Filed: Dec. 14, 2012
Latest Update: Dec. 14, 2012
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Daniel S. McConkie, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Jose Aguilar-Madriz, Preciliano Martinez, Esq., counsel for defendant Ronald Reeves, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Artemio Aguilar, Dan F. Koukol, Esq., counsel for defendant Jua
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Daniel S. McConkie, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Jose Aguilar-Madriz, Preciliano Martinez, Esq., counsel for defendant Ronald Reeves, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Artemio Aguilar, Dan F. Koukol, Esq., counsel for defendant Juan..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Daniel S. McConkie, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Jose Aguilar-Madriz, Preciliano Martinez, Esq., counsel for defendant Ronald Reeves, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Artemio Aguilar, Dan F. Koukol, Esq., counsel for defendant Juan Silva, Carl E. Larson, Esq., counsel for defendant Salvador Silver, J Toney, Esq., counsel for defendant David Martinelli, Michael B. Bigelow, Esq., counsel for defendant Gregorio Zapien-Mendoza, Scott N. Cameron, Esq., counsel for defendant Gabino Cuevas-Hernandez, Hayes H. Gable, III, Esq., counsel for defendant Moses Puledo Aguilar, Clemente M. Jimenez, Esq., counsel for defendant German Alvarez Ortega, Michael D. Long, Esq., counsel for defendant Adam Gutierrez Cruz, Erin J. Radekin, Esq., counsel for defendant Manuel Madriz Sanchez, Kyle R. Knapp, Esq., and counsel for defendant Pedro Aguilar Aguilar, Olaf W. Hedberg, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on December 14, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until February 8, 2013 and to exclude time between December 14, 2012 and February 8, 2013 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and continue negotiations with prosecution in an effort to reach a resolution.
b. Currently the discovery in this case includes 129 pages and two video DVDs.
c. Counsel for the defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of December 14, 2012 to February 8, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
