ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO COMPEL

Re: Dkt. Nos. 83, 86

THOMAS S. HIXSON, Magistrate Judge.

The parties submitted a joint letter brief, in which Plaintiff Rita C. Ho moves to compel the production of documents in response to her January 18, 2018 first sets of requests for production to Defendants Mark Pinsukanjana and Bryan Yedinak. ECF No. 83.1 The requests to Pinsukanjana and Yedinak are identical, so the Court will refer to them together as the "RFPs" for ease of reference. The Court held a telephonic hearing in this matter on February 20, 2019, and now issues this order.

The Court ORDERS Defendants to produce documents responsive to RFPs 1, 3-10, 12-16, 18-23 and 25. These RFPs seek relevant documents, and the requests are proportional to the needs of the case. Defendants' objections are unpersuasive.

RFP 2 asks for "[c]opies of all documents and materials provided to any person whom the Defendants intend to use as an expert witness in this action including, but not limited to, documents and materials relied upon by that person in formulating his or her expert opinion." Leaving aside RFP 2 for the moment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) has disclosure requirements for testifying experts, and Defendants must comply with those requirements by the applicable deadlines. RFP 2 is problematic, however, because it seeks to use fact discovery to take expert discovery, and the fact discovery cutoff in this action is earlier than the expert discovery cutoff. See ECF No. 66 (case scheduling order). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to compel as to RFP 2. To avoid confusion, nothing in this order relieves Defendants of their expert disclosure obligations under Rule 26.

At the telephonic hearing, Plaintiff withdrew RFP 11, rendering that dispute moot.

RFP 17 asks for "[d]ocuments regarding any legal proceedings involving the Defendants, from January 1, 2008 to the present." At the hearing Plaintiff explained that if Defendants have cheated other artists, that could potentially show they are the type of people who engage in cheating, making Plaintiff's claims more plausible. Perhaps, but that is a speculative fishing expedition that is not proportional to the needs of the case. The Court DENIES the motion to compel as to RFP 17.

RFP 24 seeks "[d]ocuments supporting Defendants' allegations in the Cross-Claim filed in the Probate Action." The RFPs define the Probate Action to mean "the action between the parties to the instant proceeding first brought in the Superior Court for the State of California and County of Santa Cruz." The Court has no further information about the Probate Action, including what the Cross-Claim is. At the telephonic hearing, Plaintiff's counsel stated he was not prepared to address this RFP in any detail. As Plaintiff has failed to explain the relevance and proportionality of this RFP, the Court DENIES the motion to compel as to it.

During the hearing the Court and the parties discussed the relevant time frame for the requests. The Court has previously explained that the parties' pleadings show that the claims and counterclaims relate to conduct from 2012 to the present. See ECF No. 78 at 2-3. Plaintiff argued, however, that even for conduct 2012 to the present, Defendants contend they have co-authorship rights in some of the images at issue stemming from a monograph first published in 2006. Defendants did not argue to the contrary. Accordingly, for RFPs 3 and 16, the Court ORDERS Defendants to produce responsive documents from 2006 to the present. For RFP 25 — which seeks "all documents upon which Defendants intend to rely relating to this action proceeding to trial" — the Court ORDRS Defendants to produce all responsive documents regardless of time frame, since if Defendants are going to use a document at trial, Plaintiff is entitled to it. For RFPs 1, 4-10, 12-15, and 18-23, the Court ORDERS Defendants to produce responsive documents for the time period 2012 to the present.

Finally, the Court discussed with the parties how long it would take Defendants to produce documents. Defendants represented they could complete document production within 14 days of the Court's order. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Defendants to produce the documents described in this order within 14 days.

IT IS SO ORDERED.