ORDER

DOMINIC W. LANZA, District Judge.

On December 16, 2019, the Court entered an order vacating Petitioner Leslie Orman's $10.3 million arbitration award and awarding sanctions against Orman and her former counsel, Jeremy Claridge, to Respondents Central Loan Administration and Reporting ("Cenlar") and CitiMortgage Inc. ("Citi") (collectively, "Respondents"). (Doc. 39.) In that order, the Court directed Respondents to submit an itemized listing of the legal fees they incurred in this matter and further directed Orman and Claridge to submit objections to those fees. (Id. at 13.) All parties have now submitted their documentation, and the Court is prepared to determine the appropriate amount of fees to be assessed against Orman and Claridge.

BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural history of this case is set out in the Court's December 16 order. In a nutshell, Orman attempted to use this Court to confirm a sham arbitration award. (Id. at 13.) Relying on 9 U.S.C. § 10 and basic tenets of contract law, the Court vacated the award. (Id. at 5-9.) The Court also determined that Orman and Claridge had acted with bad faith—Claridge recklessly filed an application to confirm an obviously fraudulent arbitration award, and Orman was trying to use this Court to harass her former mortgage lender. (Id. at 8-13.) Recognizing that "bad faith comes in various forms" and that Claridge's failures were those of "judgment and prudence," the Court allocated 10% of the award to Claridge and held Orman responsible for the other 90%. (Id.)

On January 6, 2020, Claridge moved for reconsideration of the fee award, or, alternatively, an extension of time. (Doc. 44.) The Court denied the request for reconsideration but extended the time for Claridge and Orman to object. (Doc. 45.)

All parties have now submitted their documentation. Before the Court are Respondents' itemized fee statements and supporting documentation (Doc. 42), Orman's objections and supporting documentation (Doc. 46), Claridge's objections and supporting documentation (Doc. 48), and Respondents' responses to both objections (Docs. 47, 50).

ANALYSIS

The Court has already determined that Respondents are entitled to sanctions. (Doc. 39.) Thus, the only issue at this stage is the reasonableness of Respondents' requested fees.

The Court sanctioned Orman and Claridge pursuant to its inherent authority "to award sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees against a party or counsel who acts in `bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.'" Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d. 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997)). Under that power, any fees imposed "must be compensatory rather than punitive in nature" and "go no further than to redress the wronged party for losses sustained; it may not impose an additional amount as punishment for the sanctioned party's misbehavior." Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S.Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017). Thus, "the court can shift only those attorney's fees incurred because of the misconduct at issue" and must "establish a causal link—between the litigant's misbehavior and legal fees paid by the opposing party." Id.

Here, the causal link is easy to establish. The bad-faith conduct at issue is the reckless, frivolous filing of the petition to confirm a sham arbitration award. (Doc. 1.) As the Court stated in its previous order, "Orman concocted a rambling document that she then had rubber-stamped by an arbitrator who merely restated the near-gibberish contained in Orman's `counter offer,'" and Claridge saw fit to file this legal nullity.1 (Doc. 39 at 10-11.) In other words, this litigation was pursued in bad faith from its inception. Accordingly, the Court concludes that all attorneys' fees incurred by Respondents in this matter were incurred because of the misconduct. Respondents would not have incurred these fees but for the filing of a completely baseless petition to confirm. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. at 1187 (causal connection in attorneys' fees cases is "appropriately framed as a but-for test"). See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 56-57 (1991) (stating that award of entire amount of fees incurred was appropriate when offending party's actions "were part of a sordid scheme of deliberate misuse of the judicial process"); Lu v. United States, 921 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2019) ("In an exceptional case such as Chambers, where fees associated with the entirety of an action. . . would not have been incurred but for the bad faith conduct of a litigant, the district court may shift all of a party's fees. . . in one fell swoop.") (internal quotations omitted).

