ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [17]

OTIS D. WRIGHT, II, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 25, 2016, Plaintiff Gokhan Kaya filed a Petition for Review of the Denial of his Application for Naturalization. (ECF No. 1.) Kaya sought the district court's review after the California District Office of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") denied his application for naturalization. (See id.) On February 13, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.1 (ECF No. 17.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion and dismisses the case.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Kaya is a citizen of Turkey. (Petition ¶ 4.) On June 30, 2010, he married a United States citizen, and he became a conditional resident of the United States on March 7, 2011. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 10.) He then received lawful permanent resident status on April 28, 2013. (Id. at ¶ 16.) The next year, in September 2014, Kaya separated from his wife and moved out of their shared apartment, and in October 2015, his wife filed for divorce. (Id. at ¶ 17.) The dissolution of the marriage became final on January 13, 2017. (See Mot. 4-5; Opp'n 2.)2

Kaya submitted a Form N-400, Application for Naturalization on May 27, 2014, a few months before he and his wife began experiencing marital difficulties. (See Petition ¶ 17.) His application cited 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) as the basis for his eligibility for naturalization. (See id.; Ex. 7, ECF No. 1-7.) Section 1430(a) provides an avenue for expedited naturalization for applicants whose spouse is a citizen of the United States: applicants in such a position can be naturalized after three years of lawful permanent residence. Without a basis for expedited naturalization such as 1430(a), the default residency requirement prior to naturalization is five years of lawful permanent resident status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

An applicant for naturalization bears the burden of showing eligibility for citizenship. Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 630, 636-637 (1967). "[D]oubts [about eligibility] should be resolved in favor of the United States and against the claimant." U.S. v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626 (1931).

On a motion to dismiss, a court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual "allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe all "factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most favorable" to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). But a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

Generally, a court should freely give leave to amend a complaint that has been dismissed, even if not requested by the party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, a court may deny leave to amend when it "determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

Kaya's Petition asks for naturalization on two bases: either § 1430(a), given that he was married to a United States citizen at the time of submitting his application for naturalization, or § 1427, because he now satisfies the five-year residency requirement as a lawful permanent resident. (See generally Petition.) Defendants argue that the allegations Kaya pleads in his Petition do not give rise to a claim for naturalization under either statute. (See Mot.) The Court agrees with Defendants: even after viewing all of the facts in the light most favorable to Kaya, his claim is not viable and cannot survive Defendants' motion to dismiss.

A. Section 1430(a)

Section 1430(a) provides for naturalization where the applicant meets all other citizenship requirements other than the five-year residency requirement under § 1427, and (1) is married to a citizen of the United States, (2) has been a permanent lawful resident for at least three years, and (3) has been living in marital union with the citizen spouse for the three years immediately preceding the date of application. The first requirement—that the applicant be married to a United States citizen, not formerly married—precludes Kaya from naturalization under this statute. Kaya is divorced from his citizen spouse, and as numerous cases have held, an applicant must remain married up until completion of the naturalization process to be eligible under § 1430(a). See, e.g., Alenazi v. USCIS, No. 09-cv-2053, 2010 WL 3988744, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010); Ali v. Smith, 39 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 1999). Therefore, since Kaya admits that he is now divorced, his Petition fails to state a claim under § 1430(a) on which relief can be granted.

B. Section 1427

Section 1427 allows naturalization where a lawful permanent resident has been a resident of the United States for at least five years. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). Kaya argues that because he has now been a lawful resident for more than five years, he is eligible for naturalization under § 1427. Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that this Court has no power to naturalize under that statute because Kaya was not eligible at the time he filed his N-400. (Mot. 9-10.) Again, Defendants are correct. The Code of Federal Regulations establishes that in applying for any benefit (such as naturalization), an applicant or petitioner "must establish that he or she is eligible for the requested benefit at the time of filing the benefit request and must continue to be eligible through adjudication." 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1) (emphasis added). Based on the facts Kaya pleads in his Petition, he became conditional resident on March 7, 2011, and a lawful permanent resident on April 28, 2013. (Petition ¶ 16.) He applied for naturalization on May 27, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 17.) The difference between the date he became a conditional resident and when he applied for naturalization is just over three years—sufficient for naturalization under § 1430(a), which Kaya is no longer eligible for, but almost two years short of the minimum residency under § 1427. Therefore, Defendants are correct that Kaya cannot be granted naturalization under § 1427. Kaya must submit a new application to USCIS, which has the sole power to adjudicate the application in the first instance.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED. (ECF No. 17.) Because the Court finds that no additional facts consistent with Kaya's Petition could cure its failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the dismissal is without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court shall close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.