ROBERT E. WIER, District Judge.
Sheila Miller appeals the Acting Commissioner's denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income (collectively, "benefits"). The parties filed dueling summary judgment motions. The Court
Miller is currently 48 years old. See, e.g., R. at 84. She alleges disability beginning on October 4, 2012. See R. at 15, 84, 101, 316, 333. Miller applied for benefits in early 2014. R. at 15, 84, 101, 316. The SSA denied her claims initially on July 16, 2014, see R. at 143-51, and upon reconsideration on October 14, 2014. See R. at 161-67. Miller then filed a written request for a hearing on October 20, 2014. R. at 173-74. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Ronald M. Kayser held hearings on the applications on February 1, 2016, and July 11, 2016. R. at 54-81, 1554-86. At the hearings, attorney Matthew Shupe
The ALJ made several particular findings in the required sequence. He determined that Miller did not engage in substantial gainful activity from October 4, 2012, through October 3, 2016, the date of decision. R. at 18. The ALJ next determined that Miller has seven severe impairments. Id. However, ALJ Kayser then found that Miller did "not have an impairment or combination of impairments that [met] or medically equal[ed] the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1." R. at 19. The ALJ further made a detailed residual functional capacity (RFC) finding. R. at 21-34. Although ALJ Kayser found Miller "unable to perform any past relevant work," the ALJ determined that "there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Miller] can perform[.]" R. at 34-36. Based on all these considerations, the ALJ ruled that Miller was not "under a disability . . . from October 4, 2012, through the date of th[e] decision," October 3, 2016. R. at 36. Unsatisfied with the result of the SSA's administrative process, Miller turned to federal court for review.
The Court has carefully read the ALJ's decision, the transcripts of the administrative hearings, and the entire administrative record (which, similar to the ALJ's remarks, is "one of the biggest files" the Court has encountered, R. at 56, spanning nearly 1,600 pages). The Court has scrutinized the record, while primarily focusing on the portions to which the parties specifically cite. See DE #11 (General Order 13-7), at ¶ 3(c) ("The parties shall provide the Court with specific page citations to the administrative record to support their arguments. The Court will not undertake an open-ended review of the entirety of the administrative record to find support for the parties' arguments.").
Judicial review of the ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits is a limited and deferential inquiry into whether substantial evidence supports the denial's factual decisions and whether the ALJ properly applied relevant legal standards. Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009); Jordan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2008); Brainard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (providing and defining judicial review for Social Security claims) ("The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]").
Substantial evidence means "more than a scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004). The Court does not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or assess questions of credibility. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007). Similarly, the Court does not reverse findings of the Acting Commissioner or the ALJ merely because the record contains evidence—even substantial evidence—to support a different conclusion. Warner, 375 F.3d at 390. Rather, the Court must affirm the ALJ's decision if substantial evidence supports it, even if the Court might have decided the case differently if in the ALJ's shoes. See Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005); Her v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999).
The ALJ, when determining disability, conducts a five-step analysis. See Preslar v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). At Step 1, the ALJ considers whether the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity. See Preslar, 14 F.3d at 1110. At Step 2, the ALJ determines whether one or more of the claimant's impairments are severe. Id. At Step 3, the ALJ analyzes whether the claimant's impairments, alone or in combination, meet or equal an entry in the Listing of Impairments. Id. At Step 4, the ALJ determines RFC and whether the claimant can perform past relevant work. Id. The inquiry at this stage, as to past work, is whether the claimant can still perform that type of work, not necessarily the specific past job. See Studaway v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 815 F.2d 1074, 1076 (6th Cir. 1987). Finally, at Step 5, when the burden shifts to the Acting Commissioner, if the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the ALJ determines whether significant numbers of other jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform, given the applicable RFC. See Preslar, 14 F.3d at 1110; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If the ALJ determines at any step that the claimant is not disabled, the analysis ends at that step. Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 969 (6th Cir. 1985); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
When reviewing the ALJ's application of the legal standards, the Court gives deference to his interpretation of the law and reviews the decision for reasonableness and consistency with governing statutes. Whiteside v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 834 F.2d 1289, 1292 (6th Cir. 1987). In a Social Security benefits case, the agency's construction of the statute should be followed "unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong." Merz v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 969 F.2d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Whiteside, 834 F.2d at 1292).
