ORDER

CAROLYN K. DELANEY, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying an application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act"). For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grant the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on June 22, 1999. AT 115. An application for supplemental security income (SSI) was filed on behalf of plaintiff on June 29, 2012 and closed on October 24, 2012. Administrative Transcript ("AT") 116. On April 8, 2013, plaintiff's mother filed a second SSI application on plaintiff's behalf, alleging disability beginning November 1, 2000, when plaintiff was less than two years old. AT 102, 199-208. Plaintiff's mother alleged that plaintiff was disabled due to behavioral and physical issues, including academic problems, possible post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and skin disease. AT 141, 149, 214, 231, 239. In a decision dated February 17, 2015, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act.2 AT 16-30. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

AT 19-29.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not disabled: (1) the ALJ failed to include evidence from plaintiff's prior application for benefits; (2) the ALJ failed to fully develop the record and/or obtain the opinion of a pediatric specialist; and (3) the ALJ erred in finding less than marked limitation in three of the domain areas.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether (1) it is based on proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). "The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). "The court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the ALJ's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

ANALYSIS

A. Prior Application

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly failed to include evidence from her prior application for disability benefits, which was denied on initial consideration six months prior to her second application. Plaintiff argues that the prior application required the ALJ to apply Acquiescence Ruling (AR) 97-4(9) and Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988). AR 97-4(9) explains how Chavez applies to disability cases involving claimants who reside in states in the Ninth Circuit:

Plaintiff contends that, instead of applying AR 97-4(9) as required, the ALJ ignored plaintiff's prior application and failed to determine whether the evidence overcame a presumption of non-disability.

In his decision, the ALJ wrote:

AT 22.

Defendant argues that AR 97-4(9) does not apply with respect to plaintiff's prior application, because there is no record of a "final decision" on that application, which was closed at the initial stage and not appealed.3 AT 116; see ECF No. 17 at 5. As this argument has merit, the court finds the ALJ did not err by failing to apply AR 97-4(9).

B. Duty to Develop

Plaintiff asserts that, because the ALJ admitted a 2012 State agency evaluation made in connection with plaintiff's first application, he was "required to fully develop the record as to that application." (ECF No. 17 at 17.) See AT 31, 102-114. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have admitted and discussed various 2012 opinions of consultative examining psychologist Dr. Sid Cormier and other 2012 records related to plaintiff's first application.

Disability hearings are not adversarial. See DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ has duty to develop the record even when claimant is represented). Evidence raising an issue requiring the ALJ to investigate further depends on the case. Generally, there must be some objective evidence suggesting a condition that could have a material impact on the disability decision. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996); Wainwright v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 939 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 1991). "Ambiguous evidence . . . triggers the ALJ's duty to `conduct an appropriate inquiry.'" Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288.)

Here, as noted above, the ALJ stated that he had reviewed and considered evidence prior to the application date, but had not discussed it in detail due to its limited relevance to the disability period beginning April 8, 2013. AT 22. As to Dr. Cormier, the ALJ discussed his comprehensive mental examination of plaintiff on June 30, 2013 (AT 22; 440-445), his September 17, 2012 evaluation (AT 23, 414-42), and his June 12, 2014 evaluation (AT 23, 464-468). Defendant points out that, while plaintiff may have been scheduled for earlier appointments in 2012, there is no record that Dr. Cormier examined her on any date that year except September 17, as discussed in the decision.

While plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have discussed additional evidence pertaining to the prior application, she does not explain what ambiguous evidence triggered the duty to develop or why any failure to develop the record was not harmless error.

Related to the duty to develop, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to obtain the opinion of a pediatric specialist under AR 04-1(9), interpreting Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2003). AR 04-1(9) requires that, in childhood disability cases, the ALJ

Here, the ALJ relied on the opinions of State agency medical consultants Dr. Colsky (psychiatry), Dr. Lockmiller (internal medicine), Dr. IdaHilliard (psychiatry), and Dr. Jaituni (other). AT 24, 113, 123, 136. The ALJ noted their qualifications under the applicable agency regulations and found that their opinions were "consistent with the evidence as a whole, including the treatment record, Dr. Cormier's examinations and the education records." AT 24. As this alternative to an independent specialist satisfied the requirements of AR 04-1(9), the court finds no error in this regard.

C. Limitations

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erroneously found that plaintiff's impairments do not functionally equal a childhood listing.4 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate plaintiff's functioning in three of the six domain areas, discussed below.

