PAUL M. WARNER, Chief Magistrate Judge.
All parties in this case have consented to Chief United States Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner conducting all proceedings, including entry of final judgment, with appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
On June 18, 2008, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, alleging disability beginning on December 31, 2007.
Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"),
The ALJ recognized that, as of March 1, 2013, Plaintiff had certain severe impairments.
On May 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed her complaint in this case.
The court "review[s] the Commissioner's decision to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied." Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations and citation omitted). The Commissioner's findings, "if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (quotations and citation omitted). "In reviewing the ALJ's decision, [this court may] neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ]." Madrid v. Barnhart, 447 F.3d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations and citation omitted). "The failure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been followed [are] grounds for reversal." Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citation omitted).
In order to determine whether to terminate or continue benefits, the Commissioner must determine "if there has been any medical improvement in [a claimant's] impairment(s) and, if so, whether this medical improvement is related to [the claimant's] ability to work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(a). Disability benefits may be terminated based on medical improvement only if there is substantial evidence demonstrating that "there has been any medical improvement in the individual's impairment or combination of impairments (other than medical improvement which is not related to the individual's ability to work), and . . . the individual is now able to engage in substantial gainful activity." 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)(1)(A)-(B). Medical improvement is defined as:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1). The Commissioner bears the burden of establishing a claimant's medical condition has improved. See Hayden v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 986, 988 (10th Cir. 2004).
"An eight-part sequential evaluation process is used in termination reviews." Knapp v. Barnhart, 68 F. App'x 951, 952 (10th Cir. 2003); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(1)-(8). The first step asks whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(1). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, she is no longer considered disabled. See id. If, however, the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner proceeds to the next step.
At step two, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal a section of Appendix 1 of the relevant regulations (individually, a "listing" and collectively, the "listings"). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If the claimant's impairments meet or equal a listing, she will continue to be found disabled. See id. If, on the other hand, the claimant's impairments do not meet or equal a listing, the Commissioner moves to the next step.
The third step requires the Commissioner to determine whether there has been medical improvement, as defined above, in the claimant's conditions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(3). If there has been medical improvement in the claimant's conditions, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. See id. If there has not been medical improvement in the claimant's conditions, the Commissioner proceeds to step five. See id.
At step four, the Commissioner considers whether the demonstrated medical improvement is related to the claimant's ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(4). The consideration at this step is whether there has been an increase in the claimant's RFC based on the impairments that were present at the time of the claimant's most recent favorable medical determination. See id. If the medical improvement is related to the claimant's ability to work, the Commissioner proceeds to step six. See id. If it is not, then the Commissioner proceeds to step five. See id.
At step five, which is reached only if the Commissioner determines that there has been no medical improvement or that the medical improvement is not related to the claimant's ability to work, the Commissioner considers whether any of the exceptions to medical improvement contained in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(d) or (e) apply. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(5). If none of them applies, the Commissioner will determine that the claimant is still disabled. See id. If any of the first group of exceptions applies, the Commissioner proceeds to step six. See id. If any of the second group of exceptions applies, the claimant the Commissioner will determine that the claimant is no longer disabled. See id.
At step six, which is reached only if the Commissioner determines that there has been medical improvement related to the claimant's ability to work or if one of the first group of exceptions to medical improvement applies, the Commissioner considers whether all of the claimant's impairments are severe. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(6). If all of the claimant's impairments are deemed to be severe, the Commissioner proceeds to step seven. See id. If not, the Commissioner will determine that the claimant is no longer disabled. See id.
The seventh step requires the Commissioner to consider whether the claimant can engage in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(7). The Commissioner first determines whether the claimant has the RFC to engage in work he or she has done in the past. See id. If the claimant can perform such work, the Commissioner will determine that the claimant is no longer disabled. See id. If not, the Commissioner proceeds to step eight. See id
At step eight, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant has the RFC to do other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(8). If the claimant can perform other work, the Commissioner will determine that the claimant is no longer disabled. See id. If not, the Commissioner will determine that the claimant is still disabled. See id.
Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner's final decision in this case should be reversed because the ALJ erred (1) by determining that Plaintiff experienced medical improvement and (2) in the assessment of Plaintiff's RFC. The court will address those arguments in turn.
As noted above, in order to determine whether terminate or continue benefits, the Commissioner must determine "if there has been any medical improvement in [a claimant's] impairment(s) and, if so, whether this medical improvement is related to [the claimant's] ability to work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(a). Medical improvement is defined as
20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1). In considering whether medical improvement has occurred, the ALJ must compare prior and current medical evidence and show that there have been improvements in symptoms, signs, or laboratory findings associated with the claimant's impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(c)(1). The relevant point of comparison of prior medical evidence is the most recent favorable decision or "the latest [final] decision involving a consideration of medical evidence and the issue of whether [the claimant was] disabled or continue[s] to be disabled." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(7).
In support of her argument that the ALJ erred by determining that Plaintiff experienced medical improvement, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ failed to (A) properly weigh certain medical opinion evidence; and (B) make a comparison of the severity of Plaintiff's impairments at the time of the most recent favorable decision with the current severity of Plaintiff's impairments. The court will address those arguments in turn.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in his treatment of medical opinions from three sources. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in (1) his treatment of two of Plaintiff's treating sources, Jane Johnson ("Ms. Johnson") and Dr. Tim Kockler ("Dr. Kockler"), as well as in (2) his treatment of the opinions of a non-examining source, Dr. Susan MacNamara ("Dr. MacNamara").
Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted) (sixth alteration in original); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
An ALJ is not required to discuss every factor set forth in the relevant regulations. See Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1257 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that when an ALJ does not discuss every factor, it "does not prevent this court from according his decision meaningful review"). As with other evidentiary matters, when an ALJ is considering medical opinion evidence, it is the ALJ's role to weigh and resolve evidentiary conflicts and inconsistencies See, e.g., Rutledge v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 2000); Eggleston v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 1988).
With respect to Ms. Johnson's opinions, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's decision demonstrates that he was "picking and choosing" the portions of Ms. Johnson's opinions he needed to support his decision.
Concerning the opinions of Dr. Kockler, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to specifically indicate the weight he was giving to those opinions. While it is true that the ALJ did not use the specific word "weight" when discussing Dr. Kockler's opinion, the ALJ stated that Dr. Kockler's findings were "substantially aligned" with other record evidence.
As a final matter on the opinions of Ms. Johnson and Dr. Kockler, the court notes that many of Plaintiff's arguments concerning those opinions are directed at the weight of the evidence before the ALJ. Such arguments are futile on appeal. It is not this court's role to reweigh the evidence before the ALJ. See Madrid, 447 F.3d at 790. Indeed, it is the ALJ's role to weigh and resolve evidentiary conflicts and inconsistencies. See Rutledge, 230 F.3d at 1174; Eggleston, 851 F.2d at 1247. From an evidentiary standpoint, the only issue relevant to the court is whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the ALJ's conclusions. See Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1257 (providing that the court reviewing the ALJ's decision reviews "only the sufficiency of the evidence, not its weight" (emphasis omitted)).
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ did not err in his treatment of the medical opinions of Ms. Johnson or Dr. Kockler. Accordingly, the court has determined that Plaintiff's arguments with respect to the ALJ's treatment of those opinions are without merit.
Plaintiff next argues that the opinions of a non-examining source, Dr. MacNamara, were not based on a review of the entire record and that, therefore, the ALJ erred by giving them great weight. More specifically, Plaintiff contends that Dr. MacNamara's opinion did not consider additional medical records that were added to Plaintiff's file after Dr. MacNamara's review of the record. However, as noted by the Commissioner, Plaintiff does not point to any significant medical records dated after Dr. MacNamara's opinions that would have changed those opinions. Although Plaintiff relies upon Ms. Johnson's opinions and treatment notes, those undermine Plaintiff's argument, as they generally indicate that Plaintiff was able to work. Accordingly, the court has determined that the ALJ did not commit any error in his treatment of Dr. MacNamara's opinions, even though those opinions were not based on a review of the entire case record. See Tarpley v. Colvin, 601 F. App'x 641, 644 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the claimant's argument that the ALJ gave too much weight to the nontreating agency physician's opinion, who did not review later treating physician opinions, because "nothing in the later medical records [the claimant] cites supports the disabling limitations found by [the later opinions] or a material change in [the claimant's] condition that would render [the nontreating agency physician's] opinion stale").
The court concludes that the ALJ did not err in his treatment of the medical opinions of Dr. MacNamara; therefore, Plaintiff's argument with respect to the ALJ's treatment of that opinion fails.
In further support of her argument concerning medical improvement, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to make a comparison of the severity of Plaintiff's impairments at the time of the most recent favorable decision with the current severity of Plaintiff's impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(7). That contention is without merit. The court concludes that Plaintiff has engaged in a hyper-technical reading of the ALJ's decision. In his decision, the ALJ began his detailed analysis by recounting Plaintiff's past medical history, as well as the physical and mental examinations she underwent, beginning in 2007 and working forward chronologically. The ALJ then properly considered the medical opinion evidence, the majority of which demonstrated that Plaintiff's impairments had improved. Relying upon that substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had experienced medical improvement. Although there may not be a specific section devoted to the above-referenced comparison, the ALJ's decision demonstrates that he thoroughly compared the prior and current medical evidence, which demonstrated that there had been improvements in the symptoms, signs, or laboratory findings associated with Plaintiff's impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(c)(1). Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiff's argument on this point fails.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate Plaintiff's RFC because the ALJ failed to (A) include any limitations for prolonged sitting and (B) include any mental limitations.
Plaintiff's argument on this point centers on the ALJ's treatment of the opinions of one of Plaintiff's treating sources, Dayne Johnson ("Mr. Johnson"), who opined that sitting for long periods would increase Plaintiff's back pain.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to include any mental limitations in Plaintiff's RFC. In advancing that contention, Plaintiff again argues about the weight the ALJ assigned to certain medical opinions, including those of Ms. Johnson, Dr. Kockler, and Dr. MacNamara. The court concludes that Plaintiff's arguments on this point are nothing more than an effort to reargue the weight of the evidence before the ALJ. As previously noted, that tactic is unavailing on appeal. See, e.g., Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1257; Madrid, 447 F.3d at 790; Rutledge, 230 F.3d at 1174; Eggleston, 851 F.2d at 1247. Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiff's arguments concerning the ALJ's failure to include mental limitations in Plaintiff's RFC are without merit.
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that all of Plaintiff's arguments fail. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision in this case is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
