HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR., District Judge.
Before the Court is the pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Petitioner Miguel Cardona Inostroz challenging the validity of a judgment obtained against him in state court. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition, Dkt. No. 4, and Petitioner has filed a traverse, Dkt. No. 8. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
On July 9, 2013, a jury found Petitioner guilty of murder in the second degree enhanced by personal discharge of a firearm, assault with a firearm enhanced by personal use of the firearm and infliction of great bodily injury, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Dkt. No. 4-4, Clerk's Transcript ("CT"), 2CT 271-276; Dkt. No. 4-8, Reporter's Transcript ("RT"), 4RT 453-455. On July 10, 2013, in a bifurcated court trial of the prior offenses, the trial court found that Petitioner had two prior convictions that were strike offenses and serious felonies. 2CT 278-281; 4RT 451-452, 462-463. The trial court struck the "prison-prior" enhancement alleged for one of the two prior convictions. 2CT 281; 4RT 462. On October 24, 2013, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of 112-years-to-life. 2CT 289-290, 296-298.
On October 24, 2016, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. Dkt. No. 4-10, Ex. 6.
On February 1, 2017, the California Supreme Court denied review. Dkt. No. 4-10, Ex. 8.
On September 26, 2017, Petitioner filed the instant petition in this Court. Dkt. No. 1. He raised the following two claims that his due process rights were violated: (1) when the trial court failed to instruct the jury with the Dewberry
The following factual background is taken from the October 24, 2016 opinion of the California Court of Appeal:
People v. Inostroz, No. A140482, 2016 WL 6212026, *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2016) (footnotes in original and brackets added).
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA02ee). This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue "`had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).
Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established Federal law to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. "[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. "A federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at best, ambiguous." Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003). A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases," or if it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent." Id. at 405-06. "Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. "A federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at best, ambiguous." Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003).
On federal habeas review, AEDPA "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings" and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In applying the above standards on habeas review, the Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court. See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018); Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir.), amended, 733 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2013).
In its unpublished disposition issued on October 24, 2016, the state appellate court addressed the merits of Petitioner's two claims. Inostroz, 2016 WL 6212026, *4-8. Therefore, the last reasoned decision as to these claims is the California Court of Appeal's unpublished disposition. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192; Cannedy, 706 F.3d at 1156.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that under AEDPA, there is a heightened level of deference a federal habeas court must give to state court decisions. See Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 66 (2011) (per curiam); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-100 (2011); Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594 (2011) (per curiam). As the Court explained: "[o]n federal habeas review, AEDPA `imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' and `demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Id. at 1307 (citation omitted). With these principles in mind, the Court addresses Petitioner's claims.
As mentioned above, Petitioner raises two due process claims, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to sua sponte instruct the jury with the Dewberry instruction; and (2) admitting "prior bad acts" evidence. Dkt. No. 1 at 5, 9.
The California Court of Appeal elaborated on Petitioner's claim relating to the trial court's failure to sua sponte give the Dewberry instruction, stating as follows:
Inostroz, 2016 WL 6212026, *4 (footnotes in original and brackets added). However, the state appellate court noted that according to Petitioner, CALCRIM No. 640 was "inadequate in this case because it failed to specifically instruct jurors `that the benefit of any reasonable doubt regarding whether he committed murder or involuntary manslaughter' must inure in his favor." Id. at *5. The state appellate court disagreed with Petitioner, considered the "totality of the jury charge in this case," and determined that "there [was] no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood or misapplied the applicable law notwithstanding the court's failure to give CALJIC No. 8.72 or the equivalent." Id. Specifically, the state appellate court determined that CALCRIM No. 640 "as a whole adequately conveyed the import of Dewberry—to wit, that "a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a jury's reasonable doubt with respect to all crimes with lesser degrees or related or included offenses—notwithstanding the trial court's failure to also give the jury CALJIC No. 8.72." Id. at *6 (citations omitted). In making this determination, the state appellate court stated as follows:
Id. at *5-6. The state appellate court concluded that the instructions, as given, correctly stated the law and likely did not mislead the jury and that even assuming error for failing to give CALJIC No. 8.72, such an error was harmless, stating:
Id. at *6 (footnotes in original and brackets added).
First, Petitioner argues in his traverse that "[t]he process due under the United States Constitution was not afforded to Petitioner by the trial court's refusal to properly instruct the jury [with the Dewberry instruction]." Dkt. No. 8 at 2. To the extent that Petitioner is arguing that he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in an instruction under Dewberry, such an argument fails. Under limited circumstances, a state statute may create a "liberty interest" protected by the federal right to due process that is enforceable in federal habeas corpus. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 841 (9th Cir. 1995). Notably, Petitioner does not assert that any state statute entitles him to have a trial court sua sponte give the instruction outlined in Dewberry. Nonetheless, if the state permits its appellate courts to cure the deprivation of state law, as the state appellate court could do if an error had occurred, at most, any state-created right constitutes a "qualified" liberty interest. Arreguin v. Prunty, 208 F.3d 835, 837-47 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 746 (1990)) overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the state appellate court's determination that the jury instructions as a whole were adequate and that any error was harmless satisfied any qualified liberty interest Petitioner may have had in the instruction. See id. at 837 (state appellate court's application of a harmless error analysis sufficient to satisfy the standard for state-created qualified liberty interests under Clemons).
Second, Petitioner's argument that the trial court failed to comply with Dewberry does not state a federal claim for the violation of due process. A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law, i.e., law stemming from the state court decision in Dewberry, does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 71-72 (1991) (federal habeas corpus relief is not available for violations of state law or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law).
