NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BOREN, P.J.

Appellant Perry F. Caravello appeals from the trial court's denial of his third party claim, brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 720.110, by which Caravello sought the return of funds he held in joint bank accounts that were levied upon by a judgment creditor of his cousin. The trial court found that Caravello contributed all monies to the accounts, but held that Caravello exposed all funds to levy by the cousin's judgment creditor through adding his cousin's name to the accounts. Based on this holding, the trial court denied Caravello's third party claim.

We reverse. The trial court's emphasis on whether the levy was proper was misplaced. Caravello's third party claim was a proper method of seeking return of the levied funds, and the trial court's finding that Caravello contributed all funds to the subject accounts necessitated a finding that the accounts belonged to him. The judgment creditor could obtain no greater right in the bank accounts than that of its judgment debtor, the cousin, and Caravello's interest as the owner of the accounts was clearly superior to that of his nonowner cousin. Caravello's third party claim therefore should have been granted.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In February 2010, Banc of America Leasing & Capital, LLC, was granted judgment against Sferas Incorporated, previously doing business as Master Graphics Printing, and its principal Mark F. Sferas, in the amount of $80,707. Banc of America thereafter obtained a writ of execution and levied upon all deposit accounts in the name of Sferas at Comerica Bank in Woodland Hills, California. Three accounts, including one time deposit, were levied on March 25, 2010.

Shortly afterward, Caravello, acting in propria persona, filed a verified third party claim, in which he stated that the levied bank accounts were in his name and he was the complete and unequivocal owner of the levied funds. Caravello claimed that Sferas, his cousin, was not owner of any levied funds, that Sferas had never made deposits into or withdrawals from the bank accounts, and that Sferas had never transferred or acquired any funds from the accounts. The claim stated that Sferas had been jointly named on Caravello's accounts solely because Caravello planned that, in the event of death, Sferas would transfer the account funds to Caravello's daughter, a resident of Texas. Caravello filed a petition for hearing on his third party claim pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 720.110, 720.210, and 720.310, seeking a determination of the validity of his claim and the proper disposition of the account funds.

Apparently unable to obtain a regular hearing date for his third party claim prior to August 2010, Caravello filed an ex parte application on April 14, 2010, for an order shortening time, with a declaration made under penalty of perjury that substantially repeated the information contained in his verified third party claim. Banc of America opposed. The court's April 14, 2010 minute order stated that the application was granted, and that the "petition for hearing on third-party claim" was set for April 29, 2010. Confusion arose, as Banc of America thought that the ex parte hearing on the order shortening time was merely continued until April 29, 2010, not that the third party claim would be heard on that date. Nevertheless, Banc of America filed an opposition to Caravello's claim, arguing that Caravello had failed to submit competent, admissible evidence supporting his claim, particularly because he had attached no documentary evidence. Banc of America also argued that because Sferas was named on the accounts, he had dominion and control over them, and Banc of America's rights with respect to the accounts funds were superior to those of Caravello. Caravello filed a reply to Banc of America's opposition, expanding on the points he made in his initial third party claim.

At the April 29, 2010 hearing, the trial court stated that its minute order had been in error, and that only the ex parte application would be heard that day. The parties wished to have the third party claim heard immediately, however, and stipulated to a waiver of procedural irregularities. The court further requested that the parties stipulate that any appeal be taken directly from the statement of decision that would be issued after the hearing. The parties agreed, and tried the third party claim that day.

Caravello attempted to present evidence at the hearing by examining Sferas as well as himself. Objections to much of Caravello's direct examination were sustained. Caravello did manage to present some evidence that Sferas never made any deposits or withdrawals from the subject bank accounts, and that Sferas's name was placed on the accounts for the purpose of transmitting the funds to Caravello's daughter in the event of Caravello's death. There was also evidence presented that the subject bank accounts were under both Caravello's and Sferas's names, that Sferas's name was placed on the accounts in approximately July 2009, and that when the accounts were levied in March 2010, both Caravello's and Sferas's names were still on the accounts. The parties further stipulated that a total of $27,436.23 was in the three levied accounts.