With that in mind, the Court will consider all fees requested after this action was initiated on July 18, 2019. (Doc. 1.) All told, Cenlar seeks $17,056.50 and Citi seeks $20,998.71, for a total of $38,055.21. (Doc. 42-2 at 4; Doc. 42-2 at 10.) These fees encompass the research and writing of Respondents' papers.

I. Reasonableness Of Fees

To determine whether Respondents' fees are reasonable, the Court looks to whether the hourly rates are reasonable, and then whether the time spent on the matter is reasonable. Kaufman v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 2019 WL 2084460, *13 (D. Ariz. 2019). Reasonableness is typically determined through the "lodestar method." The lodestar is calculated by "multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate." Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008).

The first step in the process is to determine a reasonable rate. "The prevailing market rate in the community is indicative of a reasonable hourly rate. The fee applicant has the burden of producing satisfactory evidence, in addition to the affidavits of its counsel, that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and reputation." Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and footnote omitted). When, as here, a client has actually paid fees, "the best indicator of a reasonable hourly rate. . . is the rate charged by the lawyer to the client." Jackson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 13567069, *2 (D. Ariz. 2015).

Both Respondents in this case are represented by Ballard Spahr LLP, and for this matter, Cenlar was charged $665 per hour for the work of Andrew Petrie, $420 per hour for the work of Chase Bales, and $300 per hour for the work of Jillian Andrews. (Doc. 42-1 ¶¶ 7, 12, 15.) Citi had a pre-existing arrangement with Ballard Spahr and was billed at a lower rate—$519.75 per hour for Petrie, $237 for Bales, and $300 for Andrews. (Id.) Petrie is a partner at Ballard Spahr and has been in practice since 1981. (Id. ¶ 6.) Bales, an associate, has been practicing since 2013. (Id. ¶ 10.) Andrews has been practicing since 2019 and completed two judicial clerkships before joining the firm. (Id. ¶ 13.)

Whether these rates are reasonable is determined by reference to the forum in which the district court sits. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978. Other courts within this district have determined that a reasonable rate "for highly skilled, experienced, and regarded lawyers" involved in "complex, high-dollar commercial litigation" can range as high as $552 per hour. Kaufman, 2019 WL 2084460 at *13. See also Edwards v. Vemma Nutrition, 2019 WL 5684192, *13 (D. Ariz. 2019) (upholding $350 hourly rate for partners and noting it was a "below market rate[] for Phoenix attorneys of their caliber"); Excel Fortress Ltd. v. Wilhelm, 2019 WL 5294837, *4 (D. Ariz. 2019) (upholding $500 hourly rate for partner). Similarly, reasonable associate rates approved in this district have reached $280 per hour. Edwards, 2019 WL 5684192 at *13. In light of those decisions, the Court finds that some of the rates charged in this case exceed the reasonable rate of Phoenix attorneys. The rate Petrie and Bales charged Cenlar exceeds the norm for lawyers in the Phoenix community, so it will be adjusted down. Because the hourly rate charged to Citi for Petrie's work falls within the reasonable range for the Phoenix area, the Court will adjust the billing rate for Cenlar to the same rate—$519.75 per hour. Andrews's rate, though slightly above what other courts have found reasonable, is not so far removed from that range, and thus provides a useful benchmark in adjusting Bales's rate. Accordingly, Bales's rate charged to Cenlar will be adjusted to match Andrews's—$300 per hour.2

Claridge suggests the hourly rate for all work done on this matter should be set at his normal billing rate of $250 per hour. (Doc. 48 at 3.) It is unclear why Claridge thinks his billing rate should control another attorney's, but it seems based on his argument that Respondents' counsels' fees are above the average billing rate for the entire state of Arizona. (Id.) This is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, a statewide average does not inform whether the fees billed by a particular lawyer in a particular matter are reasonable. Kaufman, 2019 WL 2084460 at *12. In the same vein, when a client has actually paid for legal service, what the client paid is the best measure of a reasonable fee. Jackson 2015 WL 13567069 at *2. This is particularly true here, where Respondents were being sued for more than $10 million. It makes sense they would hire highly skilled, if expensive, attorneys in light of the amount in controversy.