Miller's overarching argument is that the ALJ "erred when he failed to evaluate the numerous opinions of record regarding Plaintiff's impairments and limitations in accordance with Agency policy and Sixth Circuit precedent." DE #19-1, at 3. Miller "assemble[s]" the alleged errors "into two categories," which the Court considers in turn.
The Court can quickly dispatch Miller's argument concerning this category.
Claimant contends that "the ALJ clearly erred by failing to even mention" proof from Dr. Theophilus Arthur-Mensah and "a determination by the medical review team for Kentucky Works." DE #19-1, at 4-7 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 6 (phrasing argument as one targeting an alleged failure to "at least acknowledge probative evidence of record," which the ALJ allegedly "clearly did not do").
This argument—simply that the ALJ erred by not mentioning the record proof from Dr. Arthur-Mensah and Kentucky Works—is factually wrong. Judge Kayser did mention and acknowledge this evidence. See R. at 31 ("In October 2014, the claimant began receiving mental health treatment from Theophilus, Arthur Mensah, M.D., and his staff." (all as in original)); R. at 33-34 ("In this case, multiple medical sources and even other government agencies opined that the claimant was effectively disabled. . . . The [ALJ] considered these opinions and gave them little weight." (citing Exhibits 29F (Arthur-Mensah),
Miller's second category of alleged error concerns evidentiary treatment where Claimant acknowledges ALJ consideration but contends such assessment did not accord with applicable law. See DE #19-1, at 7-23. Miller specifically targets Judge Kayser's treatment of the proof from five medical providers: Drs. Jose E. Mendoza, Erin D. Stephens, Daniel O. Lee, James C. Owen, and Arthur-Mensah. Id. at 8-12.
In "deciding the weight [to] give to any medical opinion" in this context, the ALJ "consider[s]" several factors. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(c). "The ALJ need not perform an exhaustive, step-by-step analysis of each factor; []he need only provide `good reasons' for both h[is] decision not to afford the physician's opinion controlling weight and for h[is] ultimate weighing of the opinion." Biestek v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 880 F.3d 778, 785 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. granted on unrelated sub-issue sub nom. Biestek v. Berryhill, 138 S.Ct. 2677 (2018);
Miller first makes an abbreviated and confusing argument concerning a full-time work requirement. See DE #19-1, at 12-13. This argument appears to be predicated on the Court agreeing with Claimant's substantive record analysis, to which the Court soon turns. See id. (conditioning argument on whether ("if") the "opinions of the treating and examining sources" Miller emphasizes are "credited").
Turning to Miller's specific complaints concerning the ALJ's record evaluation, Claimant "[b]egin[s] first with the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Lee's opinion regarding Plaintiff's migraine headaches[.]" DE #19-1, at 16-17. The ALJ reasoned:
R.at 28-29 (all as in original).
Judge Kayser's treatment here easily passes muster under substantial-evidence review. He stated good reasons—quoted above—to give Lee's evaluation the afforded weight. See also R. at 27 (citing exhibits). Miller's sole contrary argument concerns the "subjective complaint" reasoning above. See DE #19-1, at 16. That was, as an initial matter, but one of the good reasons the ALJ gave for discounting. Regardless, substantial record evidence—which is, remember, less than a preponderance—supports the ALJ's assessment. See R. at 1425 (Lee noting: "no vomiting"; "no paresthesias, no vertigo and no weakness"; "good compliance with treatment, good tolerance of treatment"); R. at 1425-26 (normal survey of systems); R. at 1427 (physical exam as described by ALJ); R. at 1431 (Lee explicitly relying on Miller's subjective allegations: "Patient . . . reported"; "She report"; "Reported that"; "She'll report"; "She finds"); R. at 1433 (physical exam as described by ALJ). "A doctor's report that merely repeats the patient's assertions is not credible, objective medical evidence and is not entitled to the protections of the good reasons rule." Mitchell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 330 F. App'x 563, 569 (6th Cir. 2009)).