The trial court issued a lengthy statement of decision on May 14, 2010, which, after recounting the procedural history, stated: "Indeed, Mr. Caravello was a credible witness. He testified directly and with conviction. The testimony received at trial establishes that the monies held in all three subject bank accounts were deposited by Mr. Caravello without any contribution thereto by Mr. Sferas." Nevertheless, the court found that the ultimate issue to be decided was "whether applicable California law allowed [Banc of America] to levy against the subject bank account regardless of notice of Caravello's claim . . . ." The court found that "once Mr. Caravello added the name of Mr. Sferas to the subject bank account, Mr. Caravello exposed all of the funds contained therein to any judgment creditor of Mr. Sferas." The court held that Banc of America's judgment was superior to Mr. Caravello's claim to the account funds, and concluded by finding that the levy was valid under applicable California law and therefore that Caravello's claim could only be denied. Thereafter, the court entered judgment in favor of Banc of America denying Caravello's third party claim.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Caravello argues that he proved the funds in the levied bank accounts were entirely his and that the trial court thus erred by denying his third party claim. Banc of America contends that the levy on the accounts was proper, that Caravello failed to meet his evidentiary burden of proof in making his third party claim, and that the trial court's ultimate decision should not be disturbed. We find that the trial court's holding that the account funds were contributed only by Caravello was supported by substantial evidence, but the trial court then erred by denying Caravello's third party claim. Accordingly, we reverse.

I. The Trial Court's Determination that the Account Funds Came Solely from Caravello Was Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Although much of the evidence that Caravello attempted to present in support of his third party claim was excluded, some admissible evidence was presented and considered by the trial court. In its statement of decision, the trial court held that the monies in all three subject bank accounts were deposited by Caravello without any contribution by Sferas.

The Court of Appeal examines a trier of fact's resolution of disputed factual questions under a substantial evidence standard of review. (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429.) "Substantial" refers to the quality, not the quantity, of evidence. (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.) It is not synonymous with "any" evidence, but rather "must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value." (Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1203-1204, quoting Estate of Teed (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644.) The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence. (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631.) Further, we defer to the trier of fact on judging the credibility of witnesses. (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968; Oldham v. Kizer (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1065.)

The trial court's determination that all funds in the subject accounts were contributed by Caravello was supported by substantial evidence.1 The trial court correctly noted that it could not apply evidentiary and procedural rules to Caravello in a more indulgent manner simply because he appeared in propria persona (Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1056), and correctly excluded much of the evidence that Caravello sought to introduce. Despite this, admissible evidence was presented that supported the conclusion that Caravello alone contributed the money to the bank accounts, and that Sferas made no withdrawals. The trial court was in an optimal position to judge the credibility of Caravello and Sferas, and Sferas testified that he never contributed any amounts to the bank accounts and that his name was on the accounts solely so he could provide the account funds to Caravello's daughter if Caravello died. Furthermore, the court record included written statements made under penalty of perjury by Caravello, which also discussed the funds in the bank accounts, and supported the conclusion that all funds were deposited by Caravello. No evidence was presented showing that Sferas or anyone other than Caravello had contributed the funds to the accounts. We therefore will not overturn the trial court's determination of this factual matter.

II. Caravello's Third Party Claim Should Have Been Granted.

1. The emphasis on the validity of the levy was misplaced.

The trial court's statement of decision focused on whether Banc of America properly levied on the subject accounts. The trial court should have concentrated instead on whether, following the levy, Caravello successfully proved ownership of the subject funds and thereby met his burden on his third party claim. The court effectively found that Caravello proved ownership, but denied his third party claim anyway. We review this issue of law de novo. (See Pou Chen Corp. v. MTS Products (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 188, 192.)

Where personal property has been levied upon under a writ of execution, a third party who claims ownership of or the right to possess the property may make a third party claim, where the interest claimed is superior to the creditor's lien on the property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 720.110, subd. (b).) The third party bears the burden of proving the interest by a preponderance of the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 720.360; Whitehouse v. Six Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 527, 530 (Whitehouse).) It can meet this burden by introducing evidence showing that it owns the subject property. (Whitehouse, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 535; ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Tech Power, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1558 (ITT Commercial Finance).) The burden then shifts to the creditor to establish that the third party's interest is invalid or inferior to that of the creditor. (Whitehouse, at p. 535; ITT Commercial Finance, at pp. 1558-1559.)

In the trial court proceedings, Banc of America argued that it had a right to levy on the bank accounts pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 700.160, subdivision (b)(1), which states, "A court order is not required as a prerequisite to levy on a deposit account or safe-deposit box standing in the name of . . . [t]he judgment debtor, whether alone or together with third persons." The trial court agreed, and found this issue dispositive.

The third party claim process, however, is separate from the right to levy. (Peck v. Hagen (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 602, 607.) After a levy occurs, a third party may pursue a claim pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 720.100 et seq. (Peck v. Hagen, at p. 607; Code Civ. Proc., § 720.110, subd. (b) [Third party may make a third party claim "[w]here personal property has been levied upon"].) Contrary to the trial court's ruling, whether Banc of America properly levied on the bank accounts was not the ultimate issue at all. The levy was merely a fact giving rise to Caravello's third party claim. While the trial court did not err in finding that the levy was procedurally proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 700.160, subdivision (b)(1), this finding was largely irrelevant to the issue of whether Caravello's claim was meritorious.