Second, Claridge has provided no support for the contention that his fee is necessarily what other lawyers in Phoenix should charge. Claridge does not practice in Phoenix, nor has he indicated that he possesses the same level of experience in large corporate cases as Respondents' counsel. Without more, there is no reason to use Claridge's fee as the baseline in this case.

Turning to the hours expended, the Court has reviewed the itemized billing entries for both Cenlar and Citi (Doc. 42-2) and finds the activities and the time allotted are reasonable. Although Claridge objects to "duplicitous" entries (which the Court interprets as objecting to duplicative entries) (Doc. 48 at 3), Petrie's sworn affidavit makes clear that, when a service benefitted both Cenlar and Citi, the time spent was allocated 50/50 between the two clients (Doc. 42-1 ¶ 9). Thus, entries such as the September 25, 2019 entry for Petrie, which states "[r]eview Orman's motion to reconsider and affidavit in support" and which appears in both statements (entry 84 in Citi's, entry 23 in Cenlar's), do not represent the same.1 hours spent on the task charged to both clients, but instead represent a total of.2 hours spent on the task, distributed evenly between the two clients benefitting from the work. Such billing is not duplicative. The only subtraction the Court will make, by request of Respondents, is entry 26 on Citi's itemized statement. (Doc. 47 at 7 n.6.) Otherwise, the hours submitted by Respondents are reasonable expenditures of time.

Multiplying the hours worked by the reasonable hourly rate, and subtracting the entry discussed above, the reasonable fees sought by Cenlar total $12,981.03, and those sought by Citi total $20,983.71, for a total of $33,964.74. With that baseline in mind, the Court will turn to the remainder of Claridge's and Orman's objections.

II Objections

In addition to the objections addressed above, Orman and Claridge raise a variety of objections to specific fee entries, as well as to the entire fee amount. (Docs. 46, 48.)

A. Timeliness

Both Orman and Claridge argue that Respondents' fee requests are untimely. Both rely on the fact that the Court's initial order awarding fees directed Respondents to submit their itemized statements "within 14 days of this Order." (Doc. 39.) The order was signed on December 12, 2019 but was not entered on the docket until December 16, 2019. (Id.) Respondents submitted their itemized statements and supporting documentation on December 30, 2019. (Doc. 42.) In Orman's view, this renders the entire fee request untimely, because the order was signed on December 12. (Doc. 46 at 1-3.) She argues the 14-day period ran from the date the order was signed, making the due date December 26 and rendering Respondents' submission on December 30 untimely. (Id. at 2.)

Claridge doesn't argue the fee request was submitted four days late, but he does argue it was submitted five hours late. (Doc. 48 at 1.) Claridge stresses that the Court's order required Respondents to submit their request "within 14 days." (Id.) The Court's order was docketed at 10:23 am on December 16, and Respondents submitted their request on December 30 at 3:45 pm. (Id.) In Claridge's view, Respondents thus did not submit "within" 14 days, so their entire request should be rejected. (Id.)

Both objections are without merit. A judgment is considered entered when it is added to the civil docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c). See also Cannella v. Lentz, 396 F.Supp.2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Thus, the Court's order became effective on the date it was entered, rather than the date it was signed. The order was entered on December 16, 2019. (Doc. 39.) The time for Respondents to submit their fee request started at that point. Fourteen days from December 16 was December 30, not December 26.

Claridge's objection fails for similar reasons. When computing times for court-ordered deadlines, periods stated in days "include the last day of the period." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). The "last day" ends "for electronic filing, at midnight in the court's time zone." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(4)(A). Claridge does not dispute that December 30 was the last day. (Doc. 48 at 1.) Nor does he dispute that Respondents submitted their documentation before midnight on December 30. (Id.) By Claridge's own admission, then, Respondents' submission was timely.

