CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the "Motion for Stay Pending Outcome of Receiver and Investor Lawsuits and Grand Jury Investigation," filed by defendants Troy B. Wragg and Amanda E. Knorr ("Defendants") on April 9, 2012. (Doc. # 270.) The motion, now ripe for review,
Defendants are former principals of defendant Mantria Corporation and its related companies. After years of litigation — in this case stretching back to the filing of the Complaint (Doc. # 1) on November 16, 2009 — the SEC has moved for entry of final judgment against Defendants and others, arguing that the Court (1) should order Defendants to disgorge, jointly and severally with Mantria Corporation, $37,031,035.36 plus interest and (2) should assess an additional amount in civil monetary penalties. (See Doc. # 256.) The SEC's motion triggered the request for relief raised by Defendants in the instant motion. (See Doc. # 270 at 1.)
Defendants assert that the Court should stay the proceedings in this case for, essentially, two different but related reasons. First, they maintain that until two currently pending civil lawsuits
Under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) & (5), the SEC is entitled to seek disgorgement and civil penalties. Disgorgement is "an equitable remedy meant to prevent the wrongdoer from enriching himself by his wrongs. Disgorgement does not aim to compensate the victims of the wrongful acts, as restitution does." S.E.C. v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993). Similarly, civil penalties "are not `damages' payable to the victim, but fines or assessments payable to the government." Ellett Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 275 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Court agrees with the SEC that "[a]ny relief obtained by the Receiver or investors" in the Receiver and Investor Lawsuits, respectively, "is irrelevant" to determining the amount of disgorgement and civil penalties appropriate in this case. (Doc. # 271 at 2.)
Further, "no action for equitable relief instituted by the Commission pursuant to the securities laws shall be consolidated or coordinated with other actions not brought by the Commission, even though such other actions may involve common questions of fact, unless such consolidation is consented to by the Commission." 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this language as precluding a parallel private action from staying an SEC action. See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 n.24 (1979) ("[T]he petitioners were not in a position to expedite the private action and stay the SEC action. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for prompt enforcement actions by the SEC unhindered by parallel private actions. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g)."). Thus, and in accordance with Parklane Hosiery, this action will remain "unhindered" by the Receiver and Investor Lawsuits.
When a witness in a civil trial is under investigation or indictment in a parallel criminal case, he is confronted with the "dilemma of choosing to testify or invoking his privilege against self-incrimination." S.E.C. v. Power Sec. Corp., 142 F.R.D. 321, 322-23 (D. Colo. 1992). A court may, in such a situation, "decide in its discretion to stay civil proceedings, postpone civil discovery, or impose protective orders and conditions when the interests of justice seem to require such action." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition to considering the extent to which the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights are implicated, courts often consider:
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1989). Defendants have no constitutional right to a stay, id., and they bear the burden of showing that "there is a pressing need for a delay and that the other party will not suffer harm from the entry of a stay order," Dawn v. Mecom, 520 F.Supp. 1194, 1197 (D. Colo. 1981).
Despite bearing this burden, Defendants do not address the relevant factors cited above. Instead, they merely cite to cases supporting the proposition that courts may defer civil proceedings until parallel criminal prosecutions are completed. (See Doc. # 270 at 3.) However, Defendants do not assert, and the Court has no reason to believe, that a criminal
Further, the burden on Defendants' Fifth Amendment rights is limited because they have already asserted their Fifth Amendment privileges when deposed (Doc. ## 159-24 (deposition of Troy B. Wragg); 159-25 (deposition of Amanda E. Knorr)) but did not at that time, or any other time, move to stay the proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n, 811 F.Supp. 802, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[I]t is disingenuous for [defendant] to now argue that he will be prejudiced by exercising the [Fifth Amendment] privilege which he has repeatedly invoked in the past.").
Moreover, consideration of the five factors cited above militates against granting a stay:
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that Defendants' "Motion for Stay Pending Outcome of Receiver and Investor Lawsuits and Grand Jury Investigation" (Doc. # 270) be DENIED.