ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION Re: Dkt. No. 581, 582, 583

RONALD M. WHYTE, District Judge.

Before the court are three motions for leave to file motions for reconsideration filed by pro se plaintiffs Roda and Adil Hiramanek:

Having reviewed the motions and the relevant standards for reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9 and School Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993), the court DENIES plaintiffs' motions.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 29, 2016, this court denied plaintiffs' unauthorized 50-page motion for reconsideration of the court's February 19, 2016 summary judgment order. Dkt. No. 571 (denying the motion at Dkt. No. 559, among other motions). The court noted "plaintiffs' continued failure to comply with local rules regarding page limits." Id. at 2. The court also cited Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 345 (9th Cir.1996) for the proposition that "the incorporation of substantive material by reference is not sanctioned by the federal rules" as a mechanism for circumventing page limits. Id. at 3. Given plaintiffs' repeated failure to comply with the local rules and orders of this court, the court could have denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration with prejudice and refused to consider its merits.

Instead, on April 1, 2016, this court responded to plaintiffs' request for clarification by stating:

Dkt. No. 575 at 2. Plaintiffs filed the instant motions on April 12, 2016. Dkt. Nos. 581-583.

II. DEFICIENCIES AFFECTING ALL THREE MOTIONS

Once again, plaintiffs have failed to comply with this court's orders regarding page limits. All three of the motions presently before the court violate this court's March 29, 2016 and April 1, 2016 orders on page limits by attempting to incorporate material from other papers by reference. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 581 at 4 (containing 10 separate citations on a single page to Dkt. No. 559—the 50-page reconsideration motion that this court denied—or its attachments); Dkt. No. 582 at 5 (containing 18 citations on a single page to Dkt. No. 559 or its attachments); Dkt. No. 583 at 1 (containing 2 citations on a single page to Dkt. No. 559). As other courts have noted, "it is typically the shorter briefs that are the most helpful, perhaps because the discipline of compression forces the parties to explain clearly and succinctly what has happened, the precise legal issue, and just why they believe the law supports them." Elec. Frontier Found. v. C.I.A., No. C 09-03351 SBA, 2012 WL 1123529, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012) (quoting In re M.S.V., Inc., 892 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1989)). "Overly long briefs, however, may actually hurt a party's case, making it far more likely that meritorious arguments will be lost amid the mass of detail." Fleming v. County of Kane, State of Ill., 855 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs would do well to heed these warnings. Because plaintiffs have again failed to comply with applicable page limits, the court need not consider the merits of plaintiffs' arguments.

Moreover, plaintiffs' motions fail to comply with Civil Local Rule 7-9(b), which states, in relevant part:

Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). It does not appear that plaintiffs have attempted to identify newly discovered evidence or legal authority and then explain why such evidence or legal authority could not have been presented earlier. Plaintiffs assert—often with little or no analysis—that the court's summary judgment orders err in various ways. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 581 at 4 ("Order, 17:19-22 errs that wheelchair would suffice."). However, plaintiffs do not explain why these alleged errors constitute a manifest failure by the court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments that were previously presented to the court. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-9(b), the court finds that plaintiffs have not provided sufficient justification for leave to file motions for reconsideration.1

While the court need not reach the merits of plaintiffs' motions for the reasons listed above, the court finds it appropriate to clarify certain points regarding its summary judgment orders.

III. FEBRUARY 19, 2016 SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER (DKT. NO. 546)

A. Waiver

This court's February 19, 2016 summary judgment order noted that while the operative complaint describes twelve denials of requests for various accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), plaintiffs clarified in their summary judgment papers and at the summary judgment hearing that they are only pursuing claims for two types of denials: requests for telephonic appearances and electronic filing. Dkt. No. 546 at 3. In their motions for leave, plaintiffs assert that their ADA requests were not limited to requests for telephonic appearances and electronic filing but also included requests such as language translation. See Dkt. No. 581 at 1; Dkt. No. 582 at 1. Plaintiffs assert that they did not waive the right to seek relief for the denial of other types of accommodations.