B. Failure To Conduct Good Faith Settlement Conference

Local Rule 54.2(d)(1) requires that requests for attorneys' fees be accompanied by "a separate statement of the moving counsel. . . certifying that, after personal consultation and good faith efforts to do so, the parties have been unable to satisfactorily resolve all disputed issues relating to attorneys' fees." Respondents provided such a statement (Doc. 42 at 2-3), but Orman contends the settlement attempt was conducted in bad faith (Doc. 46 at 3-4). Specifically, she claims that Respondents did not attempt to contact her before the deadline to submit their fee request. (Id.) This argument, however, is premised on Orman's erroneous belief that Respondents' filing deadline was December 26, rather than December 30. Orman does not argue the settlement attempt was otherwise invalid.

C. Noncompliance With LRCiv. 54.2(e)

Orman next argues that, by submitting individual fee statements for Cenlar and Citi rather than combining them, Respondents failed to list their services chronologically as required by LRCiv. 54.2(e)(1). (Doc. 46 at 4-5.) Orman further argues that certain entries in the fee statements do not comply with LRCiv. 54.2(e)(1)(B) because those entries list multiple tasks, rather than the individual tasks required by the rule. (Id.) Both arguments are unavailing.

Orman's argument that Respondents should have submitted a single, joint fee statement is premised solely on this Court's December 16 order, which stated "Respondents shall submit an electronic Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. . . ." (Doc. 39 at 13.) In Orman's view, this was an "explicit" command that Respondents submit only one fee statement. The Court doubts that submitting individual fee statements for individual clients is erroneous, but even if it were, such a technical error does not warrant denial of attorneys' fees. Cf. Wilkin v. Time Warner Cable Co., 10 F.Supp.3d 299, 319 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that a "technical error" does not prejudice an opposing party when seeking attorneys' fees if the sanctioned party is otherwise provided adequate notice of the fees sought). See also Matthiesen v. Matthiesen, 2017 WL 10776715, *2 (S.D. Fla. 2017) ("The [court]. . . is hesitant to substantively deny an award of attorneys' fees because of such purely technical errors.").

In addition to her broad objection, Orman objects to some specific fee entries, such as row three of Cenlar's fee statement. (Doc. 46 at 5.) That entry, dated August 26, 2019, lists multiple activities. (Doc. 42-2 at 2 [second entry from the top].). In Orman's view, this violates LRCiv. 54.2(e)(1)(B), which requires a different entry for "each individual unrelated task performed on" a day. Review of the challenged entries reveals that, although those entries do contain multiple tasks and the time devoted to those tasks, tasks within an entry are all interrelated. Not only do such entries not run afoul of 54.2(e)(1)(B), they closely align with the examples of permissible entries provided by the local rules. See, e.g., LRCiv. 54.2(e)(2)(B) & (C).

D. No Fee Agreement For Citi

Orman argues that Citi's fee request should be categorically denied because Respondents failed to attach the fee agreement between Ballard Spahr and Citi. (Doc. 46 at 5-6.) Respondents only attached a letter from Citi to Ballard Spahr retaining Ballard Spahr's services for an action related to Orman's property in Pennsylvania. (Id. See also Doc. 42-3 at 6 [engagement letter]; Doc. 39 at 1-2 [detailing the factual history of this case, which deals in part with the Pennsylvania property]; Orman v. Citimortgage, 2016 WL 1592948 (E.D. Pa. 2016) [detailing the history of Orman's litigation against Citi].). Orman argues that, because the letter provides no "recitation of fee to be charged for services," it is inadequate under LRCiv. 54.2(d)(2). (Doc. 46 at 6.)

Local Rule 54.2(d)(2) requires a party seeking fees to submit "[a] complete copy of any written agreement, or a full recitation of any oral fee agreement" but further provides that "[i]f no fee agreement exists, then counsel must attach a statement to that effect." Here, Respondents acknowledged in their memorandum that the engagement letter between Ballard Spahr and Citi didn't specify the hourly rate Citi would be charged (Doc. 42 at 3 n.1), and Respondents' counsel then verified in his affidavit the actual rate that Citi was charged (Doc. 42-1 ¶¶ 7, 12, 15). This approach was permissible under Local Rule 54.2(d)(2). Moreover, even if Respondents should have provided a different document verifying the fee arrangement between Ballard Spahr and Citi, Orman and Claridge suffered no harm—they had all the information they needed to respond to the fee request on the merits, and the Citi rate was substantially lower than the Cenlar rate. Gary v. Carbon Cycle Ariz. LLC, 398 F.Supp.3d 468, 484 (D. Ariz. 2019) (excusing fee-seeking party's failure to attach fee agreement because counsel had otherwise averred to his fee agreement).