1. Interacting and relating with others

In this domain area, the ALJ found less than marked limitation, explaining:

AT 27.

Plaintiff argues that this finding ignores Dr. Cormier's June 12, 2014 opinion diagnosing plaintiff with Oppositional Defiant Disorder and Shasta County psychologist Dr. Trustman's October 15, 2013 diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct (chronic). AT 467, 462.

In Dr. Cormier's June 2014 opinion, he stated: "Although her interview behavior was quite pleasant and friendly, her reported history suggested serious impairment regarding her ability to interact with classmates and teachers." AT 467. The ALJ considered this opinion, including findings by Dr. Cormier that plaintiff presented as being in a reasonably good mood and was friendly, pleasant, and talkative. AT 23. Given plaintiff's behavior at the exam, Dr. Cormier based his finding of "serious impairment" in interacting with others on plaintiff's history as reported by plaintiff and her mother. AT 465, 467. However, the ALJ found plaintiff's and her mother's statements about her impairments "not entirely credible" in unchallenged findings. AT 22, 23.

The ALJ also considered Dr. Trustman's October 2013 evaluation, noting that plaintiff "appeared very pleasant, interactive, and cooperative" at the exam. AT 22, 457. While Dr. Trustman noted plaintiff's "rather volatile mood and difficulty with self-regulation," he did not indicate any marked or extreme limitation in plaintiff's ability to interact with others. AT 462.

At the hearing, plaintiff testified that she had several friends, had no problem talking to the kids in her neighborhood, and was able to confide in close friends with little conflict. AT 55, 58-59, 68. There was evidence that plaintiff's behavior at school had improved over the past year. AT 375 ("Aja has made significant progress in this [social/emotional/behavioral] area over the past year. . . . Aja is very nice and polite to adults and to peers."), AT 393 ("She has not received any discipline referrals since attending Foothill this year."). In light of the entire record, plaintiff has not established marked limitation in this area.

2. Attending and completing tasks

In this domain area, the ALJ found less than marked limitation, explaining:

AT 26.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's assertion of improved concentration on medication is not supported by the record. As evidence for this improvement, the ALJ cited Dr. Cormier's June 2014 examination, which reported: "Her concentration capacity was somewhat surprisingly intact as instantiated by her ability to successfully count by serial 3's from 1 to 40 within 40 seconds, and her ability to recall six digits forwards and four digits backwards." AT 466.

The ALJ also cited an April 2014 progress note, which stated: "Client admits to being moody, impulsive, angry, poor focus & attention. Client presents very mature & articulate, good eye contact, bright affect, friendly, sociable, talkative, calm, appro. coop." AT 482. The progress note prescribed Tenex. AT 482. A later 2014 progress note stated that "Tenex has improved client's impulsivity, anxiety & focus." AT 472.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's findings fail to take into account plaintiff's 2013 diagnosis of ADHD and her 2015 Individual Education Plan, which noted "borderline attention/concentration skills."5 AT 397. However, the 2015 IEP also noted that plaintiff "appears to have made significant growth since last year." AT 398. The court finds the ALJ's finding of no marked limitation in this domain adequately supported by the record.

3. Acquiring and using information

The ALJ found less than marked limitation in this domain area, writing:

AT 25.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ discounted evidence that plaintiff struggled with reading and math, and performed at four or more years below grade level academically. Testing in October 2013 indicated reading and math scores "in the average to low-average range," commensurate with plaintiff's estimated intellectual ability. AT 457. In October 2013, at age 14, plaintiff's reading score was equivalent to grade 5.1 and her math score was equivalent to grade 5.8. AT 457. Earlier that year, Dr. Cormier noted that "[h]er arithmetic reasoning skills were average . . . Her vocabulary was within normal limits." AT 443. Overall, her "general vocabulary, word usage, reported history, and ability to conceptualize suggests an individual of approximately below average intellectual functioning." AT 443. The ALJ stated in general terms that he had considered plaintiff's low-average functioning and poor grades in 2013 and 2014.

However, evidence indicated that plaintiff had improved in school since starting medication and homeschooling. The ALJ cited a July 3, 2014 progress note in which plaintiff's mother reported that plaintiff would continue to be homeschooled. AT 471. The report noted that "client's grades have improved tremendously in part to no longer having distractions from classmates and current medication regimen." AT 471. See Warre v. Comm'r, 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for SSI benefits."). The court finds the ALJ did not err in finding no marked limitation in this domain.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is denied;

2. The Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 28) is granted; and

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.