NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COFFEE, J.

Petitioner, Monique H. (Mother), seeks extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order bypassing reunification services and setting the matter for a permanent plan hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.)1 We deny her petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother has three minor children, including her infant daughter, Serenity H. (S.H.), Nathan H. and Trina H. S.H. has been in protective custody since her birth. Nathan and Trina are under guardianship with relatives.

On September 13, 2011, the Ventura County Human Services Agency (HSA) filed a petition with the juvenile court, for failure to protect and inability to support S.H., and alleging that she was at substantial risk because of her prenatal exposure to methadone, opiates and methamphetamine. (§ 300, subds. (b) & (g).) The September 14, 2011 detention report stated that father's identity was unknown.

Mother has a lengthy history of child welfare referrals and substance abuse. The child welfare referrals occurred in 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2009, and 2011.

Upon learning that she was pregnant with Nathan and Trina, Mother stopped using heroin and participated in methadone programs. She does not have custody of Nathan or Trina. Nathan remained with his stepmother after his father died. His stepmother and his older half-brother are his guardians. Maternal grandmother is Trina's guardian. Mother was already using methadone when she learned of her pregnancy with S.H. On June 17, 2011, while pregnant with S.H., she tested positive for opiates and amphetamine.

Mother's substance abuse began when she was 12 years old, and used alcohol and marijuana. By the age of 13 or 14, she started using crystal "meth." Since the age of 18, she has used heroin. She has been "off and on" methadone for years. Her daughter, Trina, displayed withdrawal symptoms at birth and was treated with methadone. Mother participated in several treatment programs, including Prototypes, Anacapa, and Miracles for Moms. Mother also has a long criminal history that began in 1996, and continued at least through 2009. It includes multiple drug offense convictions.

In its October 5, 2011 report prepared for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, HSA recommended that the juvenile court bypass reunification services for Mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). That subdivision states in relevant part that reunification services need not be provided to a parent when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that "the parent . . . has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and has resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the petition that brought that child to the court's attention, or has failed or refused to comply with a program of drug or alcohol treatment described in the case plan . . . on at least two prior occasions, even though the programs identified were available and accessible."

The October 5, 2011 jurisdiction and disposition report includes Mother's statement that all of her treatment was voluntary. In that report, HSA stated that a court ordered Mother to participate in Prototypes, and that she had violated probation by failing to comply with treatment.

Mother contested the recommendation to bypass reunification services. The court set the matter for a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on November 3, 2011. Mother then testified regarding her participation in various programs since the filing of this petition. She attended Alcoholic Anonymous and Narcotic Anonymous meetings, and participated in the Lighthouse shelter and treatment program which offered anger management, parenting, counseling, and bible studies. She testified that she still used methadone but denied that she has used any illegal substances since S.H. was born. During the hearing, Mother explained that she had changed her attitude about drug treatment because she "now" understood its prior impact on her children's lives. She also told the court that she was motivated to reunify with S.H., her infant, six-year-old Trina and ten-year-old Nathan.

In its October 31, 2011 memorandum, HSA reported that S.H. was receiving treatment for pneumonia, and that she was still taking .21 milligrams of methadone. It indicated that Mother had not yet entered the Lighthouse inpatient program. She had obtained home doses, and was taking 55 milligrams of methadone daily. When the social worker asked why she had not reduced her doses, Mother responded, "With everything going on, I don't want to mess up."

After hearing the evidence, the juvenile court made the following comments: "I did struggle a little bit because . . . the treatment that was ordered happened . . . over five years ago. It also wasn't a case where there was a lot of corroborating information to mom's admission about more recent drug use. And she's never had a dependency. . . . But the part that convinces me that offering services today would not be in the best interest of this child is the fact that when you look at her criminal history, . . . [s]he has, at least, three convictions since '05, and it appears within the last three years or certainly two of them [were]. . . . And if you're being convicted for drug use because you got caught on one occasion, that tells me there's probably more drug use going on than the circumstances under which you [were] convicted that one . . . time. [¶] And clearly mom has a very extensive history of drug use. She said all the right words today, but her actions in her life have not met those words yet, and you can't wait until you give birth to a child to say, okay. Now I get it. You have to have started that before I think in order to really demonstrate that your actions are as loud as your words. [¶] So while . . . mom seems to know the words now, and seems to be, again, addressing her drug use, I also did consider the fact that she did participate [as well] in apparently non Court-ordered programs in the past. Those didn't work. She didn't stop.2 She continued to use. She used while she was pregnant in this case, and it wasn't until after the baby was born that she seemed to want to deal with this. That's too late. You can't do that. You have to do it ahead of time. You can't say, `Oh, now I get it. You've taken my child from me, now I'm going to try to deal with this.' Not when you have this kind of history, not when you have children that are not in your care for the same reasons, even though they weren't dependencies."

The juvenile court then found that the allegations of the petition were true, ordered that services for Mother be bypassed under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), and set an interim placement hearing for December 6, 2011. Mother filed her petition with this court on December 1, 2011.

