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OPINION

THOMPSON, J.

In this putative class action employment lawsuit, defendant Priority Metals, Inc., appeals from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration. It contends the trial court interpreted the arbitration clause at issue too narrowly and under the proper interpretation plaintiff Dakota Perez's claims must be sent to arbitration. We disagree. The language of the arbitration clause is unambiguous and not reasonably susceptible to defendant's urged interpretation. Plaintiff's claims plainly fall outside its scope. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err and we affirm the challenged order.

FACTS

Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a driver and warehouse worker. After a few days on the job, defendant's owner provided him with a packet of employment-related documents. Among them was a four-page "Support Personnel Employment [A]greement" (the Agreement). Plaintiff initialed each page of the Agreement and signed the last page.

Among the terms outlined in the Agreement were plaintiff's duties and salary, trade secret protections, conditions for plaintiff's use of defendant's vehicles, and termination. It also contained an arbitration clause which was to survive the termination of plaintiff's employment by defendant. The clause provided, in relevant part: "Any controversy between Employer and Employee involving the consideration or application of any of the terms, provisions, or conditions of this agreement shall on the written request of either party served on the other be submitted to arbitration."

After about six months, defendant terminated plaintiff. Plaintiff thereafter sued defendant, alleging failure to pay overtime, failure to provide meal and rest breaks, waiting time penalties, failure to pay all hours worked when due, failure to provide accurate wage statements, and unfair competition and business practices. The complaint also contains a cause of action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.).

Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Agreement's arbitration clause. Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending none of his claims fell within the clause's narrow scope.

The court denied the motion to compel. Its decision primarily turned on interpretation of the scope of the arbitration clause. The court explained: "The arbitration clause in this case is unambiguously narrow in scope, limited to controversies `involving the consideration or application of any of the terms, provisions, or conditions of [the] [A]greement.' . . . Here, [p]laintiff's complaint does not involve any of the terms, provisions or conditions of the [A]greement. . . ."

DISCUSSION

"`[W]hen considering a motion to compel arbitration, the court must initially "determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute in question." [Citation.] "This determination involves two considerations: (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement." [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (Bruni v. Didion (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1283.) Defendant's appeal concerns the latter. It argues the trial court erred in concluding plaintiff's underlying claims fall outside the scope of the Agreement's arbitration clause. We find no error in the court's decision.

"`California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration and any doubts regarding the arbitrability of a dispute are resolved in favor of arbitration. [Citations.]' [Citation.] However, `[t]here is no public policy favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed to arbitrate. [Citation.]' [Citation.] `The scope of arbitration is, of course, a matter of agreement between the parties. . . .' [Citation.] . . . [I]n the absence of indication of contrary intent, and where the arbitration clause is reasonably susceptible [to] an interpretation [urged by the party seeking to compel arbitration], claims . . . will be deemed subject to arbitration.' [Citation.]" (In re Tobacco Cases I (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103-1104.)

Because private arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties, the same principles which govern contract interpretation apply to interpretation of an arbitration clause. (In re Tobacco Cases I, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1104.) "`The fundamental goal of contract[] interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. [Citation.]'" (Ibid.) If contractual language is clear and unambiguous, it governs. And unless the parties use terms in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage, we ascribe to words their ordinary and popular meaning. (Robolledo v. Tilly's, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 900, 913.)

When, as here, the parties did not offer extrinsic evidence concerning interpretation of the arbitration clause and the trial court did not make any factual determinations, the trial court's denial of a motion to compel is reviewed under the de novo standard. (Oxford Preparatory Academy v. Edlighten Learning Solutions (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 605, 610.)

The language of the Agreement's arbitration clause is clear and unambiguous. Only claims which involve "the consideration or application of any of the terms, provisions, or conditions of [the] [A]greement" must be arbitrated. Plaintiff's claims will not involve consideration or application of anything in the Agreement. Rather, because his claims concern various statutory obligations of an employer, resolution of the merits of the claims will involve consideration and application of the statutes to events which occurred, and actions which defendant allegedly failed to take, while plaintiff was defendant's employee. While our conclusion would maybe be different if the Agreement referenced the statues pursuant to which plaintiff's claims are brought or contained terms related to the relevant statutory obligations (see Cortez v. Doty Bros. Equipment Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1, 13-15), we are not faced with such a situation.

Defendant's interpretation of the arbitration clause, that it applies to "`any controversy' related to [plaintiff's] employment," is extremely overbroad and the language is not reasonably susceptible to such an interpretation. As the trial court aptly stated, "[w]hile [d]efendant certainly could have drafted an arbitration agreement to broadly include all claims `arising from' plaintiff's employment . . ., defendant did not do so here and is bound by [the arbitration clause's] limitations."

Because plaintiff's claims fall outside the scope of the arbitration clause, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to compel.1

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Plaintiff is entitled to costs on appeal.

O'LEARY, P. J. and BEDSWORTH, J., concurs.