Plaintiffs' arguments are unpersuasive. While the court's summary judgment order noted that plaintiffs' own briefing limited the scope of their ADA claims to requests for telephonic accommodations and electronic filing, see Dkt. No. 436 at 16-17, the court did not have to rely on waiver to determine that summary judgment was appropriate. The Superior Court moved for summary judgment on all of the claims in Count II-A of plaintiffs' complaint. Dkt. No. 435 at 18. Plaintiffs had the burden to support their ADA claims with evidence and argument. With one exception, the only claims they chose to pursue in their opposition papers related to telephonic appearances and electronic filing.2 See Dkt. No. 450. The court found that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof, and plaintiffs have provided no reason for the court to depart from that ruling.

B. Grounds for Summary Judgment

Mr. Hiramanek asserts that this court erred by granting summary judgment in part on the basis that the Superior Court provided reasonable accommodations to plaintiffs for their requests. Plaintiff asserts that defendant did not raise this argument until the Superior Court filed its opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 581 at 1; Dkt. No. 546 at 7; Dkt. No. 448 at 8-9. Plaintiff's argument for reconsideration is unpersuasive. This court's summary judgment order applied the legal standard articulated in Memmer v. Marin Cty. Courts, 169 F.3d 630, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1999) and Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that it is plaintiff's initial burden to "show that the accommodations offered by the [defendant] were not reasonable"). Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment—filed the same day as the Superior Court's motion for summary judgment—cited Duvall seven times, sometimes more than once on a page. See Dkt. No. 436 at 7, 14-16. Thus, plaintiffs have no basis to suggest that they lacked notice of their burden to show that the accommodations offered by the Superior Court were unreasonable.

The Ninth Circuit has held that "[e]ven when there has been no cross-motion for summary judgment, a district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte against a moving party if the losing party has had a `full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues involved in the matter.'" Gospel Missions of America v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1982)). In the instant case, plaintiffs had even more notice than that afforded to the Gospel Missions plaintiff. Plaintiffs were on notice of their burden of proof, as described in Duvall, when they filed their motion for summary judgment, and, to the extent that they disagreed with the Superior Court's arguments, they had the opportunity to respond in their reply brief and at the summary judgment hearing.

Even if this court were to find that plaintiffs were entitled to an additional opportunity to be heard before the court granted summary judgment, plaintiffs have failed to show how an additional hearing would have resulted in a different outcome. Plaintiffs' reconsideration motions fail to distinguish Duvall and Memmer from the instant case or present any contrary controlling authority. Accordingly, plaintiffs have presented no reason for this court to allow for additional briefing.

IV. MARCH 29, 2016 SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER (DKT. NO. 570)

Plaintiffs claim that newly discovered evidence suggests that, contrary to this court's finding, Ms. Hiramanek did request a telephonic appearance as an ADA accommodation for the July 2, 2013 hearing discussed in this court's March 29, 2016 summary judgment order. See Dkt. No. 583 at 2; Dkt. No. 570 at 3. In support of their argument, plaintiffs rely on an unauthenticated ADA request form that Mr. Hiramanek claims he discovered in mid-December 2015. See Dkt. No. 576 at 2.

Plaintiffs have not presented a sufficient basis for this court to reconsider its prior ruling. Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(2) requires a party seeking reconsideration to show that "in the exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order." Plaintiffs have not explained why they could not have located and submitted the ADA request form in question before their supplemental summary judgment brief was due on February 24, 2016. The court also notes that plaintiffs objected to summary judgment evidence that the Superior Court offered on the grounds that the Superior Court did not submit that evidence during discovery. See Dkt. No. 558. Even if the court were to consider the ADA request form, it would not change the court's ruling because, among other things, Ms. Hiramanek has submitted no evidence that she provided notice that she planned to contest the Superior Court's tentative ruling by 4:00 pm the day before the hearing as required by California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

V. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs' motions for leave to file motions for reconsideration are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.