2. Caravello met his burden of proof on the third party claim.

Caravello could meet his burden of proof by showing ownership of the funds in the levied account. (Code Civ. Proc., § 720.110, subd. (b).) It would then be up to Banc of America to rebut Caravello's claim of ownership or show that it had a superior interest. (Whitehouse, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 535; ITT Commercial Finance, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1558-1559.) The trial court found that the funds in the account were contributed solely by Caravello. Since Banc of America did not rebut this holding, or otherwise show it had a superior interest, Caravello's third party claim should have been granted.

Parties' interests in multiple party bank accounts generally are governed by the California Multiple-Party Accounts Law (CAMPAL), Probate Code section 5100 et seq. (Fin. Code, § 852; Lee v. Yang (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 481, 487-489; Evangelho v. Presoto (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 615, 622.) Multiple party accounts include joint accounts. (Prob. Code, § 5132, subd. (a).) "`Joint account' means an account payable on request to one or more of two or more parties whether or not mention is made of any right of survivorship." (Prob. Code, § 5130.) Checking accounts, savings accounts, and certificates of deposit all come within the CAMPAL definition of "account." (Prob. Code, § 5122, subd. (a).) The trial court recognized that the subject accounts were joint accounts, but did not analyze the interests in the accounts under the CAMPAL rules.

By applying the CAMPAL rules, the trial court would have determined that Caravello proved ownership of the accounts. Probate Code section 5301, subdivision (a), provides, "An account belongs, during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent."2 The Law Revision Commission's comments to section 5301 note how under former law, "if the joint account provided for rights of survivorship, the account was presumed to be a joint tenancy and each joint tenant was presumed to have an equal interest in the account. Wallace v. Riley, 23 Cal.App.2d 654, 667 (1937)." (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 53 West's Ann. Prob. Code (2009 ed.) foll. § 5301, p. 58.) Section 5301 changed that law. (Ibid.) Therefore, by ruling that "the monies held in all three subject bank accounts were deposited by Mr. Caravello without any contribution thereto by Mr. Sferas," the trial court made the finding necessary for determining the subject accounts belonged to Caravello.3

The third party claim consequently should have been granted. Section 5301's rules regarding beneficial ownership are relevant to controversies between parties to an account "and their creditors and other successors." (Prob. Code, § 5201, subd. (a).) Furthermore, and critical here, "a judgment or levy reaches only the interest of the debtor in the property because a judgment creditor can acquire no greater right in the property levied upon than that of its judgment debtor." (Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Carolina Lanes, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1329.) Thus, Banc of America's levy could provide it with no greater rights to the funds than the rights held by Sferas. Since Sferas had not contributed to the accounts, he had no interest in them, and therefore Banc of America, as Sferas's creditor, had no interest in the levied property.4 Accordingly, Caravello's interest in the account funds was necessarily superior to Banc of America's.

Banc of America argues that, as a judgment lien creditor, it had priority over any possible rights of Caravello pursuant to Orix Financial Services, Inc. v. Kovacs (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 242, 250-251 (Orix). The Orix court found that an unsecured judgment creditor, who levied on funds in the debtor's bank account (which was not a joint account), had rights superior to those of a third party secured creditor. (Ibid.) This decision was based on California Uniform Commercial Code section 9332, subdivision (b), which states, "A transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party."

This rule is not controlling here, however. Orix did not involve a joint account to which the judgment debtor had not contributed any funds.5 Orix also differed in that the plaintiff, which brought claims against the judgment creditor for unjust enrichment and imposition of constructive trust, was a third party secured creditor, not an owner of the account. (167 Cal.App.4th at p. 245-246.) We find that CAMPAL is more specifically applicable to the unusual facts present in this case. (See Zengen, Inc. v. Comerica Bank (2007) 41 Cal.4th 239, 251; Steinman v. Malamed (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1561 [noting that the California Uniform Commercial Code does not automatically displace other legal principles and code sections, and that other principles of law will apply unless displaced].) As explained, Banc of America's levy could reach only Sferas's interest in the bank accounts, and Sferas did not have ownership of the accounts. Caravello showed the accounts belonged solely to him. Caravello's interest as the owner of the accounts was clearly superior to that of a nonowner, Sferas, and Sferas's judgment creditor, regardless of the levy. The fact that the accounts were levied did not eliminate Caravello's ownership.

For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court's denial of Caravello's third party claim was in error and must be reversed.

DISPOSITION

The superior court's May 28, 2010 judgment on third party claim is reversed. The superior court is directed to enter a new and different judgment granting the third party claim pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 720.390. Appellant shall recover his costs on appeal.

We concur:

DOI TODD, J.

ASHMANN-GERST, J.