JENNIFER L. THURSTON, Magistrate Judge.
On February 18, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce judgment and compel Defendant to pay awarded attorneys' fees and costs. (Doc. 63.) On March 4, 2020, Defendant filed an opposition. (Doc. 67.) Plaintiffs filed a reply on March 11, 2020. (Doc. 68.)
On December 22, 2015, the Office of Administrative Hearings decided the case of
(Doc. 47 at 27-28.) On August 31, 2017, this Court entered judgment (Doc. 48) and the Defendant appealed. (Doc. 49.)
On November 20, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the award of fees and costs (Doc. 56), and on December 12, 2018, the Ninth Circuit issued the mandate and awarded costs in the amount of $398.10. (Doc. 59.) On January 7, 2019, the Ninth Circuit awarded Plaintiffs $35,070.00 in attorneys' fees incurred in defending against the Defendant's appeal to the Ninth Circuit. (Doc. 60 at 3.)
On December 5, 2018, Plaintiffs' attorney, Andréa Marcus, emailed counsel for the defense inquiring about when payment would be made. (Doc. 63-9.) On January 22, 2019, the TUSD School Board considered the outstanding bills in closed session, and "no reportable action" was taken. (Doc. 63 at 3; Doc. 63-11.)
After several more requests asking about when payment would be made, the Defendant's attorneys responded on January 25, 2019. (Doc. 63 at 4) The letter reads in part:
(Doc. 63-12 at 2.)
On January 27, 2019, Plaintiffs' attorney again inquired about the status of payment (Doc. 63 at 4): "Thank you for your letter, but it was not informative regarding my outstanding questions. You have still refused to say when my firm can expect payment on a series of fee awards in the Quatro and Wright cases, starting in 2017," and Plaintiffs' attorney included a list of inquiries. (Doc. 63-13 at 1, emphasis omitted.)
(Doc. 63-14 at 1-2.)
According to Plaintiffs, on April 2, 2019, Defendant's attorney responded to Plaintiffs' repeated inquiries regarding paying the fees and costs awarded Plaintiffs (Doc. 63 at 6), and stated in part that:
(Doc. 63-15 at 2.)
According to Plaintiffs, on June 27, 2019, Plaintiffs' attorney inquired again regarding "when, how and if Defendant would be paying on the judgements [sic] outstanding." (Doc. 63 at 6.) Plaintiffs report that, after receiving no response, Plaintiffs' attorney's office manager sent an invoice and W-9 form to the Kern County Superintendent of Schools (Ms. Barlow) and the Superintendent of Tehachapi Unified School District "requesting payment, and instead, received a letter from the law firm representing both — School's Legal Service — still giving no notice of when, how, or if, the judgement would be paid, but again asserting that the Kern County Superintendent of Schools had no responsibility for the debt, despite the fact that the payments received by [Plaintiffs' attorney] and her colleagues have been issued on checks from the Kern County Superintendent of Schools, and signed by Ms. Barlow." (Doc. 63 at 6-7.)
On February 18, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the judgment and to compel the Defendant to pay, and states that she "brings this Writ of Mandamus, in an effort to receive this Court's support in collecting the fees and costs awarded for prevailing in contingency work on behalf of A.W." (Doc. 63 at 7.) On March 4, 2020, Defendant filed an opposition, requesting time to review budgetary information prior to the allocation and/or payment of funds. (Doc. 67 at 5.) Plaintiffs filed a reply on March 11, 2020. (Doc. 68.)
The federal mandamus statute provides: "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ, and is issued only when (1) the plaintiff's claim is "clear and certain;" (2) the defendant official's duty to act is ministerial and "so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt;" and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.
