladding may claim an interest in the Subject Property based on a promissory note and deed of trust given by Defendant Fleming on the Subject Property. (ECF No. 87-2, ¶12; No. 87-3, Exhibit 11.) The record shows that Defendant Gladding had an opportunity to respond to the complaint and present evidence in support of his interest, but did not do so. (E.g., ECF No. 87-2, ¶¶42, 43.) As such, in the Supplemental Motion, the United States requests the Court to enter default judgment against Defendant Gladding and to enter an order that any interest Defendant Gladding may have in the Subject Property is discharged. On this record, the Court finds sufficient evidence to support the relief requested. Accordingly, the Court finds that any interest Defendant Gladding has in the Subject Property is discharged and default judgment should enter accordingly.
As to Defendant Van Eden Corporation, the Court has previously found that such defendant holds legal title to the Subject Property as the nominee of Defendant Patricia Fleming (First Order, page 22).
As to Defendant Gladding, as stated herein, any interest he has in the Subject Property is discharged.
As to Defendant Capital One Bank, pursuant to the United States and Capital One Bank's stipulation and this Court's subsequent Order of March 16, 2017, the Court has determined, as to the Subject Property, that (1) Capital One Bank's interest has priority over the United States' federal tax liens; and (2) Clear Creek County's tax liens have priority over Capital One Bank's interest. (ECF Nos. 90, 93.) The Court left some other issues open. However, in light of these parties' stipulation, to which no one has challenged over the course of this case, the Court accepts the additional stipulations (expressed or implied) as made between the parties, i.e., that Capital One Bank's lien is valid and remains in effect, and so finds.
As to Defendant Colorado Department of Revenue, it has filed a Disclaimer of Interest and the United States has voluntarily dismissed the Department, without prejudice, from this case. (ECF Nos. 57, 71.)
As to Defendant Clear Creek County, pursuant to the United States and Clear Creek County's stipulation and this Court's subsequent Order of November 25, 2015, the Court has determined that Clear Creek County's tax liens have priority over the United States' federal tax liens, but left some other issues open (ECF Nos. 36, 50). In light of these parties' stipulation, to which no one has challenged over the course of this case, the Court accepts the additional stipulations (expressed or implied) as made between the parties, i.e., that Clear Creek County's tax liens are valid and remain in effect, and so finds.
In light of the foregoing, and the United States' proposed Order of Sale which sets forth a priority for distribution of proceeds from the sale of the Subject Property, to which no party objects and there is nothing in the record to show a contrary priority, the Court accepts and agrees with the proposed priority of disbursement.
Based on the foregoing, it is