"Turning to Dr. Owen's opinion," Miller attacks the ALJ's assessment of internal inconsistencies in the consultative examiner's findings. DE #19-1, at 17-18. The ALJ explained that he
R. at 29 (all as in original); see also R. at 24-25 (also discussing Owen).
As above, this explanation undoubtedly supplies the "good reasons" warranting a discount of Owen's opinions. Plaintiff's disagreement with this evaluation centers on the ALJ's assessment that Owen's objective findings were inconsistent with his central opinions.
Claimant next challenges Judge Kayser's evaluation of Drs. Mendoza and Stephens. DE #19-1, at 19-20. These two providers feature prominently throughout the reasoning undergirding the ALJ's RFC determination. See R. at 25-26 (Mendoza), 26 (Stephens), 26-27 (Mendoza), 28-29 (Mendoza), 29 (Stephens), 30 (Mendoza), 32 (Mendoza). The Court declines to reprint every word of the ALJ's thorough, multifaceted analysis concerning these doctors.
ALJ Kayser stated good reasons for assigning the afforded weight to each provider's opinions. Miller's contrary argument is quite limited—that the ALJ did not properly evaluate record (in)consistencies. See DE #19-1, at 19.
Finally, Miller trains her legal fire on ALJ Kayser's assessment of Dr. Linda Hall's opinion. DE #19-1, at 20-21. The ALJ "gave significant weight to the opinions of" Dr. Hall, a "state agency medical consultant." R. at 30. Providing numerous specific examples, the ALJ determined that Hall "adequately accounted for the claimant's impairments." Id. Miller argues that Hall, given the comparative timing, could not have reviewed Dr. Owen's opinion, and contends that this sequencing renders reliance on Hall's opinion unsound—that "it is simply impossible to tell what Dr. Hall would have opined had she reviewed the significant amount of evidence entered into the record subsequent to her review[.]" DE #19-1, at 20 (emphases removed).
An ALJ is "entitled to assign significant weight to the opinions from . . . medical consultants despite the fact that they did not review all of the medical records." Carter v. Astrue, 886 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1111 (N.D. Iowa 2012); accord Cook v. Astrue, 629 F.Supp.2d 925, 932-33 (W.D. Mo. 2009) (refusing to adopt "a per se rule that failure to send medical records to be reviewed . . . automatically results in the opinion of that doctor not being entitled to substantial weight").
Here, of course, the ALJ himself thoroughly considered and accounted for Owen's post-Hall evaluation and still found Miller not to be disabled. See Ealy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 513 (6th Cir. 2010) ("Even if Dr. Hernandez's [(a state-agency consultant's)] RFC was completed without knowledge of [certain medical] issues, however, the record reflects that the ALJ considered them."). The ALJ came to states that she is doing really well at this time. She reports that she has been able to go to 3 stores since last visit, which is huge for her!"). that conclusion via a comprehensive review of all proof, finding that Hall "adequately accounted for [Miller's] impairments." R. at 30. Miller does not identify any specific reason Hall reviewing Owen's later opinion would have changed Hall's own take— Claimant's argument is merely a procedural, sequencing one.
The argument fails. When the ALJ explicitly considers the disputed piece of medical proof (here, Owen's opinion) and Claimant identifies no specific reason that the proof would have changed an earlier evaluation's conclusions, there is no error in assigning significant weight to the consultant's prior conclusions. Ealy, 594 F.3d at 513; McGrew v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 343 F. App'x 26, 32 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming decision where "state agency physicians' opinions . . . did not account for changes in [the claimant's] medical condition" but where the ALJ "considered the medical examinations that occurred after [the] assessment . . . and took into account any relevant changes in [the claimant's] condition").
