NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BIGELOW, P. J.

In October 2010, the trial court issued a restraining order against Peter Musurlian, ordering him to stay at least 10 yards away from Christine Aghakhani. The order expired in October 2011. We dismiss Musurlian's appeal as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In August 2010, Christine Aghakhani, a staffer for California Assemblyman Mike Gatto, sought a restraining order against Peter Musurlian pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. In her written request and in testimony at a hearing, Aghakhani alleged Musurlian verbally threatened her at a town hall meeting in a Glendale library in July 2010. According to Aghakhani, Musurlian came to the event with a video camera and was causing a disturbance, so she asked him to "stop causing the nuisance." The incident at the town hall meeting concerned, in part, a sign indicating no "uncredentialed, unauthorized" media would be allowed at the event. Aghakhani testified that after she asked Musurlian to "stop causing [a] nuisance," he began "spitting profanities, against [her]" and walked toward her with his camera, forcing her to step backwards. Police eventually escorted Musurlian out of the library. He returned without his camera. According to Aghakhani, as Musurlian was leaving a second time, he "leaned in" to her, said she was "a disgrace to the Armenian race," and told her to "watch [her] back."

Aghakhani also alleged Musurlian had previously engaged in confrontations with other members of Gatto's staff. Another Gatto staff member testified that at a different event, Musurlian was disruptive, screamed, and was asked to leave. When he was leaving, his camera was close to the staffer, who held up papers to use as a barrier between herself and the camera. According to the staffer, Musurlian violently "ripped" the papers out of her hands as she attempted to shield herself from Musurlian "shoving the camera" in her face.

Musurlian denied ever threatening Aghakhani or engaging in any harassing conduct. He claimed Gatto was "attempting to smear and silence [him]," and that he was only exercising his First Amendment rights as a prize-winning journalist to gather news about a public official.

At the conclusion of a two-day hearing, the trial court ruled:

Musurlian filed a timely appeal. However, by its own terms, the restraining order expired on October 1, 2011, before this appeal was fully briefed. Following the expiration of the order, Aghakhani filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot.

DISCUSSION

I. The Appeal is Moot

"If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot. [Citation.]" (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144 (Environmental Charter).) In general, this court will not consider a moot appeal. (Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 226-227 (Giles).) However, there are discretionary exceptions to this rule: "`(1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur [citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains for the court's determination [citation].' [Citation.]" (Environmental Charter, supra, at p. 144.) None of these exceptions applies here.

Musurlian contends the case poses an issue of broad public interest because it concerns the constitutionally protected activity of news gathering about a public official. We disagree. Although Musurlian contended he was only engaged in lawful news gathering at the town hall meeting at issue, the restraining order was based on Aghakhani's claim that Musurlian threatened her. The case was not about whether Musurlian had a right to be present at the town hall meeting, or to conduct journalistic activities. Instead, the trial court was called upon to decide whether it believed Aghakhani's claim that Musurlian threatened her, and whether Musurlian's statement or other behavior constituted a "credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose." (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b).) Musurlian denied he had engaged in such behavior. His position in the trial court was that Aghakhani was lying. He did not argue that he made the alleged threat or engaged in the alleged harassing behavior, but that the statement and conduct were legitimate journalistic activities. The question at issue—whether Musurlian said and did what Aghakhani claimed—was not one of broad public interest.

We also disagree with Musurlian's assertion that we should consider the merits of his appeal because there is a likelihood the controversy will recur between the parties. This case turned on highly individualized circumstances. The trial court heard evidence regarding Musurlian's alleged behavior at other Gatto events, but the order was triggered by and based on the altercation between Aghakhani and Musurlian in July 2010. The trial court's decision required credibility determinations, an evaluation of Musurlian's alleged behavior at the July 2010 incident, and a consideration of the relevant circumstances. Even were we to review the trial court's ruling in this case, our decision would have little value when applied to a future theoretical altercation between Aghakhani and Musurlian that would involve entirely different circumstances. (See Kenneally v. Knox (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 262, 265-266 [court would not review expired custody order because custody, visitation, and welfare orders by their nature are changeable and situation presented that year might never arise again between the parties].)

The restraining order has expired. We do not render opinions "` "`upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or . . . declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. It necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal.'" [Citations.]'" (Giles, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 226-227.)

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.

RUBIN, J. and FLIER, J., concurs.