DISCUSSION

HSA asks that we dismiss Mother's petition because it does not comply with the technical requirements of rule 8.452 (a) and (b) of the California Rules of Court. We will instead consider her petition on the merits.

Mother asks that we direct the juvenile court to order reunification services for her and return custody of S.H. to her. We decline her request. It would not be in the best interest of S.H. to order reunification services for Mother or delay the permanency planning hearing.

"Section 361.5, subdivision (a) explicitly directs the juvenile court to order child welfare services for the minor and the minor's parents whenever a minor is removed from a parent's custody. This requirement implements the law's strong preference for maintaining the family relationship if at all possible. [Citation.] However, there are limited exceptions to this rule listed in subdivision (b). Although these exceptions are narrow in scope and subject to proof by the enhanced `clear and convincing' standard, they demonstrate a legislative determination that in certain situations, attempts to facilitate reunification do not serve and protect the child's interests." (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.) ". . . `[A] parent [who has been] shown to be a chronic abuser of drugs who has resisted prior treatment for drug abuse' [citation] has a high risk of reabuse.' [Citation.] This risk places the parent's interest in reunifying with her child directly at odds with the child's compelling right to a `placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1228.)

In Laura B. v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 776, 780 (Laura B.), the juvenile court declined to order reunification services pursuant to former section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12) based on her history of failed substance abuse rehabilitation. (The pertinent language of former § 361.5, subd. (b)(12) tracks that in current § 361.5, subd. (13).) As in Mother's case, the agency filed a petition shortly after Laura's infant was born. Laura filed a writ claiming that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it declined to order reunification services because, she argued, there was insufficient evidence she resisted available treatment programs in the three years immediately preceding the filing of the dependency petition (the relevant period). (Id. at pp. 777-779.)

In Laura B., the reviewing court concluded that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12) authorized the juvenile court to bypass reunification services for her based upon her resistance to treatment during the relevant period. It reasoned that subdivision (b)(12) "create[d] two bases for denying services: either (1) where the parent with a significant substance abuse problem has resisted treatment of that problem during the three years prior to the filing of the petition; or (2) where the parent has twice previously been provided and failed or refused to take advantage of available rehabilitation services while under the supervision of the juvenile court. The first provision does not require proof that the prior treatment occur during the three-year period; it requires proof that the resistance to such treatment occur." (Laura B., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 779-780.) Citing its decision in Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 73, the court noted that "the concept of resistance does not require opposition to treatment by direct action. [Citations.]" (Laura B., supra, at p. 780.) Because the evidence showed that after Laura B. completed treatment, she "ultimately ended up resuming her drug abuse" (ibid.), the court concluded that the evidence satisfied the requirements of section 361.5, subd. (b)(12), even though there was no proof she attended any formal rehabilitation programs during the three years prior to her infant's birth. (Ibid.)

Here, as in Laura B., Mother's court-ordered treatment fell outside the relevant three-year period preceding the filing of the petition. Like Laura B., Mother ended up resuming her drug abuse in the relevant three-year period. (Laura B., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 780.) Contrary to Mother's claim that she was not ordered to participate in treatment, the relevant superior court file indicates that much of her treatment was court ordered. We take judicial notice of the superior court file in People v. Monique H. (Ventura County Super. Ct. Case No. 0171299) in which Mother pled no contest to a drug offense. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d) & 459.) In that case, the court ordered her to participate in a court-approved drug treatment program on August 25, 2004, as a condition of probation. She admitted a probation violation based on her failure to report to the assessment center as ordered. On March 22, 2005, she admitted another failure to report to the assessment center as ordered. On April 11, 2005, the court treated her admission to failure to appear for a reassessment as "strike number 3" against her Proposition 36 probation grant. Mother failed to appear and provide proof of testing as required on May 23, 2005. On May 27, 2005, the court reinstated her probation and ordered her to participate in Prototypes residential drug treatment program for 90 days. On June 22, 2005, Mother admitted another probation violation. The court then revoked, reinstated and modified her probation, subject to her service of 120 days in county jail.

Following her release from custody, Mother committed and admitted additional probation violations in 2006 and 2007, based on her use or possession of drugs or paraphernalia. She was also convicted of crimes involving or related to substance abuse in 2008 and 2009. She tested positive for opiates and amphetamines on June 17, 2010, during her pregnancy with S.H.

Like the mother in Laura B., Mother falls within the section 361.5, subdivision (b) category of a chronic abuser of drugs who has resisted prior treatment. (That provision is in current subd. (b)(13), and was in former subd. (b)(12) at the time of the Laura B. decision, as indicated above.) Within the relevant three-year period, Mother's conduct demonstrated her resistance to eliminating the chronic use of drugs or alcohol which led to the need for juvenile court intervention to protect S.H. She thereby demonstrated that reunification services would be a fruitless attempt to protect S.H. because Mother's "past failure to benefit from treatment indicates that future treatment also would fail to change [her] destructive behavior." (Karen S. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1010; Laura B., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 780.)

DISPOSITION

We deny the petition.

GILBERT, P.J. and YEGAN, J., concurs.