E. Petrie's Involvement

Orman and Claridge object to Petrie's involvement in this case. Orman contends that, before Petrie was admitted pro hac vice to practice in the District of Arizona (he is based in Colorado), his involvement in this case constituted unauthorized practice of law. (Doc. 46 at 6-7.) Additionally, Claridge argues that Petrie's involvement in this case was unnecessary. (Doc. 48 at 3-4.) Claridge views Petrie's involvement as "correlation between attorneys that did not need to be engaged." (Id.) No specific remedy is offered for this supposed unnecessary correlation, but it constitutes part of Claridge's argument that the fee request should be dismissed outright. (Id. at 4.)

1. Unauthorized Practice Of Law

Any lawyer practicing in Arizona is subject to the Arizona Supreme Court's regulatory authority. Ariz. S. Ct. R. 31(a). Generally, the Arizona Supreme Court prohibits anyone who is not a member of the Arizona bar from practicing within Arizona. Ariz. S. Ct. R. 31(b). An exemption to that prohibition, however, is that lawyers licensed in a jurisdiction other than Arizona are allowed to "engage in conduct that is permitted under ER 5.5 of the rules of professional conduct." Ariz. S. Ct. R. 31(d)(27). E.R. 5.5(c)(1), in turn, provides that an attorney licensed in another jurisdiction "may provide legal services on a temporary basis in Arizona that involve Arizona law" if those services "are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in Arizona and who actively participates in the matter." Id.

This rule forecloses Orman's objection. The record shows that Petrie was Citi's initial point of contact. (Doc. 42-3 at 6.) After Petrie performed the intake and initial review of the matter on July 29, 2019, Bales quickly became involved. (Doc. 42-2 at 5.) Bales, a member of the Arizona bar in good standing, then became the attorney of record. (Doc. 11.) Petrie continued to work in association with Bales up until he was admitted pro hac vice on September 10, 2019. Bales actively participated in the case throughout—as Claridge points out, Bales was the only attorney with whom he had contact for most of this litigation. (Doc. 48 at 3.) In other words, Petrie's services were "undertaken in association with a lawyer admitted to practice in Arizona and [who] actively participate[d] in the matter." Ariz. E.R. 5.5(c)(1). Such services do not constitute unauthorized practice of law.

2. Petrie's Association

Claridge's argument that Petrie "did not need to be engaged" lacks merit. "Multiple attorneys may, within reason, collaborate on important drafts and/or bill time for work on the same filing." Edwards, 2019 WL 5684192 at *14. Especially in the context of a large firm, it is customary that a partner will engage an associate to assist on a new legal matter.

Moreover, Claridge seems to get the argument backward, because Petrie involved Bales, not the other way around. Petrie, by assigning the brunt of the work to Bales, actually reduced his clients' costs compared to if Petrie had done the work himself. Such an approach is usually requested by those ordered to pay fees. See id. (denying sanctioned party's contention that more work should have been assigned to lower-billing associates); Kaufman, 2019 WL 2084460 at *13 (same). Thus, the association of multiple attorneys worked to Claridge's benefit.

F. Fees Incurred In Preparing Fee Request

Orman argues that Respondents are not entitled to the fees incurred in preparing their fee request, known as fees-on-fees. (Doc. 46 at 9.) Citing LRCiv. 54.2(c)(2), Orman claims that Respondents' failure to cite legal authority entitling them to fees-on-fees precludes them from recovering such fees. (Id.)

