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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. VASSALLO, CIV. S-09-0665 LKK/DAD. (2014)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20140723951 Visitors: 18
Filed: Jul. 21, 2014
Latest Update: Jul. 21, 2014
Summary: ORDER LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, District Judge. The court has determined that this motion can be decided on the papers already submitted, and accordingly VACATES the hearing on this matter scheduled for July 28, 2014. On November 6, 2009, the Receiver for defendant Equity Investor Management and Training, Inc. ("EIMT"), instituted a summary proceeding against Michael Callahan, a non-party, seeking an order requiring Callahan to disgorge $2 million in defrauded investor funds. 1 See ECF NO. 17
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ORDER

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, District Judge.

The court has determined that this motion can be decided on the papers already submitted, and accordingly VACATES the hearing on this matter scheduled for July 28, 2014.

On November 6, 2009, the Receiver for defendant Equity Investor Management and Training, Inc. ("EIMT"), instituted a summary proceeding against Michael Callahan, a non-party, seeking an order requiring Callahan to disgorge $2 million in defrauded investor funds.1 See ECF NO. 171.

Callahan objected that there was an insufficient evidentiary basis for the order. The court accordingly referred the matter to a Magistrate Judge for an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary hearing was held on March 29-30, 2010. On July 21, 2010, the Magistrate Judge filed his Findings and Recommendations, concluding that Callahan should be held jointly and severally liable for the $2 million, and that an order of disgorgement should issue in that amount. See ECF No. 309.

On August 11, 2010, Callahan filed his objections to the Findings and Recommendations. See ECF No. 319. Callahan argued that (1) the court's own standard ordering disgorgement was not met, (2) the evidentiary hearing was not what this court ordered, (3) the hearing violated Callahan's Due Process rights, (4) there was no basis for joint and several liability, (5A) the Magistrate Judge's findings were unsupported by the evidence, (5B) the Magistrate Judge acted beyond the authority assigned him by this court, (6) there was no evidence that Callahan received $2 million, (7A) there was no basis for a finding of liability, (7B) the findings and/or the proceedings were procedurally incorrect, and (8) the Tucker declaration was improperly rejected. See ECF No. 319.

On September 29, 2010, this court filed its order which considered and rejected Callahan's objections. See ECF No. 347. The court adopted the findings and recommendations in full, found Callahan jointly and severally liable for the $2 million and ordered him to disgorge that amount. Id.

Callahan did not at that time seek reconsideration of, nor relief from, this court's order. Moreover, Callahan did not appeal the court's order, nor did he request the entry of a final judgment, if he believed the order was not otherwise appealable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (permitting entry of a final judgment as to one or more of multiple parties or claims). Now, nearly four years later, he seeks relief from the court's order.

Although Callahan, proceeding pro se, does not cite any rule or statute as the basis for his motion, his request is controlled by Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) & (c), governing requests for relief from final judgments, orders or proceedings. Rule 60(b) motions "must be made within a reasonable time." Rule 60(c)(1).2 The motion must also demonstrate the existence of "new or different facts or circumstances ... which did not exist or were not shown" at the time of the disgorgement order. E.D. Cal. R. 230(j); Brodheim v. Dickinson, 2014 WL 897084 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (Karlton, J.) ("The rule derives from the `law of the case' doctrine which provides that the decisions on legal issues made in a case `should be followed unless there is substantially different evidence, ... new controlling authority, or the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would result in injustice'") (quoting Handi Investment Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 653 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 1981)).

Callahan's current motion contains several arguments, all of which were, or years ago could have been, argued to the Magistrate Judge, included in Callahan's Objections filed with this court, or argued to this court on a timely motion for reconsideration. Callahan does claim that he has two pieces of "new evidence" that justify reconsideration. ECF No. 501 at 52-54.

First, Callahan points to the "new" Declaration of Matthew Tucker. See ECF No. 501 at 65-67. However, this declaration is nearly identical to the Tucker Declaration filed in support of Callahan's objections four years ago. See ECF No. 319 at 14-17. Callahan does not identify any of the differences between these declarations, nor explain why they justify reconsideration. The court's examination of the two does not reveal any new evidence justifying reconsideration.

Second, Callahan asserts that he now has evidence that Tucker received $1.875 million of the $2 million transferred from EIMT. However, the Magistrate Judge and this court were aware of this assertion. The Magistrate Judge found, and this court agreed, that even assuming the truth of the assertion, Callahan was a "joint tortfeasor" with Tucker, and therefore "jointly and severally" liable with Tucker for the entire $2 million, regardless of which of them physically received the money. See ECF No. 309 at ¶ 16.

There being no new evidence or other basis for reconsideration, Callahan's egregiously belated motion for reconsideration or relief from the 2010 order of this court (ECF No. 501), is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FootNotes


1. A non-party, known as a "nominal defendant" or "relief defendant," may be held liable for disgorgement of such funds, when he is possession of the funds and "has no legitimate claim" to them. See SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1998). Moreover, summary proceedings are authorized for such matters. See SEC v. Wencke, 783 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986).
2. If the basis for reconsideration is "mistake," "newly discovered evidence" or "fraud," the request must be made "no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." Rule 60(c)(1).
Source:  Leagle

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