Further, the Court has independently reviewed the Hall and Owen evaluations. They, indeed, appear essentially consistent with one another. Compare R. at 120-40, with R. at 1370-72. For example, Hall characterized Miller as being able to occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds (and frequently carry/lift 10); Owen, for his part, agreed that Miller was not "preclude[d]" from lifting and carrying items. The Court certainly perceives nothing so obviously inconsistent between the doctors' evaluations to support a notion that Hall being able to review Owen's evaluation would have altered her own opinion. [Further, the ALJ ordered Owen's opinion only for a limited purpose—it was "a neurological and an orthopedic consult examination to see what your condition of your hands and . . . this vertigo stuff is[.]" R. at 1583. Hall reviewed plenteous medical records in rendering her opinion, R. at 121-29 (listing items), and Miller's physical and vertiginous concerns were no medical secret.] The ALJ, confronting multiple opinions and assessments from a variety of care providers, measured the overall proof in a reasonable manner, rationally accounted for the Hall and Owen reports, and rested his conclusions on substantial evidence.
As this discussion reveals, ALJ Kayser displayed easy currency with a truly voluminous, medical-record-heavy case and expertly applied the SSA's sequential disability determination process to reach a defensible administrative result as to Ms. Miller. He comprehensively reviewed the medical proof, resulting in a 14-page, single-spaced RFC assessment (and 22-page overall disability determination)—the most thorough such evaluation the Court has seen. While the Court has focused this Opinion on Ms. Miller's particular complaints, the Court notes that the record is replete with substantial material supporting the ALJ's conclusions, as he capably documented and the Acting Commissioner contends. See, e.g., R. at 21-34 (citing exhibits throughout), 57-73, 93-100, 133-40, 643-46, 671-74, 703-05, 767-71, 869-72, 933-40, 982-85, 1010-11, 1035-36, 1047, 1054-55, 1105, 1113-15, 1122-23, 1170-78, 1188-90, 1264, 1271, 1274-77, 1295-1300; other pages cited supra. As Judge Kayser summarized, he formulated an RFC "supported by the medical evidence, the medical opinions of the state agency medical consultants, the medical opinions of Dr. Anderson, and the evidence presented regarding the claimant's treatment history." R. at 34.
To be sure, as in many SSA appeals, portions of the record perhaps also support a pro-disability conclusion. This, in many ways, though, betrays Miller's plain and fundamental misapprehension of the Court's role in this inquiry. Especially confronting an administrative decision of this volume and quality of reasoning, it is simply not for this Court to step into the ALJ's shoes, try the case de novo, or re-weigh the evidence to come to an independent determination of Miller's disability status. Bass, 499 F.3d at 509; Longworth, 402 F.3d at 595; Warner, 375 F.3d at 390. Rather, the Court affirms the administrative decision as long as substantial evidence supports it, even if substantial evidence also could support a contrary finding. Id. Here, engaging in such deferential review, the Court affirms Judge Kayser's thorough, well-reasoned, factually supported, and legally sound decision to deny benefits.
For the reasons stated, the Court
Further, the Court, in this Opinion, applies the regulations in effect at the time of the administrative decision, as Miller seeks. See DE #19-1, at 5 n.1. Acting Commissioner Berryhill does not request otherwise. The Court does, though, disagree with (although it does not ultimately matter, given the Court's treatment of the issues) Miller's call for "plenary" judicial review "with respect to all questions of law." Id. at 3. Neither authority she cites established such a standard. See Whiteside, 834 F.2d at 1292 ("[T]he scope of this court's review is not, as both parties have instructed the court, `de novo.'" (emphasis in original)).
Stephens, for example, was of the contrary, obvious outlier view that Miller could work zero—literally "none"—hours per day, could not stand or sit for more than 15 minutes, and was altogether precluded from lifting objects. R. at 1328. [Mendoza's view was similar. R. at 1533-34.] Judge Kayser reasonably assessed the entire record and discounted such extreme opinions—expert judgment other record nuances vindicate. Compare, e.g., R. at 1543-45 (Dec. 2014, stating drastically: "She is basically nonfunctional."), with, e.g., R. at 1507 (June 2016, showing marked improvement: "Pt.
If Miller intended this argument to be broader than Owen-centric, she makes no other reasoned contention, forfeiting the possible claims. McPherson, 125 F.3d at 995-96.