STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant Diana Woods, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 17, 2012. By minute order, the hearing was then reset for December 18, 2012.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until February 25, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between December 17, 2012 and February 25, 2013 under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and related documents in electronic form, including approximately 40,000 pages of discovery. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with her client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions, to prepare pretrial motions and otherwise prepare for trial.

c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The United States does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 17, 2012 to February 25, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.