Assuming arguendo that Petitioner had raised a federal claim, a state trial court's refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). The error must so infect the trial that the defendant was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend upon the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the jury. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 745 (9th Cir. 1995).
Here, the state appellate court found that the instruction under Dewberry was unnecessary in light of the other instructions, especially CALCRIM No. 640, which was found to have "adequately conveyed the import of Dewberry." Inostroz, 2016 WL 6212026, *6. As such, the state appellate court determined that when read as a whole, the trial court's instructions provided the protections mandated by the Dewberry court. Id. The jurors were instructed on the elements of first and second degree murder, and of involuntary manslaughter. 2CT 237-238, 241. The jurors were instructed that "if they had a reasonable doubt about whether defendant committed second degree murder but unanimously agreed he committed involuntary manslaughter, they must give defendant the benefit of this doubt by finding him guilty only of the latter." Inostroz, 2016 WL 6212026, *6. The jurors were also instructed that "they could not convict defendant of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter unless they unanimously agreed he was not guilty of first or second degree murder." Id. Thus, this Court finds that these instructions conveyed the essence of a state Dewberry instruction and did not render Petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair under the federal Constitution.
Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this first due process claim, and it is DENIED.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in admitting a prior bad act to establish his intent. Dkt. No. 1 at 28-31. Specifically, the trial court admitted testimony that, "two days before the shooting, Maiko Ross (a convicted felon who was a friend of the victim) overheard Petitioner argue with the victim over money and say that he had "shot people for less than this." Id. at 28. Defense counsel objected to Ross's trial testimony relating to this prior bad act under California Evidence Code § 352 and requested an evidentiary hearing. Id. During the hearing, Ross testified that she knew Petitioner because he regularly came over to the house Ross shared with Silva and Bode. Id. Two days before the shooting, Ross was in her living room playing a card game, when she overheard Petitioner and the victim arguing on the front porch over money that had been taken off of Petitioner's food stamp card. Id. Petitioner was heard telling the victim that he had killed people for less than what she owed him. Id. Following this testimony, the trial court overruled defense counsel's objection and admitted the evidence upon finding it "highly relevant with respect to possible intent" and not substantially prejudicial. Inostroz, 2016 WL 6212026, *8. The state appellate court noted that defense counsel made a tactical decision to question Ross on cross-examination to elicit the exact statement made by Petitioner: "I've killed people for less." Id.
The Court liberally construes Petitioner's contentions as a claim that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of the prior bad act under California Evidence Code § 1101(b) and that such evidence should otherwise have been excluded under California Evidence Code § 352. Section 1101(b) permits admission of evidence, including uncharged misconduct, when it is relevant to establish some fact other than the person's character, such as motive or intent. Under section 352, a trial court is to exclude evidence where the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the potential for prejudice.
On direct appeal, the state appellate court rejected Petitioner's claim that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the prior bad act. Inostroz, 2016 WL 6212026, *7-8. The court found "no bases for disturbing the trial court's admission of the challenged evidence," stating as follows:
Id. at *8.
A claim that the state trial court erred in admitting evidence, as a general matter, does not present a cognizable habeas claim. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68, 72 (state court's incorrect application of state evidentiary law to allow evidence of prior bad acts did not present a claim cognizable by a federal habeas court); Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219-21 (2011) ("We have stated many times that `federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law'"). The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). Due process is violated only if there are "no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence." Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991).
Here, Respondent argues the state appellate court "reasonably concluded that permissible inferences rendered admission of the challenged evidence reasonable and that any prejudice was insufficient to render the conviction unfair." Dkt. No. 4-1 at 18 (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67). Respondent points out that "other than [P]etitioner's own words, no evidence was introduced that [P]etitioner had in fact committed other murders as stated in the prior threat." Id. Thus, Respondent contends that "the jury was left with three inferences, none of which reasonably precluded admission of the statement as unduly inflammatory," explaining that:
Id. at 18-19 (citing 4RT 404-405). The Court agrees that these were permissible inferences that the jury could draw from the evidence.
Nor did any arguable error in admitting the evidence render the trial prejudicially unfair under Brecht. 507 U.S. at 637. As the state appellate court found in its analysis of the first claim, the evidence establishing Petitioner's guilt and criminal intent was substantial. Inostroz, 2016 WL 6212026, *3-6. The record reflects that, upon learning the victim was coming to the hotel room, Petitioner put his .38 caliber revolver in his pants. Id. at *6. Once the victim arrived, Petitioner confronted her, grabbed her by the hair, slapped away the money she offered him in repayment, and struck her in the head with the butt of his gun. Id. The state appellate court also observed that the prior bad act was raised by defense counsel during Ross's cross-examination. Id. As Respondent points out, "[t]he defense elicited this detail to undermine the credibility of the witness who overheard the threat by impeaching her claim that she had reported the threat to police." Id. at 18 fn. 11 (citing 3RT 168-170, 4RT 404-405). In summary, Respondent argues that the state appellate court "reasonably found the evidence was neither inflammatory nor unduly prejudicial, highlighting that the defense had elicited much of the detail surrounding the specifics of [P]etitioner's prior threat." Dkt. No. 4-1 at 18. This Court again agrees, and finds that the state appellate court's rejection of Petitioner's evidentiary claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on this alleged due process violation, and his second claim is DENIED.
The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Case, Rule 11(a).
A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard, id. § 2253(c)(3). "Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Here, Petitioner has not made such a showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of appealability will be denied.
For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file.