In California, money judgments against local public entities are enforced under article 1 of chapter 2 of part 5 of division 3.6 of title I of the Government Code, consisting of sections 970 through 971.2. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 683.320; 695.050; Cal. Gov. Code §§ 970(b), 970.1(b);
Section 970.4 of the California Government Code provides that a local public entity must pay any judgment in the fiscal year in which it becomes final, to the extent that funds are available:
Cal Gov Code § 970.4. "[I]f a local public entity does not pay a judgment, with interest thereon, during the fiscal year in which it becomes final, the governing body shall pay the judgment, with interest thereon, during the ensuing fiscal year immediately upon the obtaining of sufficient funds for that purpose." Cal Gov Code § 970.5. Section 970.8, subdivision (a) provides that "[e]ach local public entity shall in each fiscal year include in its budget a provision to provide funds in an amount sufficient to pay all judgments in accordance with this article."
In sum, the Government Code expressly and specifically requires a local public entity to pay the full amount of any judgment, with interest. The entity is required to pay the judgment out of any unrestricted funds it has for the fiscal year in which the judgment was entered, and if any amount remains unpaid, is required to obtain funds and pay that amount the following fiscal year. The only exception is that the entity can in some cases obtain a court order allowing it to pay the judgment, with interest, in annual installments for a period up to 10 years. Gov. Code § 970.6.
Defendant failed to pay in the fiscal year in which the judgment became final (2018/2019) in accordance with Section 970.4. Assuming Defendant did not have had funds available at that time, this excuses payment only during that fiscal year. Instead, in that event, Section 970.5 requires it to pay the judgment in the following fiscal year (2019/2020).
The Court's judgment on the award of fees and costs became final on December 12, 2018 when the Court of Appeals issued the mandate. (Doc. 56.) Additionally, the Ninth Circuit awarded attorneys' fees on January 7, 2019. (Doc. 60.) These judgments became final in the 2018/2019 fiscal year. Accordingly, Defendant was required to pay the judgment by June 30, 2019.
Defendant must pay the judgment in the manner provided by Government Code section 970, et seq., otherwise a writ of mandate is the appropriate remedy to compel Defendant to perform.
Defendant states in its opposition that the Tehachapi Unified School District was to meet to review the issue of payment of these judgments on March 10, 2020. (Doc. 67 at 2.) Defendant contends that the Tehachapi Unified School District will need the opportunity to review the budget to determine how payment on the judgment can be made. (Doc. 67 at 4-5.) As Plaintiffs argue, "[s]tate law does not provide for the indefinite payment plan Defendant appears to argue it does . . . particularly after delaying resolving it in the budget year the judgement [sic] is entered." (Doc. 68 at 2.)
At the hearing, counsel for the District admitted that the District did not consider paying the judgment during the 2018/2019 year, despite the judgment became due in that fiscal year, and that the Board members did not meet to discuss the judgment until it was time to develop the 2019/2020 budget. Chief Financial Officer Melissa Kielpinksi, who appeared at the hearing for the District, admitted that though the District maintains a budget item for payment of legal fees, there was no provision made to pay this judgment in the 2019/2020 budget and no budget provision for judgments in the 2018/2019 budget. Ms. Kielpinksi reported that the payment of the judgment in the current fiscal year would be made by taking funds from other budget line items, such as books and classroom expenses
As stated above, Government Code § 970.5
Plaintiffs also seek prejudgment interest. (Doc. 63 at 11.) Plaintiffs cite to
In the complaint, Plaintiffs sought "interest . . . as provided by law, but they did not specify prejudgment interest." (Doc. 1 at 6) They did not seek prejudgment interest in their motion (Doc. 35) and this Court did not award prejudgment interest. (Doc. 47) The time for moving the Court for such an award has passed and Plaintiffs cannot now recover prejudgment interest. (
Plaintiffs seek postjudgment interest and cite to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. (Doc. 63 at 11-13.) "[W]here the cause of action asserted arises from a federal statute, questions of the allowance of postjudgment interest in federal courts are governed solely by federal law."
For the reasons set forth above, the Court construes Plaintiffs' motion to enforce judgment as a request for issuance of a writ of mandate. The Court
1. Defendant
2. No later than
2. A writ of mandate is
IT IS SO ORDERED.