Orman is correct that LRCiv. 54.2(c)(2) requires a party seeking fees to provide legal authority to recover fees-on-fees. Respondents cited no such authority in their initial request for fees. (Doc. 13 at 10; Doc. 15 at 13.) Additionally, the Court's order concluding that Respondents were entitled to sanctions made no specific mention of whether the sanction award would include fees incurred in preparing Respondents' supporting materials. (Doc. 39 at 9-14.) That, admittedly, made it unclear whether Respondents needed to provide authority for seeking fees-on-fees in their initial memorandum (which they failed to do). (Doc. 42.) However, after Orman raised an objection under Local Rule 54.2(c)(2) in her response, Respondents included in their reply a citation to Camacho, which provides that "it would be inconsistent to dilute a fees award by refusing to compensate attorneys for the time they reasonably spent in establishing their rightful claim to the fee." 523 F.3d at 981.

The problem with Respondents' approach is Camacho also contains the following passage: "In statutory fee cases, federal courts, including our own, have uniformly held that time spent in establishing the entitlement to and amount of the fee is compensable." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 659-660 (9th Cir. 1985)). The fee award in Camacho, including fees-on-fees, arose under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Id. at 978. Here, fees were awarded pursuant to the Court's inherent authority. (Doc. 39 at 10, 12.) The purpose of each is different—statutory fee provisions exist to "encourage private enforcement of the law," Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978, while sanctions imposed pursuant to the Court's inherent authority are meant to dissuade parties from acting "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons," Leon 464 F.3d at 961 (quoting Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc., 115 F.3d at 648). Given these separate justifications, it would be improper to import Respondents' cited authority to justify fees-on-fees under the Court's inherent authority. Aviva USA Corp. v. Vazirani, 2012 WL 2503962, *2 (D. Ariz. 2012) ("Although Aviva does cite to authority for awarding [fees-on-fees] under other fee-shifting rules, they have failed to do so for sanctions under the Court's inherent power.").

Accordingly, the Court will strike the fee entries associated with the preparation of Respondents' supporting documentation. To that end, the Court will strike all entries for both Citi and Cenlar that occurred after December 12, 2019, except for the December 17 entry (which reflects Andrews's time preparing and filing a notice of substitution of counsel). (Doc. 42-2 at 4, 9-10.) This amounts to a reduction of $2,192.65 in Cenlar's request, and a reduction of $2,021.54 in Citi's request.3

G. Research And Clerical Work

Orman's final objection is that she "should not be responsible for paying for `on the job' training of attorneys and paralegals who don't know procedures for filing a Motion to Dismiss for example, or statutes of the subject matter they are working on, or for clerical or secretarial work." (Doc. 46 at 10.) The spreadsheet Orman submitted along with her objections applies this argument to entries with tasks such as "research" and "review."

This objection likely stems from unfamiliarity with the work of lawyers. These entries are not indicative of "on the job training"—instead, they reflect attorneys taking proper care in learning the relevant law and following the appropriate procedures. Not only is such research proper, it is expressly contemplated by the local rules. See, e.g., LRCiv. 54.2(e)(B). No lawyer knows and can recall every aspect of law or procedure involved in a given case. These entries reflect a proper use of time.

CONCLUSION

After adjusting Cenlar's fee request to bring the hourly rate in line with the reasonable rate for Phoenix, and striking the entries associated with the preparation of the fee statement, the total, reasonable fees requested by Cenlar are $10,788.38. After striking the fees-on-fees related entries in Citi's fee request, Citi's total reasonable fees requested is $18,962.17. Pursuant to the Court's order awarding fees, Claridge is responsible for 10% of these fees and Orman is responsible for the other 90%. (Doc. 39 at 13.)

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Claridge shall pay $1,078.84 to Cenlar;

(2) Claridge shall pay $1,896.22 to Citi;

(3) Orman shall pay $9,709.54 to Cenlar;

(4) Orman shall pay $17,065.95 to Citi; and

(5) Claridge and Orman shall satisfy these obligations within 60 days from the date of this Order.